







Chernov 'icons' (Chernov as the Virgin Mother, with Kolchak as 
the Child Jesus and Denikin and Iudenich as angels - drawn by 
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Viktor Mikhailovich Chernov (1873-1952) was a Russian revolutionary 
figure and chief theoretician of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. 
During the 1890s he led the Populist groups away from a program of 
anarchism, violence and despair into a closer harmony with the new 
problems facing Russia at the turn of the century - urbanisation, 
Marxism and industrialisation. He played a central role in shaping the 
political perceptions and tactics that came to be the hallmark of 'neo-
populism'. Chernov was instrumental in the coalescing of discordant 
Populist elements into the formation of the Socialist Revolutionary 
Party, and despite splits and seccessions he remained at its helm until its 
final demise around 1920. He was concerned with the overthrow of 
autocracy and socialist revolution. He persuaded his fellow par~y 
members to accept the existence of an industrial proletariat in Russia 
and of its revolutionary vanguard role, leading the peasantry as a mass 
strike force. He argued that the small peasant producers formed part of 
the working class with a similar interest in socialism to that of the 
proletariat. Chernov also succeeded in forming an agrarian policy 
which was summarised in the slogan 'the land belongs to no one and 
labour alone confers the right to use it'. 
iii. 
Virtually all that Chernov wrote between 1899 and 1917, during his long 
stay in Europe, broken only briefly in 1905, was designed to adapt 
Western political strategy to the peculiarities of the Russian situation. 
However, the endeavour, at times, suffered from obvious defects and 
weaknesses. He took an 'internationalist' stance to the First World War 
and returned to Russia in April, 1917, and in May, he joined Lvov's 
Provisional Government as Minister of Agriculture. Chernov proved 
to be an ineffectual and impotent minister, and he resigned from the 
Provisional Government in September, 1917. He was powerless to 
prevent the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. 
As leader of the majority party, he was elected president of the 
Constituent Assembly in January, 1918. Upon its dispersal by the -
Bolsheviks, he fought a propaganda war on 'two fronts' against the -
Bolsheviks and the reactionary forces, arguing that the SRs constituted a 
democratic 'third force'. Harassed by the Cheka, Chernov left Russia in 
1920, once again for a long and melancholy exile in the West. 
iv. 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND DATING 
The system of transliteration adopted here is that of the Library of 
Congress, with a few modifications; diacritical marks are om~tted, and 
spellings of the better-known proper names follow a more familiar 
usage: thus Trotsky not Trotskii, Aksentiev not Aksent'ev. Similarly 
with some names of non-Russian origin: Kronstadt is preferred to 
Kronshtadt. 
Where events in Russia occur before 1 February 1918, they are dated 
according to the Julian (Old Style) calendar then observed in Russia, 
which in the nineteenth century ran twelve days, and in the twentieth 
century ran thirteen days, behind the Gregorian (New Style) calendar 
in use in Western Europe. The change-over in Russia to the Western 
calendar occurred on the day following 31 January 1918 (O.S.), which 
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The Russian revolutionary movement in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, and indeed, up until 1917, faced an 
unprecedented task in the history of the socialist movement. It was 
the task of deciding what was the best socialist tactical policy in a 
country that was essentially economically backward and peasant 
based. The question was not solely centred on the most suitable 
organisational form for socialist transformation, but also centred ol'. 
the ideological debate between Populists and Marxists as to the 
future development of Russia. 
This study will focus on the problem of a socialist revolution in a 
backward agricultural land through the eyes of one of its leading 
participants, Viktor Mikhailovich Chernov. I have chosen Chernov 
because I believe that a ,study of his intellectual and political career 
will enlarge our understanding of 'modern populism', a 
movement within the Russian revolutionary tradition that from 
1901 to 1917 was the major rival of Russian Marxism. Although 
Chernov's name has long been associated with a theoretical 
tendency and a strategy of Russian revolutionary populism, he 
himself has never been presented fully as a thinker and actor in the 
movement. In this respect, he is possibly the most neglected of all 
the major figures in the history of the Russian revolutionary 
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movement. This neglect is perhaps due to a critical defect in an 
approach to history that seems to regard only the successful as 
meriting close examination. 
Moreover, from the early 1900s to 1917, it was by no means a 
foregone conclusion that Lenin would emerge as the major figure 
in the Russian revolutionary movement, let alone as the ruler of 
Russia. Chernov, Martov and Trotsky could equally have been 
heirs apparent to the throne. Indeed, there were occasions when it 
appeared that Chernov's Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs) would 
succeed in dominating the Russian revolutionary movement, and 
for much of 1917, they exercised far more influence over the 
working class and in the country at large than did the Bolsheviks or 
Mensheviks. In fact, it can be argued that SR policies and blunders 
in 1917 contributed as much to the Bolshevik triumph as did t~e 
actions of the Leninists themselves. 
No one played a more central role than Chernov in shaping the 
political perceptions and tactics that came to be the hallmark of 
'modern populism'. On all the questions that separated the SRs 
from the Social Democratic Parties - the organisation and structure 
of the party, the nature of the revolution against the autocracy, the 
, relationship between the working class and peasantry - Chernov's 
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views proved prophetic. He was the spokesman for the SR Party, 
and was the party's chief ideologist, and ·he established the 
theoretical underpinnings of many of its most important political 
positions. He contributed more than any other party member 
towards developing 'modern populism' into a distinct ideological 
and politiqi.l force. 
Because Chernov was concerned with the overthrow of autocracy, 
and socialist revolution, an examination of his ideas and proposals 
brings into sharp relief the practical problems that arose from an 
attempt to introduce Populist ideals into a country undergoing 
industrialisation and the encroachment of a capitalist system in the 
countryside. Virtually all that Chernov wrote between 1899 and 
1917 during his long stay in Europe, only returning briefly in 1905, 
was designed to adapt Western political strategy, which he had 
mastered, to the peculiarities of the Russian situation. Though 
thoroughly inventive and sophisticated, the endeavour suffered 
from obvious defects and weaknesses. The very effort to create a 
mass based party in an autocratic police state was bound to be 
painful and problematical. It is not surprising that a number of 
individuals within the SR Party challenged Chernov's conceptions 
and so provoked some of the most dramatic and momentous splits 
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in the movement. In the attendant debates both Chernov and his 
opponents were forced to clarify _their positions, and analyses of 
these discussions illuminate the issues that were at stake and 
provide clues as to why the SR Party developed as it did. 
Chernov was acutely aware of the direct connection between tactics 
and ideology. This awareness led him to conclude, sooner than 
most SRs, that terrorist tactics were unproductive and detrimental 
to the political program for advancing socialism. 
An examination of Chernov's political and intellectual career also 
illuminates several other radical currents in Russia. Active in 
revolutionary movements as a student revolutionary in the 1890s, 
as a revolutionary in emigration in the West up until 1917, and as a 
revolutionary in power in 1917, Chernov's experiences of those 
years yield further insight into the political restlessness of the 
radical intelligentsia. 
The radicals of the 1870s were agitated by several important 
questions, but the one that most troubled Chernov was to haunt the 
revolutionary intelligentsia for decades to come: given Russia's· 
general backwardness (as compared to Western Europe), the lack of 
a strong and politically assertive middle class, the lack of a 
numerically strong and politically conscious working class, the 
absence of civil liberties and political freedom, and the extension of 
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capitalistic large-scale methods to the countryside, how could a 
revolutionary party hope to be effective? Should it devote itself to 
mobilising mass support and, if so, how? Or should it concentrate 
on training a radical elite that would somehow deal a deathblow to 
the archaic autocracy? The choice of one or the other alternative 
could not, as Chernov realised, be made simply on the basis of the 
pragmatic criterion of effectiveness. The· choice bore long-term 
implications: it would not only determine the nature of the 
revolutionary movement, but ultimately that of Russian society on 
the morrow of the revolution. 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century Populism was for 
Russia the dominant revolutionary ideology. Imbued by a 
romantic, naive and mystical vision of Russia and the 
revolutionary potential of the peasantry, the populists martyred 
themselves to their noble cause. The Populism of the nineteenth 
century was not, however, a coherent body of philosophical, 
political and social thought. It was very much heterogeneous in 
nature. Populism was not so much a concrete body of political or 
social doctrine as a broad range of ideas and attitudes, a matrix from 
which emerged various specific (and often contradictory) ideologies 
and movements. Russian Populism was· never a unified political 
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ideology; it was a loose, non-hierarchical movement that permitted 
varying interpretations by the remarkable array of strong-minded 
individuals who placed themselves under its banner. The attempt 
to realise often varying objectives as part of a vaster program of 
social change led to a number of controversies within the Populist 
intelligentsia, especially ones concerning the nature of the 
organisational framework best able to support the movement's 
energies in its struggle against the autocracy. The appeal of secret, 
conspiratorial, ruthless and hierarchical revolutionary 
organisa~ions, such as those espoused by Tkachev and practiced by 
Nechaev, was always quite limited. It was instead the written word 
that the intelligentsia used as its primary weapon, and it did so 
superbly. Chernov exemplified this tradition. It is virtually the only 
tradition that links the populism of old and Chernov's 'modern 
populism' or neo-populism. 
The philosophical foundations of nee-populism draw upon 
Populist ideals, but do not rest exclusively on them. The neo-
populism of Chemov is a fundamentally radical departure from the 
utopian socialist ideology of Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Lavrov ·and 
Mikhailovsky. N eo-populism was far more than a reaction to · a 
demographic phenomenon, a consequence of capitalism. Instead, it 
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reacted against the forms of governance, social relations, economic 
organisation and culture which came to prevail in major urban 
centres. To ignore this relationship is to misunderstand the nature 
of neo-populism. Chernov's neo-populism was urban in Russia 
because it was a reaction against the development and expansion of 
capitalism, which had undergone a rapid expansion in 
organisational and productive capacity in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Capitalism was enormously efficient, but 
it depended on, among other things, concentrating capital and 
decision making in urban centres. Chernov provided a distinctive 
and original socialist revolutionary theory - neo-populism of the 
twentieth century - that fulfilled the requirements of revolution 
making 'in a predominantly agriculturally based economy 
undergoing rapid capitalist expansion. 
This study in part will attempt to examine how Chernov attempted 
the implementation of theory into practice, ideology into reality. 
The intellectual Viktor Chernov (1873-195Z), son of a tsarist official 
enobled for his services to the state, and an active socialist from his 
student days, unlike most of the other SR leaders, was a keen 
student of Marxism and well acquainted with the Socialist 
movements of the Wesf. Before the 'Revolution of 1917, he had 
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lived long in exile, mainly in Switzerland, where he had edited the 
chief SR organ Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia (Revolutionary Russia) 
before the Revolution of 1905. In exile he had learnt to regard as 
obsolete the old Narodnik doctrine which looked to the building of 
a peasant Socialism on the basis of the ancient ccommunes. He had 
also shed his opposition to industrial development, while retaining 
a strong objection to the extension of capitalistic large-scale methods 
to the countryside. Chernov even saw a role for the industrial 
proletariat to play the part of vanguard in the coming revolution, 
which, in his view, would supply most of the direction, with the 
peasants forming the main body of the army of progress. A 
proletariat-peasant alliance was conceived by Chernov before 
Lenin's theoretical pronouncements on the matter. Chernov also 
learnt to reject the Narodnik way of thinking of the entire 
peasantry as constituting a single revolutionary class. In the 
Revolution, he said, the poorer peasants would contend with the 
rural bourgeoisie, while the urban proletariat dealt with the 
bourgeoisie of the towns. He was critical of Marxist class analysis 
which categorised the peasantry as petty bourgeois. By emphasising 
the distribution relations rather than relations to the means of 
production, Chernov argued small producers were not petty 
capitalists, and hence, not petty bourgeois. As for the l?ourgeois 
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revolution, to which the Social Democrats looked forward as a 
future event, Chernov placed it in the past, as having taken place 
already when the serfs were emancipated and supplies of workers 
f~r industry were thus made available from the country districts. 
Accordingly, there could be no place for a further bourgeois 
revolution. Nevertheless, Chernov believed that the coming 
revolution would have two stages, where the first or 'minimum 
program' would end tsarism, establish a bourgeois democracy, and 
preserve the peasantry from capitalist contamination, and the 
second or 'maximum program' would build voluntary, socialist 
cooperatives of an advanced type throughout the countryside, and 
then set up a loose socialist government in the capitals, eventually 
turning the cities, too, into a network of voluntary cooperatives. 
Chernov believed that his 'Constructive Socialism' combined what 
was good in Marxism with what was good in Utopian Socialism. 
The advent of the First World War further added to the problems 
of an already disunited and disorientated party. The SR Party 
developed an insidious and, as it turned out, permanent split on 
the question of supporting the Russian war effort. Many party 
members, especially at home, became the 'defensists'. Chernov did 
not. Instead, he became the leading light among the Russian 
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delegations to the left, socialist conventions held in Switzerland, at 
Zimmerwald in 1915 and Kienthal in 1916. 
Chernov spent most of the war in Switzerland. He returned to 
Russia after the February Revolution of 1917, arriving in Petrograd 
on 8 April, five days after Lenin. In May, he joined Lvov's 
Provisional Government as Minister of Agriculture. As a minister, 
however, he appears to have made no effective impression on his 
colleagues, and his position in the government was fatal to his 
prospects of gaining popular support. Wishing for peace, he found 
himself committed to a continuance of the war. Similarly, he was 
eager to get the land for the peasants, but he had as minister to do 
what he coul~ to prevent them from taking it for themselves 
without waiting for the Constituent Assembly to give it to them. He 
found himself under attack from the right because of his 
Zimmerwaldian record, and from the left as a hanger on of the 
bourgeoisie and an opponent of Soviet influence. He was, indeed, 
evidently at a loss as to what to do, and unable to give his party any 
effective leadership. His declining hold over the masses was shown 
in July 1917, when he was saved by Trotsky from the hands of an 
angry crowd. As the leader of the largest socialist party, his position 
should have been one of commanding strength, but it was, in fact, 
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one of increasing weakness. 
Chernov resigned from the Provisional Government in September 
1917. He was powerless to prevent the seizure of power by the 
Bolsheviks. The SR Party once again was chiefly concerned with, 
and distracted by, factional infighting and the elections to the 
Constituent Assembly. The Assembly duly convened in Petrograd 
on 5 January, 1918. It met for only one day, during which it elected 
Chernov as chairman. Chernov was called on by some of his 
colleagues to summon his supporters to its aid, but he refused, 
saying that he would not be a party to the shedding of blood in 
internecine socialist conflict. 
Civil wars broke out in the course of 1918. Chernov made his way 
to Samara on the Volga, where many leading SRs had come 
together with a few Mensheviks, and were attempting to set up a 
new Provisional Government made up of members of the 
dispersed Constituent Assembly. In November 1918, Admiral 
Kokhak brought off his own putsch, seized power in his own 
hands, and arrested the democratic and socialist leaders. Chernov 
·managed to escape and declared his intention of continuing an 
unarmed struggle against the Bolsheviks on the one hand, and the 
right wing counter-revolutionaries on the other. 
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Chernov's last appearance in Russia seems to have been in May 
1920, when he arrived in Moscow in disguise, and made a speech at 
a meeting organised by the mainly Menshevik Printers' Union, 
with the British Labour Delegation then visiting Russia. From there 
he began a long and melancholy exile, in Reval (now Tallin), in 
Prague, in Paris, and finally in New York. During thirty two years of 
frustration, recriminations, and feelings of guilt, Chernov defended 
himself, split from most of his colleagues, denounced the 
Bolsheviks and wrote histories and memoirs, but all in vain; the 
Bolsheviks maintained power in Russia. The prospects for the 
society and the life that Chernov had striven for had faded. In 1952, 
Chernov died in a tiny, gloomy apartment in New York. 
The end of the SR Party came in 1922, when its remaining leaders 
in Russia were tried for treason and condemned to death. The SR 
Party, always an amalgam of many groups and tendencies, had 
owed what theoretical coherence it ever had almost entirely to 
Chernov. Chernov virtually had been the sole architect of its 
program in 1906, and had retained his leadership despite his 
evident practical incapacity, as there was no-one else to take his 
place. There were, of course, other leaders, such as, M.Gots and 
G.Gershuni, but none of them ever formulated a coherent policy, 
and were instead primarily concerned with tactical and 
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organisational matters. 
This study in essence will examine the program Chernov devised, 
and more importantly, how he attempted to implement it. It will 
examine Chernov as a revolutionary figure from his student days 
to his emigration in 1920. It will also, by necessity, be a study of 
Russian social, economic and political life during this period. 
Moreover, although history is made in a definite economic setting, 
on a definite economic base, without an understanding of which 
itself would be incomprehensible to us, history nevertheless is 
made by living human beings who need not be directly motivated 
by economic factors. The analysis of these motives, even of those 
that are completely individual, does not in the least lead us away 
from the ground of the historical materialist method, and does not 
change us into 'psychologists'. 
Viktor Chernov was a prolific writer and the SR party's leading 
theoretician. Nikolai Sukhanov described Chernov in his memoirs 
as·' ... the only substantial theoretician of any kind it had - and a 
universal one at that. If Chernov's writings were removed from the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party literature almost nothing would be 
left.'1 Chernov describes himself as ' ... a theorist, a man of speech, 
-., 
1 
- N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917, edited, abridged and translated · 
by J Carmichael, Oxford University Press, 1955, p.305. 
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literature, the writing desk and lecture platform rather than a 
professional politician.'2 The fou~dation for a study of Chernov's 
development both as a revolutionary figure and .writer are his two 
memoirs both of which provide an indispensable starting point. 
Zapiski Sotsialista-Revoliutsionera (Notes of a Socialist-
Revolutionary) Berlin, 1922 Book 1 (of which no more were 
published) encompassess the period from the late 1880s to the late 
1890s when he went abroad, and was written in Moscow at a time 
when Chernov was residing there illegally from 1919-1920. The 
book complements his other memoir work, Pered Burei (Before 
the Storm) New York, 1954. In the last years of his life, Chernov was 
gravely ill, and although he had hoped to complete the writing of 
his memoirs, he had no longer the strength to do so. D.N. Shub 
took it upon himself to oversee this project by collecting material. H 
it was not for his effort, Pered Burei would never have seen the 
light of day. Together his memoirs cover his life from birth through 
to exile after the Bolshevik suppression of the Constituent 
Assembly in January, 1918. The central part of Pered Burei repeats, 
with some deletion, material from the Zapiski. Both are essential, 
of course, in any attempt to reconstruct Chernov's development, 
·
2 
· · v.M. Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, translated and abridged by P E 
Mosely, Russell & Russell, New York, 1966, p. 398. 
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and Pered Burei is indispensable for a history of the Socialist 
Revolutionary Party. The Zapiski are more informative of action 
than Pered Burei. Many pages of Pered Burei are devoted to 
sketches of Chernov's friends in the movement and this tends to 
obscure Chernov himself. Chernov does not speak of his personal 
life in his memoirs. For example, he makes no mention of the fact 
that about 1910 he left his first wife, Anastasia Nikolaevna Sletova, 
nor does he tell how and where he met his second wife, Olga 
Kolbasina Chernova. However, this study holds no pretentions of 
being a full scale biography: personal details, the psychology of his 
mind, or a sociological approach are beyond its scope. T.B. Cross, 
however, attempts to analyse the psychological structure of 
Chernov's thinking in the introduction of Viktor Chernov: 
Reason and Will in a Morality for Revolution, Ph.D thesis, 
Indiana University, 1968. The social philosophy of Chernov is 
directly descendant from Mikhailovsky, or so states Randall in the 
only other work which purports to analyse Chernov's ideology, 
The Major Prophets of Russian Peasant Socialism: A Study irz the 
Social Thought of N.K. Mikhailovskii and V.M. Chernov, Ph.D 
thesis, Columbia University, 1961. 
Major accounts of the history of the SR Party in Western languages 
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are: A. Spiridovitch, Histoire du Terrorisme Russe, 1886-1917, 
Paris, 1930; O.H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism: 
Promise and Default of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, 
February to October 1917, New York, 1958; Radkey, The Sickle 
under the Hammer: The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the 
Early Months of Soviet Rule, New York,1963; Maureen Perrie, 
The Agrarian Policy of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party: 
From Its Origins through the Revolution of 1905-1907, Cambridge, 
1976; M. Hildermeirer, Die Sozialrevolutionare Partei Russlands: 
Agrarsozialismus und Modernisierung inn Zarenreich (1900-1914), 
Cologne and Vienna, 1978; J. Baynac, Les Socialistes -
Revolutionnairies de Mars 1881 a Mars 1917, Paris, 1979; and M. 
Jansen, A Show Trial Under Lenin. The Trial of the Socialist 
Revolutionaries. Moscow 1922, The Hague, 1982. 
The studies cited above unfortunately focus primarily on the 
history of the party, its splits, terrorist policy and agrarian policy in 
the turbulent period between 1905 and 1917, emphasising its 
' 
peasant orientation. Chernov's revolutionary career, political and 
social thought, his contributions to the revolutionary tradition, and 
in particular to the development of a socialist tactical policy for a 
socialist revolution in an agricultural country wher"e absolute 
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monarchy was still dominant, are only treated in a cursory manner. 
This study will hopefully go some way to remedying this 
imbalance. 
Soviet histories of the SR Party first began appearing in 1921, 
although the subject only began to to be investigated in some depth 
by Soviet historians in the 1950s. The principal work is by Gusev, 
Krakh partii levykh eserov, (The Failure of the Left Socialist 
Revolutionary Party) Moscow. 1963. The subsequent articles and 
books by Soviet historians tend to emphasise the period March to 
October 1917 and characterise the SRs as a bankrupt petty bourgeois 
party. They also tend to focus on the left wing of the party ;;tnd its 
brief period of cohabitation with · the Bolsheviks. Chernov is 
accorded only superficial treatment, and until now,, there appears 
little discernible difference in their perception of Chernov, though 
their vitriolic rhetoric has abated. He is now described an 
'interventionist', and a 'counter-revolutionary'. This ·study will 
throw Chernov a lifeline and rescue him from politically 
motivated ideological assassination. 
Chernov's view of the events of 1917 can be studied by consulting 
two main works: The Great Russian Revolution, New York, 1966 
translated and abridged by P. Mosely, and Rozhdenie 
revoliutsionnoi Rossii Fevralskaia revoliutsiia, Paris, 1934 which 
1 8 
was the basis for the Mosely translation, and is the same as 
Velikaia russkaia revoliutsiia, Paris, 1934 volume 1 of which was 
published, while the rest of it remains only in manuscript form. In 
the early period, Chernov's abundant output of writings are 
contained largely in four periodicals all published in Paris: 
Russkoe Bogatstvo (Russian Riches); Viestnik Russkoi 
Revoliutsii (Herald of the Russian Revolution); Nakanunie (On 
the Eve); and Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia (Revolutionary Russia). 
From 1899 to 1905 Chernov published in these journals, but only 
one, Russkoe Bogatstvo, continued to appear after 1905. Chernov's 
Filosofskie i sotsiologicheskie etiudy (Philosophical and 
sociological studies, Moscow, 1907), are based on his publications in 
Russkoe Bogatstvo between 1899 and 1902. Nakanunie had a short 
life, only appearing from 1899 to 1901. Viestnik appeared 
irregularly between 1901 and 1904. Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia 
appeared between 1901and1905. 
After 1905, Znamia Truda (Banner of Toil) and Sotsialist-
Revoliutsioner (Socialist-Revolutionary), both published in Paris, 
carried the burden of Chernov's thinking. Znamia Truda came out 
periodically from 1907 to 1912 and Sotsialist-Revoliutsioner had 
just four issues from 1908 through to 1913. Chernov did not 
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substantially modify the political and social outlook he formed 
during the period 1899 and 1914. Between 1914 and 1917 Chernov's 
attention focussed on the stance socialists should take toward the 
war. His articles appeared in Zaviety (Legacies), published in Paris 
between 1912 and 1914. During 1917 Delo Naroda (The People's 
Cause), published in Petrograd, carried much of the burden of 
Chernov's thinking. After the revolution Chernov continued to 
write for various exile journals. 
Since the considerable archival resources in the Soviet Union, 
Europe, and the United States were not available for use, this study 
will be substant~ally based upon published sources. Chernov's 
published works; journals, newspaper articles and party congress 
reports provide ample material to justify the exercise. Moreover, 
the archival materials of various collections are explored in some 
depth by Radkey, Ferrie, Janson and Hildermeirer. By utilising these 
sources what would seem an apparent deficiency in such a study, in 
fact becomes negligible. 
The notable archival sources are the large Partiia Sotsialistov-
Revoliu tsionerov (PSR) Archive and the smaller collection of 
V.M. Chernov papers held at the International Institute of Social 
History, Amsterdam. The Hoover -Institute at Stanford University 
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holds various papers and manuscripts in the Chernov Collection. 
The Okhrana files held by the Institute contain police reports, 
dispatches, circulars and photographs. The B.I. Nicolaevsky 
Collection also contains a small number of Chernov's personal 
papers. 
In dealing with Chernov's writings, we should bear in mind that 
the majority of accounts were written many years after the 
Revolution, and they relied largely on memory, varied widely at 
times from the facts. We must also be aware that, although some 
seventy years have elapsed since the Revolution, the accounts of 
' ' 
events presented in Chernov's memoirs still reflect the original 
emotions and the conflict of ideas that characterised the fateful year, 
1917. The task, therefore, . is for the writer of Chernov's 
'revolutionary career' to evaluate for himself the testimonies 
presented. 
Chernov's revolutionary career is set out in a chronological fashion 
with the narrative interwoven with analysis. This format also 
encompasses a detailed exposition and analysis of Chernov's 
critique of Marx's theory of class and the agrarian prQblem, which 
forms an integral part of his political thought, and therefore is 




The Narodniki or Russian populists took their name from the 
Russian word narod meaning 'people'. The name is an apt one 
since, although the populist movement included many diverse 
elements, its most typical concern was that of activating the Russian 
population against tsarism. The movement was orientated towards 
the people. The term 'movement' is used deliberately as the 
Narodnik influence was much wider than that of the political 
parties it spawned. It was a literary influence and a general cultural 
trend as well as a specifically political movement and few Russian 
intellectuals who reached maturity between the years 1861 and 1905 
escaped its influence. 
Because of the universality of its influence Russian populism is 
difficult to define exactly. The political attitudes of the populists, as 
distinct from their political programs, included a distrust of 
liberalism and parliamentary democracy, a belief in the possibility 
of an autonomous development of socialism in Russia through the 
preservation of the village community (the obshchina) and the 
avoidance of capitalism. The- object of '.going to the people' was 
primarily designed to broaden the popular resistance to tsarist 
autocracy. It was not necessarily based on any veneration of the 
' . 
Russian peasant, although this was often present. Since nine-tenths 
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of the Russian population were rural dwellers, and since the 
majority of them were peasants, it was natural that any politicai 
movement seeking to secure a popular basis should be concerned 
with activating the peasantry. At times, as with the Chaikovskists 
in 1872-1873, Russian populists concentrated on organising the 
urban workers. Yet even here the concentration was sometimes not 
on urban workers as a developing industrial proletariat, but on 
urban workers as peasants temporarily employed in the cities, who 
were better educated than their fellow villagers, and therefore more 
easy to influence. It was expected that they would return to their 
villages taking the message of populism, back with them. 
Populism, like earlier movements based essentially on intellectuals, 
favoured the 'study group' form of organisation. Groups of 
students, writers, teachers and others formed clandesfinely for the 
organisation of libraries of prohibited books, the compilation of 
books of political e?<:tracts, publication of popular pamphlets and 
political education. These groups soon extended to include workers 
and peasants. In the early years of the movement the groups were 
locally organised and only loosely linked. This was true even with 
the first Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom) groups which were 
· · · organised during the' early 1860s. Although these groups were soon 
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shattered by arrests, new exile groups with new leaders and a 
similar orientation and purpose replaced them. In 1876, a new 
Zemlya i Volya organisation was formed. Unlike the earlier 
organisation of the same name, this was more disciplined and more 
centralised, and was, in fact, a political party in the modem sense. 
The influence of this second Zemlya i Volya was wider than the 
first. In addition to a central group of about twenty-five, there were 
fixed centres in several provincial towns. From these centres 
teachers, students, doctors and zemstvo officials and other 
intellectuals moved out to influence the peasantry in the 
surrounding countryside. The organisation reached a new ·stage in 
October 1878 with the appearance of the journal Zemlya i Volya. 
This was printed abroad but was widely distributed inside Russia. 
However, even at the time when this journal was launched, the 
organisation was showing signs of internal strain. In response to 
increased police persecution and the failure of the policy of 
arousing the peasants, a large section of its members increasingly 
favoured terrorism as a political method. In 1879, this group 
organised within the Zemlya i Volya, a tightly disciplined terrorist 
group called the Narodnaya Volya (Peoples Will). The non-
terrorists, including the later socialist G.V. Plekhanov, separated 
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themselves from the Narodnaya Volya and formed the Cherny 
Peredel (Black Redistribution).1 Whereas the former group:-
concentrated its activities increasingly towards the assassination of 
the Tsar, the latter group continued the older emphasis on 
influencing workers and peasants and on popularising its program 
of immediate reforms. The division between the terrorist and non-
terrorist wings of the populist movement was largely confined to 
differences over political strategy. Both groups favoured the same 
sort of political program. This involved demanding the election of 
a Constituent Assembly based on universal suffrage, regional self-
administration based on the autonomy of the mir (commune), 
land nationalisation and the distribution of the landed estates to the 
peasantry, workers' control of factories, and freedom of conscience, 
speech, press, meeting, association and electoral agitation.2 
'-- - The assassination of Alexander II on 1 March, 1881 led ·to a quick -
and savage retaliation. Hundreds of Narodniks were ·arrested; 
several were executed, and the remainder were sentenced to long 
terms of imprisonment and exile. Police control was strengthened, 
especially in the larger towns. Populist political organisation did not 
recover from this attack, although remnants of the Narodnik 
.' 
1 They took their name from their central objective of dividing up the 
landed estates among the peasantry. 
2 F. Venturi, Roots of Revolution, London, 1960, pp.677-678. 
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influence survived in the later SR Party. Many of the early Russian 
Marxists, including Plekhanov and Lenin, were influenced by 
populism, and the early Marxist groups, despite their repudiation of 
populism, absorbed much of its tradition and some of its program. 
The fact that Marxist writers such as Plekhanov, Martov and Lenin 
were forced to devote a good deal of their time and energy, as late as 
1900 to exposing the 'errors' of populism, is a tribute to the strength 
of the populist tradition in Russia.3 They were later to devote as 
much attention to the neo-populism of Chernov. 
It is within this historical tradition that Viktor Chernov must be 
placed. Although the continuity of thought is by no means a direct 
one, the philosophical foundations of neo-populism draw upon 
populist ideals. However, they do not rest exclusively on them, as 
the subsequent chapters shall demonstrate. 
Viktor Mikhailovich Chernov was 'born in the town of Kamyshin, 
in the Samara district situated on the Volga, on 19 November, 1873. 
Chernov's father was born into a peasant serf family. His 
grandfather, on gaining his freedom, resolved to spare his son from 
3 For example see, Plekhanov's works Socialism and the Political 
Struggle, (1883); Our Differences, (1885); On the Development of the 
Mon is tic View of History, (1895); On the Materialist Conception of 
History, (1897) and On the Role of the Individual in History, (1898); 
·and Lenin's What the 'Friends of the People' are, (·1894) and The 
Development of Capitalism in Russia, (1899). 
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the rigours of muzhik exploitation. Chernov's father became a 
rural school teacher and later entered tsarist service, initially as a 
young clerical assistant to the district treasury. Slowly and 
methodically he progressed up the hierarchical ladder. In the end, 
after some forty years service, he reached the top of the treasury 
administration, and became District Treasurer. With this position 
came the order of Saint Vladimir and personal nobility, together 
with the title Councillor of State.4 
In his memoirs, Viktor Chernov relates how, in his early years, he 
suffered under the daily and hourly oppression of his stepmother, 
whom he rejected, and how he consequently sought solace in the 
society of street children, absorbing their experiences like a sponge 
absorbs water.5 Chernov's mother died when the boy was still in 
infancy, although he speaks of her as 'fine and deep'. His 
stepmother was kind to her husband's children until she bore her 
own. Then the house divided, the old family lived downstairs, the 
new family lived in the second storey .. They met only for meals, 
which was a 'strained and boring ritual' for the members of the 
lower house. The children referred to their home as bicameral. 
Chernov's attraction to, and empathy with the downtrodden is 
4 Chernov, Pered Burei, (Before the Storm) New York, 1953, p.27. 
5 Chernov, Zapiski Sotsialista- Revoliutsionera, (Notes of a Socialist 
Revolutionary}, Berlin, 1932, pp.13-14. 
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linked to his perception of his stepmother: 'I myself grew up under 
constant "humiliation and insult"; and for me it was so natural an 
urge to ,be attracted to all who were "humiliated and insulted".'6 
While Chernov's stepmother alienated him, his father influenced 
Viktor's view of the world: 'I inherited from him a plebeian 
outlook on life. •7 
In' his adolescent years, Chernov turned to literature, and was 
inspired by the poet Nekrasov, so much so, that he memorised 
much of his work. In Chernov's estimation he breathed life into 
the 'people'. Nekrasov was just one of many authors Chernov read, 
though in no systematic order.8 The influence of writers and 
poets in the Russian revolutionary movement was characteristic of 
the nineteenth century as a whole, but it was especially° 
characteristic of the period from 1820 onwards. Pushkin and some 
of his contemporaries were involved in the Decembrist movement 
and later writers developed under the stimulus of its heroic failure. 
Herzen, Belinsky, Turgenev, Goncharov, Chernyshevsky and many 
others were actively involved in revolutionary agitation. 





Chernqv, Zapiski, p.87. 
ibid, 'p.14. 
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influenced by the revolutionary Petrashevsky in the 1840s. 
Nekrasov was actively associated for a time with the Populist 
movement. His best poems are those in which he expressed either 
his love for his Polish-born mother or his compassion for the long 
suffering Russian peasant. Nekrasov did not succeed in creating a 
school of his own: n~ 'peasant' poets came in his wake. But he, 
more than any other Russian poet, made his contemporaries aware 
of the existence of the peasant and his problems. Few 'knew as much 
as he about the Russian peasant. Still fewer could express the truth 
as artistically and as powerfully. 
Immersed in the world of literature, Chernov continued to live a 
secluded intellectual life. He described his adolescent years as 
uneventful ' ... an unusually dull, lacklustre time.... In a 
I 
revolutionary sense, society was absolutely lifeless.'.9 It was not 
until the latter· half of the 1880s that Chernov started to live a 
politically conscious life.10 His introduction to politics was at the . 
instigation of his elder brother, Vladimir. It was he who introduced 
Chernov to his political circle, which was organised by a Tolstoian 
army officer. From this initial encounter Chernov went on to 
participate in other political circles. His involvement in such 
9 ibid, p.13. 
1 0 ibid, p.13. 
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political activity did not go unnoticed. In 1890, A.V. Sazonov was 
arrested, and Chernov was also taken into custody; he was searched, 
questiC?ned and released. I I 
Towards the end of his schooling in Saratov, Chernov met the 
veteran Populist Mark Natanson,I2 describing him as ' ... no writer, 
no orator, nor an adventurer, whose affairs vividly speak for 
themselves. He was an organiser.•I3 In order to avoid further 
police prosecution, Chernov in the autumn of 1891, travelled to 
DerptI4 in Estonia to continue his studies. While there, he made 
the acquaintance of like-minded students and this led to the , 
formation of an organisational circle, in which Chernov carried on 
his propaganda. It was here that he met and became a close friend of 
Karl Parts, a member of the Estonian Constitutional Democratic 
Party. Chernov completed his school-leaving certificate and 
returned to Saratov. 
In 1892, Chernov continued his formal education at Moscow 
11 
12 
Chernov, Pered Bur~i, pp.50-51. 
Mark Andreevich Natanson {1850-1919) was one of the founders of 
the Chaikovsky circle and of Zem/ya i Volya (Land and Freedom); after the 
split in the latter orgariisation, he affiliated himself with Narodnaya Volya 
{People's Will). Natanson founded the People's Right Party in 1893 and was 
leader until 1894, when he was arrested. In 1905, Natanson joined the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party associating himself with its left wing, and 
became a member of the party's central committee. Natanson joined the Left 
Socialist Revolutionaries in 1917. 
13 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.46. 
14 Renamed lurev. 
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University, where he enrolled in the Faculty of Law. It was during 
this period at university that Chernov first encountered Marx's 
writings. Chernov's study of Marx was espoused in these terms: 
We are not Marxists, we studied Marx to know him better, rather 
than to be converted. This at times turned into for us a sort of sport. 
We had to know all the main authors who may be utilised in an 
argument .... We appeared to the young Marxists as utopians and 
petit bourgeois; "moss-grown troglodytes" we were called by one of 
their prominent Marxist publications in the mid-1890s.15 
Chernov's activities in his early university life were confined to 
ideological debates and discussion. While at university he became 
involved in a student organisation called 'Union of Soviets', a 
populist circle which irregularly published a journal entitled, 'The 
Struggle for Public Power in Russia'.16 
Narodnoe Pravo (People's Right Party) emerged in 1893 under the 
headship of M.A. Natanson. It was through Natanson that 
Chernov's friend E. Iakovlev (who at one time was a· disciple of 
Natanson's, back in Saratov), joined People's Right, and through 
him, Chernov's brother Vladimir also joined. T~e Party's goal was 
to unite revolutionary and _liberal elements in order to overthrow 
despotism. In the party program, printed in Smolensk, one can find 
populist demands such as representative government based on 
15 
16 
Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.55-56. 
ibid, pp.56-57, p.71. 
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universal suffrage, freedom of religion, press and assembly, 
inviolability of the person, and political self-determination of 
nations.17 
'I.be Party quickly crumbled after the arrests of its leading members 
in April, 1894. Among those arrested were Chernov's brother 
Vladimir, his· sister Nadejda and E. Iakovlev. Chernov himself was 
arrested at this time; he was only twenty years old. The police 
accused him of playing a prominent role in the party organisation 
and having in his possession numerous illegal publications. While 
in police custody, Chernov wrote an autobiographical account of his 
life up until his arrest for his interrogators. It makes for interesting 
reading, although the accuracy of his statements must obviously be 
called into question in view of his particular circumstances and the 
audience it was intended for. 18 Chernov states that up until the 
completion of his schooling in Derpt, he did not participate in any 
17 G.A. Kuklin (ed.}, ltogi revoliutsionnago dvizheniia v Rossii za sorok 
liet 1862-1902, (Compilations of the revolutionary movement in Russia 
for forty years, 1862-1902). Geneva. 1903, p.283. See also Chernov 
Pered Burei, pp.73-79, and Zapiski, p.182ff. The program of the party 
can be consulted in V. Burtsev (ed.), Za Sto Liet 1800-1896, (After a 
hundred years: 1800-1896). London, 1897, p.250, and also in Kuklin in 
ibid, pp.76-77. For a Soviet history refer to V.V. Shirokova, Partiia 
'Narodnogo' Prava, (People's Right Party), Saratov, 1972. 
18 For an account of Chernov's experiences in People's Right refer to V.M. 
Chernov 'K istori Partii Narodnoe Pravo', (Toward a history of the party of 
People's Right), Krasnyi Arkhiv (Red Archive), 1 (1922), pp.282-288. 
·As mentioned in the text, this is .a peculiar document. Chernov tried to 
convince his interrogators (1894) that he was a Marxist, and he also denied 
belonging to the People's Right. 
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·circles, and his interest at that time centred instead on questions of 
morality and philosophy. Upon his arrival in Moscow, his interest 
changed from exploring philosophical questions to the study of 
economics and politics, reading Marx's Capital and other selected 
works, and mastering the theoretical components of socialism. 
This, in turn,. generated an interest in applying this theoretical 
knowledge to Russian society. For Chernov, Russia was a land of 
agriculture, poor, and dominated by small landowners. The 
Russian peasant lived a more primitive, and hence, more well-
rounded life, and a more communal, fraternal, and hence more 
moral life, than other Russians or Europeans. Chernov believed 
that the peasant commune, the peasant joint workshop and the 
peasants' cooperative habits were priceless moral survivors of 
priffiitive socialism, which should not be destroyed by competitive, 
divisive capitalism from Western Europe. ,'Capitalism for Russia 
played and will play a destructive role, _more so than a creative 
one.'19 Chernov held that the Tsarist state machine, and all other 
Leviathan states, should be dismantled after the revolution, to give 
way to, small-scale, local, cooperative, and largely non-coercive 
community governments. 
19 ibid, p.284. 
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After initial questioning by the police, Chernov was transferred to 
Petropavlovsk prison in St. Petersburg.20 From Petropavlovsk 
prison, he was transferred to a less stringent detention centre before 
his trial. This transfer provided him with the opportunity to write 
and to have access to reading material.21 'With a quill pen in my 
hands I felt in myself immediately a sense of ,mental strength ... .'22 
Whi~e still under detention, Chernov resolved to write an article in 
which he would look at the critique of philosophy, continuing 
questions in the methods of sociology, the theory of struggle for 
individuality, individual freedom, the fate a~d destiny of 
capitalism in Russia, the proletariat and the peasantry, and agrarian 
revolution. After three months this article was completed. The title 
was long and awkward, just like its contents: 'Philosophical flaws in 
the doctrine of economic materialism'. 
In January, 1895, after the petition of his father and uncle, Chernov 
was released and exiled to his native province Saratov, and his 
home town of Kamyshin. Thus came to an end Chernov's first 
20 Chernov's cell neighbours were N.C. Tiutchev and E. lakovlev with 
whom he communicated by tapping noises on the cell wall. 
21 Chernov provides us with a list of his reading material. E. Kant 
Critique of Pure Reason, F.A. Lange Historical Materialism, K. Marx 
Capital, P.S.Struve, Critical notes on the question of the development of 
Capitalism in Russia and Beltova On the question of the Monistic 
interpretation of history. Chernov, Zapiski, pp.232-233. 
22 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.89. 
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period of imprisonment. He was later to name this period his 
abridged nine months university course.23 Life in Kamyshin 
proved to be difficult; he was subjected to verbal abuse and 
harassment for his revolutionary activities. Chernov left 
Kamyshin, and after a brief stay in Saratov (the city) where he 
engaged in political debates in the Argunov circle, Chernov arrived 
in Tambov.24 Tambov at this time was the scene of more agrarian 
unrest than any other Russian province. Undaunted by the past 
experiences of the 'going to the people' movement, Chernov and a 
group consisting of Anastasia N*olaevna Sletova (later to become 
Chernov's first wife), her brother S.N. Sletov, P.A. Dobronravov, 
the brothers Volski and others initiated the first revolutionary 
peasants' organisation in Russia during the years 1896-1897 in the 
village of Pavlodar, Borisoglebsk u'ezd (district). From here the 
movement gradually spread to the surrounding districts of Tambov· 
province until the multiplication of 'brotherhoods', as these 
revolutionary units were called, culminated in the large-scale 
insurrections of 1905.25 ~t was a neo-populist 'going to the people' 
23 Chernov, Zapiski, p.236. 
24 For an account of this period refer to A.A. Argunov, 'lz proshlago 
Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov' (From the past of the Socialist-
Revolutionary Party), Byloe (The Past), no. 10/22, October, 1907. 
pp.94-1_12. 
25 O.H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, Promise and Default 
of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries February to October 1917, 
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movement revitalised, though with a different orientation. 
Chernov envisaged the movement as a mass people's movement, 
based upon a close organisational union between the proletariat in 
- ' 
the cl.ties and the labouring peasants in the country villages. It was a 
town-country alliance that was to later become the cornerstone of 
his revolutionary strategy for the transformation of Russian society. 
However, such activity was not enough to placate Chernov, for he 
had an irrepressible urge to travel abroad, to submerge himself 
entirely in the revolutionary struggle in the West, to absorb and re-
shape the 'most recent words' in world socialist ·thought. His 
intention was to stay for a two or three year period, long enough, he 
thought, to assimilate the various philosophical and political 
trends. After nine months imprisonment and three -years 
'administrative exile' under police supervision (1895-1899), 
Chernov in 1899 obtained a passport to go abroad. He intended to go 
via St.Petersburg so as to be able to meet Mikhailovsky and the 
other revolutionaries, -N.F. Annenski, V.G. Korolenko, V.A. 
Miakotin and A.V. Peshekhanov. In the end, Chernov was only 
able to meet with Mikhailovsky, to whom he would later refer as, 
' ... friend, collaborator, teacher, my second father ... .'26 In the course 
Columbia University- Press: 1958, p.56. 
26 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.55. 
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of his life, Chernov wrote a number of articles on Mikhailovsky, 
including personal memoirs and defences of his thought. 2 7 
Chernov loved to argue in print by using a series of quotations 
from others' works, and it is characteristic that his final quotations, 
presented to close a given argument, usually came from 
Mikhailovsky. Chernov felt that it was patriotic to praise 
Mikhailovsky before the world, to assert that Mikhailovsky, a true 
Russian, had anticipated Western thought in many ways, and had 
phrased certain strands of Western thought more cogently than any 
Westerner. 28 
Mikhailovsky enjoyed great popularity among democratic and 
revolutionary circles in Russia in the late nineteenth century. In his 
various writings he called on the Russian intelligentsia to serve the 
people, sought to arouse a sense of personal responsibility for the 
country's future, defended democratic traditions, and opposed 
27 For example see 'N.K. Mikhailovskii, k 20 letiu do dnia smerti' (N.K. 
Mikhailovsky on the 20th Anniversary of his Death), Volia Rossii (Russia's 
Will), no.3, Prague, 1924, pp.44-54; Pamiati N.K. Mikhailovskago, (In 
Memory of N.K. Mikhailovsky). Geneva, 1904; 'N.K. Mikhailovskii kak 
eticheskoi myslitel' (N.K. Mikhailovsky as ethical thinker), Zaviety 
(Legacies), no.1 Janary, 1914, pp.1-46; 'Gdie Klivch k ponimaniiu N.K. 
Mikhailovskago' (Where is the key to understanding Mikhailovsky), 
Zaviety (Legacies), no.3 March, 1913, pp.88-131; 'Filosofskii osnovy 
ucheniia N.K. Mikhailovskago' (Philosophical foundations of the teachings of 
Mikhailovsky), in Filosofskie i sotsiologicheskie etiudy (Philosophical and 
sociological studies), Moscow, 1907. pp.5-29. 
28 Chernov, Zapiski, p.249. 
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reactionary ideology. 
Mikhailovsky considered himself the preserver and continuator of 
Chernyshevsky's tradition. In sociology, Mikhailovsky, along with 
P.L. Lavrov, elaborated the idea of a free choice of an 'ideal', which 
provided the philosophical foundation for the view that social 
development could be changed in a direction chosen by the 
progressive intelligentsia. This idea underlies the 'subjective' 
method in s'ociology, proclaiming the individual, the 'irreducible' 
element, to be the starting point for historical research and the 
supreme measure of social progress. Mikhailovsky rejected 
Marxism without qualification. His political views were influenced 
by the Narodnik movements of the 1870s. 
Mikhailovsky divided history into three stages in which technology 
became more complex while human beings, fragmented by 
increasing division of labour, became more oppressed by giant 
systems such as Christianity, the tsarist state, and European 
capitalism. Only the Russian peasant, he asserted, retained in many 
ways the older, more well-rounded way of life, and only the 
Russian village commune might serve as a model for the future, 
small-scale, democratic, socialist communities after the passing of 
tsarism and capitalism. Although a radical, Mikhailovsky usually 
.- ..... , 
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opposed terrorist activity to overthrow the regime. In his last 
decade, he spent much time controverting Russian Marxists. 29 
At their St. Petersburg meeting Mikhailovsky gave his blessing to 
Chernov to study European socialism at 'its source. 'You of course, 
are right, seclusion in some sort of Russian national provincialism 
is unnatural and harmful. •30 
In 1899, Chernov left Russia for Switzerland. 
29 See J.H. Billington, Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1958. 
3D Chernov, Zapi~ki, p.356. 
Chapter 2. 
The Formation of Social 
Revolutionism 
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In 1899 Chernov made the first of a number of trips abroad, not· 
only for further education, but also in order to have a freer hand at 
revolutionary agitation. After leaving Russia, Chernov arrived in 
Zurich. The Russian emigre community at this time was primarily 
composed of young social-democrats involved in the 
Emancipation of Labour Group, a Russian revolutionary 
organisation, organised on Marxist principles. Its chief ideologist 
was G.V. Plekhanov. Chernov met Plekhanov through Axelrod, 
. and was later to recount in hi~ autobiography that the relationship 
between the two failed - it failed to develop and blossom.1 In such· 
an atmosphere Chernov's espousal of populist sentiments and 
peasant revolution found few political adherents or sympathisers. 
However, one populist group, the Union of Russian Social-
Revolutionaries Abroad, did attract Chernov's attention. Under 
- '· 
Zhitlovskii's leadership it functioned as the Northern Union's 
branch abroad. 2 While in Zurich, Chernov and Zhitlovskii ~ere 
inseparable. Zhitlovskii advised Chernov to leave .Zurich and to 
travel to Berne, where Zhitlovskii himself was based, in order to 
enrol as a student at Berne University, The idea was for Chernov to 
V. Chernov, Pered Burei ( Before the Storm }, p.103. 
2 The 'Northern Union of SR's', was founded by Argunov in Sara_tov in 
1896, and removed to Moscow the following year. -
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extend his philosophical research, an ambition he had held while 
in Russia. The ultimate goal for Chemov was a doctor's diploma, a 
matter to which Zhitlovskii attached great importance. Zhitlovskii 
at this time also promised to publish the Constitution, which 
Chernov had drafted for the Pavlodar Brotherhood, in the next 
issue of Russkii Rabochii ( Russian Worker ), a small journal 
which he edited. In addition, he undertook to open a campaign to 
redirect the attention of Russian socialists towards the next 
question on the political agenda: the transfer of the vanguard of a 
mass organisation from the proletariat in the cities to the peasantry 
in the countryside.3 
Chernov did not hesitate too long as there was nothing in Zurich 
to keep him there. In the first year that Chernov spent in Berne, 
rarely a day went by when Chemov did not meet with Zhitlovskii. 
. There was not one question which they had not discussed.4-But 
the harmonious relationship was soon to falter. Chernov states 
that he soon became aware of ideological differences between the 
two, although he does not elaborate on this point.5 He does 
however allude to the fact that the failure of Zhitlovskii's Russkii 




V Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.102-4. 
ibid. p. 105. 
ibid. p. 106. 
41 
disillusioned and disappointed him.6 
The Constitution had originally been drafted by Shcherbinin, but 
Chernov had altered it, as he had altered the name of the 
organisation, to fit better his plans for wider propaganda among the 
peasantry. In Shcherbinin's Constitution, according to Chernov, 
the aims of the society were mentioned very briefly and diffusely. 
The main content of the Constitution consisted of indicating the 
obligations of each member towards the whole, and of defining 
what would happen if he failed in his duty to fulfil them. In this 
respect the Constitution was more than strict: Chernov noted the 
recurrent phrase, 'is liable to be deprived of his life. '7 · 
Dobronravov delivered the Constitution to Chernov bearing 
' 
Shcherbinin's title 'Society of brotherly love.' Chernov was to alter 
it to 'Brotherhood for the defence of the people's rights.'8 The 
original Constitution contained the aim of the society, which was 
to struggle 'against the pomeshchiki and other oppressors of the 
people who stand between the people and the Tsar.'9 This merely 
reinforced the standard mythology that the tsar was shielded from 
6 ibid. p. 112. 
7 V. Chernov, Zapiski Sotsialista-Revoliutsionera, ( Notes of a 
Socialist Revolutionary ), p. 315. 
8 ibid. p. 321. 
9 ibid. p. 322. 
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the peasants' plight by the gentry and the bureaucracy. The myth 
was included by Shcherbinin, ostensibly, as Chernov states, to 
divert suspicion away from the Society should the Constitution fall 
into the hands of the tsarist police. This contrivance to fool the 
authorities was abandoned on Chernov's advice, 'so that we 
should not confuse the people, instead of the authorities (who 
would not have been fooled in any case).'10 The published 
Constitution of the Brotherhood11 contained no explicit mention 
of the Tsar, but the accompanying 'Letter to the entire Russian 
peasantry' contained a direct attack on the peasant view that the 
Tsar himself was innocent of the oppression which was practised 
in his name. 12 Indeed, perhaps, the most valuable, of all the 
lessons learned during this period (1896-97) was 
that the old bugaboo of the revolutionists, the peasants' 
loyalty to the throne, could be overcome by skillful 
propaganda which taught the peasants to look upon the tsar, 
not as a compassionate father deceived by wicked squires, but 
as himself the first of the squires and the greatest landowner 
in all Russia. That was the entering wedge devised by 
Chernov to split the people from the throne, and it must be 
admitted that it was an efficacious one, The only trouble was 
that Chernov did not harvest the fruits of his labor; they were 
gathered in by the Bolshevik foe. 13 
10 ibid. p. 322. 
11 The Constitution was published by the Union in Geneva, in October 
1899 - a fact which Chernov's autobiography fails to mention. It was 
published, not in the journal Russkii Rabochii, but as a separate pamphlet, 
along with an appeal, 'A Letter to the entire Russian peasantry.' 
- 1 2 M. Perrie, The Agrarian policy of the Russian Socialist-
Revolutiuonary Party from its origins through the revolution of 1905-
1907, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, p. 26. 
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Chernov's vision was to unite the Brotherhoods within Russia, 
which would be served by a journal published abroad. Semen 
Akimovich An-Skii (Solomon Rappoport)14 travelled to Berne in 
order to meet with Chernov and to unfold to him, on Lavrov's 
behalf, a plan for ,an autonomous emigre group, divorced from the 
existing emigre circles, which would organise the peasant agrarian 
movement from abroad. This concept was in effect similar to 
Chernov's own aspirations, and since Lavrov was a most respected 
if not venerated old Populist Chernov was convinced. When in 
January, 1900, Chernov arrived in Paris from Berne to meet with 
Lavrov's group, he was hailed by· them as ' the first swallow of 
Russia's coming revolutionary spring.'15 Lavrov stood as a 
magnet for pro-peasant revolutionaries in exile.16 
Unfortunately, Lavrov died on 6th February, 1900, shortly after 
Chernov's arrival. His funeral attracted Russian Populist emigres 
from throughout Europe. Far from stifling the concept of a new 
populist organisation however, his death, in fact, enhanced its 
13 0. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of _Bolshevism, p. 57. 
-
14 An old populist and former protege of Gleb Uspenskii and .at this stage 
Lavrov's personal secretary in Paris. V. Chernov, Pered Burei, p. 113, 
114, 116 . 
. 15 
16 
ibid. p. 191. 
ibid. p. 118. 
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realisation. The Agrarian Socialist League was founded by Chernov 
in collaboration with Semen Akimovich An-skii, Leonid 
Emmanuilovich Shishko, Feliks Vadimovich Volkhovskoi and 
Egor Egorovich Lazarev. The three last-named had all earlier been 
involved in London with the 'Fund of the free Russian press'.17 
'Lavrov's funeral became the christening party of our Agrarian 
Socialist League: the dear departed was its invisible godfather, and 
Semen Akimovich An-skii was, as it were the executor of his will 
concerning the league.'18 By the end of 1901 the League had 
released its first publication. At the beginning of 1902, 25,000 ~opies 
had already been published under the title Socialist Revolutionary 
Party Abroad.19 The Agrarian Socialist League had indeed become 
a major source of radical tracts to be smuggled into Russia. 
While he was with the Agrarian Socialist League, Chernov wrote 
about socialism and the revolutionary process. The policy of the 
League is set out in an essay entitled Ocherednoi - vopros 
revoliutsionnogo dela (The Immediate Task of the Revolutionary 
Cause), which the League published in London in 1900. Although, 




V. Chernov, Pered Burei, p. 118, pp. 125-27. 
ibid. p. 124-25. 
ibid. p. 127-28. 
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imprint of Chernov. 
There is no historical law that says that the socialist 
organisation of any branch of production may be possible only 
as a product of preceding capitalist development. There is no 
historical law that requires that in all branches of production 
the direct producers first have to pass through a kind of 
_ purgatory - the proletarian state - before entering the socialist 
' paradise. For a certain part of the direct producers, for certain 
branches of production, a more direct transition to socialism is 
possible through the evolution of various types of communal 
ownership, including the village commune, to the 
nationalisation of the land, and through cooperative 
associations. . .. 
We are deeply convinced that in Russia the future can belong 
only to the party that manages to find a fulcrum for its struggle 
not only in the city but also in the village, a party that can 
construct a harmonious program which would enable it to 
represent and defend simultaneously the interests of the 
industrial working class and those of the toiling p~asantry. 
Without some support among the peasantry - and still less 
against its will - no revolutionary party in Russia will be able 
to strike a serious~ decisive blow to the bourgeois-capitalist 
regime, which in our country knows how to live in peaceful 
harmony with the relics of an age of serf-owning gentry under 
the wing of Russian absolutism .... 
Only an alliance between the intelligentsia and the people can 
transform the spontaneous popular movements of our time 
into conscious action and direct them along sensible paths. 
And only a;n alliance between urban and rural workers will 
represent a vital force strong enough to break the power of the 
existing order and prepare the triumph of the ideals of 
socialism and revolution.20 
While confirming the old populist belief - that Russia's future lay 
in bypassing Western market capitalism - this essay nonetheless 
20 . Ocherednoi vopros revoliutsionnogo de/a [ The Immediate. Task .of the. 
Revolutionary Cause ] London; Agrarian-Socialist League, 1900, 
pp.8,23,26. 
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made an important and radical departure from the traditional view 
and interpretation of Russian populism. It recognised the fact that 
capitalism had indeed already emerged in Russia, that Russia had 
already experienced a substantial amount of industrialisation, and 
that there had indeed emerged a new class, the industrial 
proletariat, . whose interests should not be ignored, but rather 
represented and defended. Chernov went one step further and 
argued for an alliance between the toiling peasantry and the 
industrial working class. The revolution was no longer to be an 
exclusively peasant affair. 
The traditional view of the later Socialist Revolutionary Party, 
which Chemov was to lead, portrays it as being primarily peasant -
orientated; this is clearly a misapprehension. The Socialist 
Revolutionaries even from their earliest days took a great interest 
in the urban proletariat and in return received strong support from 
workers. In essence, Chernov was advocating a programmatical 
formulation of a proletarian vanguard leading the peasant masses. 
One of the tasks which the Agrarian-Socialist League defined as its 
mission in 1900 was 'the publication and distribution of popular 
revolutionary literature suitable both for the peasantry, as well as 
for the 'urban factory - and craft-worker, especially those. having ties 
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with the village.'21 While still fundamentally peasant-orientated1 
the League under Chernov's influence1 was concerned with both 
workers and peasants. The League did not aim at a complete 
upheaval of the movement's orientation1 but it should be recalled 
that it was Chernov who was the chief theorizer of the concept of a 
'proletarian vanguard': the proletariat was given the role of the 
vanguard; the peasantry the role of the mass strike-force.22 
The emphasis on the proletariat demonstrated the Marxian 
influence on Chernov's thought. But the key point as regards the 
idea of the proletarian vanguard in its particular Russian context is 
that it was of populist rather than Marxist provenance. Until Lenin 
began his theoretical and programmatic adjustments on the 
peasantry in 1902 - 19031 Russian Marxists continued to view the 
proletariat as the revolutionary class par excellence and expected 
little of the petty bourgeois peasantry.23 While Chernov borrowed 
much from Marx1 he attacked the Marxist view that the 'peasantry 
was a reactionary force1 together with the view that1 in order to 
achieve socialism1 proletarianisation of the peasantry was 
necessary. While conceding the advent of capitalism in Russia1 
21 ibid. p.2. 
22 V. Chernov, Zapiski, p. 336. 
23 M. Melanco, The Socialist Revolutionaries from 1902 to February 
1917;A party of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers. Unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, Indiana University, 1984. p.9. 
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Chernov argued there was no historical law that determined the 
compulsory stage of a proletarian purgatory to achieve the socialist 
ideal. The emergence of capitalism and specifically capitalist 
agriculture, had not led to the eradication of the small landholding 
peasant producer who should have been swept away by 
competition. Indeed, the peasantry had proved much more 
resilient in the face of agricultural capitalism because it had not 
been incorporated into large scale production units as was the case 
of urban industry. 
The assumption by classical Marxists, that the working peasantry24 
was 'petty bourgeois' was dispelled in the second edition of the 
pamphlet, Ocherednoi vopros revoliutsionnogo dela, published 
in 1901, as ' both theoretically and practically incorrect .' The term 
petty bourgeois gave the appearance that the small peasant 
producer was on the same plane as the large bourgeois. Chernov 
and his associates in the Agrarian Socialist League argued that 
there was a qualitative and not just a quantitative characteristic 
mark distinguishing the economy of the working peasantry and 
that of the bourgeois capitalist: 
24 ' working peasantry' [trudovoe krest'ianstvo - those who support 
themselves exclusively by their own labour ) 
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The latter [ bourgeois capitalism ] is a means of extracting · 
surplus value; the former [ peasant economy ] is simply "a 
mode of production. The latter guarantees its owner an 
unearned income; the former does not guarantee its owner 
against becoming a tributary of capitalism. The great majority 
of peasants comprise a particular class of independent 
agricultural producers, the source of whose income is labour -
but only labour which is still not alienated from the means of 
production ... In essence, therefore, the working peasantry is an 
economic category sharply distinct from the bourgeoisie and 
more closely approximating the proletariat.25 
This is not to say that there were not any similarities between the 
working peasantry, on the one hand and the rural bourgeoisie and 
agricultural proletariat on the other._ The working peasantry, like 
the bourgeoisie, owned their means of production. However, 
unlike the bourgeoisie they did not exploit the labour of others. 
The peasantry like the proletariat supported themselves 
exclusively by their own personal labour. This labour could be 
exploited by the privileged classes in the form of taxes and rents. 
·Hence, Chernov among others rationalised that the working 
peasantry were on the same plane as the proletariat and not the 
same plane as the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, as Western experience 
had shown, the peasantry invariably produced popular 
movements by joining with the proletariat rather than with the 
bourgeoisie. 26 The interests of the working peasantry were thus 
25 Oc_her~dnoi ~qpros revoliutsionnago de/a, 2nd edition [ Geneva, 1901 
], pp.9-10. 
26 ibid. pp.42-3. 
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considered by Chernov to be identical to the interests of the 
proletariat and he was later to expound on these nebulous and 
uncoordinated ideas in a much more coherent and cogent fashion 
in Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia. 
The overthrow of the autocratic state was not to be accomplished by 
the use of terror, a peculiar feature of the old populist movement. 
Rather, as Chernov states in an early manifesto of the Socialist 
Revolutionary Party, it could be achieved instead by a passive, 
peaceful withdrawal of labour and money by the peasants. 
What can the intelligentsia and proletariat do together with 
the peasantry? Everything. The peasantry gives autocracy an 
enormous portion of its material strength: money and 
soldiers; tsarist power rests upon peasant ignorance as a 
hitherto unshakable foundation. Therefore, it is not 
absolutely necessary for the entire peasantry to attack 
autocracy with armed force in order to destroy it. At the 
critical moment, for example, merely a mass refusal to pay 
taxes and furnish recruits may prove sufficient for the chief 
props of autocracy to totter, and for it to crash down with the 
first strong push. 27 
Of course, one· had to believe in the potential of peasant 
revolutionary consciousness. Its genesis came from the populists 
of the 1870's and was taken up by the neo-populists of the 1890's 
and early 1900's. However, as stated earlier, the theory of a worker 
and peasant revolution was essentially a neo-populist concept.28 
27 'Nashi zadachi v derevne' [ Our tasks in the village ], in Po voprosam 
programmy i taktiki. Sbornik statei -;z 'Revoliutsionnoi Rossii' ([Paris:] 
Tip. Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov, 1903), pp. 28. 
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Nee-populism with Chernov at the helm recognised and admitted 
the inevitability of industrialisation and the onset of a capitalist 
money economy in Russia.29 The Socialist Revolutionaries, as 
neo-populists, also recognised the deleterious long-term effects of 
this process on the commune, a point which signified that SR's 
had eschewed, once and for all, any naive notions of peasant 
socialism per se. They now felt that the still existing communal 
modes of the peasant economy would smooth the transition to a 
collecti.Yist economy by serving as a basis for their land 
socialisation program, which itself was merely a step, albeit an 
important one, towards socialism. Consequently, Chernov and the 
SR's were protective of the commune, but did not idealise it, nor 
were their plans for the achievement of the socialist order based 
directly upon it.30 Rather, Socialist Revolutionary theory saw the 
proletariat, a class born of industrialisation, as the leading force in 
the revolutionary socialist army. As for the peasantry, the SR's, as 
neo-populists had neglected them not for theoretical reasons, since 
SR theory believed peasants capable of revolutionary 
28 At least until 1905 when Lenin completed his own theory of worker and 
peasant revolution. 
29 D. Treadgold, Lenin and his rivals, Methuen, London, 1955, p.65. For 
a review of nee-populist theory refer to pp.60-82. 




consciousness, but because of their decades of long quiescence. 
Traditional historiography of the SR party implies there was a 
direct link between early populist theories calling for complete 
reliance on the peasantry and the rejection of industrialisation for 
Russia. Riasanovsky states; ' ... the Socialist Revolutionaries of the 
twentieth century, led by Victor Chernov ... remained essentially 
faithful to populism staking the future of Russia on the peasants 
and on a " socialization of land"'.31 
This is a misinterpretatiqn. While drawing on early populist ideals 
the neo-populism of .the 1890's and the SR party of the first years of 
the twentieth century was based firmly on· the theoretical 
pronouncements of Viktor Chernov, who devised an original and 
distinctive Russian theory for peasant revolution. 
Meanwhile, the Agrarian-Socialist League continued to fulfil its 
primary function, the publication and distribution of propaganda 
literature, especially designed for the peasantry. By January 1902, it 
had produced 1,000 copies ~f 'The immediate question of the 
revolutionary cause' and a further 1,000 copies of the second 
edition. In addition to this the League had also published five 
propaganda pamphlets ; 'How the Minister takes care of the 
<._: 31 N. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, Oxford University Press; New 
York (3rd edition), 1977, p.499. 
53 
peasants,' 'How the Hungarian peasants are fighting for their 
rights,' in (1,000 copies of each) and 2,000 copies each of; 'Peasant 
unions in Sicily,' 'Sketches from Russian history,' and 
'Conversations about the land.'32 Unfortunately, the product of 
their labour ·was circumvented by an agent provocateur within 
their ranks. The smuggling of illegal literature into Russia had 
always been a haphazard affair. In this case N.K.Pauli, who had 
been assigned the task of overseeing the transportation of the 
league's publications into Russia, was in the pay of the tsarist secret 
police, and most of the literature was confiscated at the frontier.33 
In late autumn of 1901, Chernov returned to Berne. It was a time 
when many of the neo-populist groups felt that the occasion was 
right to form a national political organisation. The impetus and 
driving force for unification came from the Southern Union, or 
more particularly, from two groups within it, Kiev and 
Voronezh. 34 The Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries, as the 
32 ' Kassovyi otchet Agrarno-Sotsialisticheskoi Ligi ' ( Cash-account of 
the Agrarian-Socialist League ), Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no. 8, 25 June 
1902, p.28. 
33 E.K Breshko-Breshkovskaia, ' Vospominaniia i Dumy ' ( Memoirs and 
Thoughts ) Sotsialist-Revoliutsioner, no.4. 1912, pp.104-5, pp.111-12. 
3 4 S. Sletov, ' K lstorii vozniknoveniia Partii Sotsialistov -
Revoliutsionerov, ( Toward the history of the origins of the Socialist-
Revolutionary Party ), Petrograd, 1917 p.68. Sletov's book is a posthumous 
reissue of his ' Ocherki po istorii Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov ', 
published under his party nickname of 'S.Nechetnyi' in Sotsialist-
Revoliutsioner, no.4 ,1912 pp.1-101. Sletov,while in administrative 
exile in Tambov (1897) came under the influence of his sister and Chernov, 
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Southern Union was known, was formed in Voronezh in 1897. 
The merging of the Southern Union and the only other major 
grouping, the 'Union of Socialist-Revolutionaries' or Northern 
Union, (originally centred in Saratov in 1896 by Argunov, but later 
transferred to Moscow in 1897), saw the birth of the Party of 
Socialist Revolutionaries. Other, smaller Socialist-Revolutionary 
groupin$S in Russia, such as Gershuni's predominantly Jewish 
'Workers Party for the political liberation of Russia ' and the 
independent Saratov circles also adhered to the new party at this 
time. 35 While unification was achieved within Russia, the emigre 
community outside Russia in Western Europe was still in disarray. 
M.R.Gots36 and Chernov were enthusiastic prime movers in 
seeking to unite the various quarrelling factions.3 7 After some 
deliberations with Evno Azef and Gershuni, who had travelled 
Sletov came to reject his social-democratic views, especially those 
concerning the peasantry. When Chernov left Tambov in 1899, it was Sletov 
whom he entrusted with the continuation of his work among the peasants. In 
1901 Sletov,too, went abroad to Switzerland, where he joined the Agrarian-
Socialist League; V. Chernov Zapiski Sotsialista-Revoliutsionera, pp. 
330-32. Sletov, who was killed on active service in France in 1915, was a 
prominent member of the SR Central Committee, and the brother-in-law of 
Viktor Chernov. 
35 ibid. p.68. For a detailed account of the amalgamation of nee-populist 
groups forming the united PSR refer to ibid pp.67-106. 
36 Viktor Chernov's first acquaintance with Mikhail Gots began in Berne in 
1901. V.Chernov, Pered Burei, p.147. Chernov was to later describe him 
as a 'friend and older brother'. V.Chernov,_ Pered Burei, p.146. 
37 Sletov, p.107. 
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abroad as representatives of the embryonic PSR, agreement was 
reached. The result of long and protracted negotiations was the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party, formally founded in that year, 
although it gained cohesion and importance only with the relative 
freedom within Russia, in 1905-p6. 
The newspaper 'Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia ', originally published 
by the Northern Union, was to be transferred abroad to Switzerland 
under the editorship of Chernov and Gots.38 The newspaper was 
to ·become the official organ of the newly formed and united 
party.39 A Central Committee was established to head the party. 
Among its principal members were M.A.Natanson, E.K.Breshko-
Breshkovskaia, N.S.Rusanov, V.M.Chernov, MR.Gots, and 
G.A.Gershuni. Zhitlovskii's 'Union of Russian Socialist-
Revolutionaries' was to be transformed into the 'PSR Organisation 
Abroad', which was also to include the. editorial boards of the two 
38 The first two editions of Revoliutsionnaia Rossia were published in 
Tomsk. The 3rd edition was published abroad under the editorialship of Gots 
and Chernov after the tsarist police had $eized their secret press in Tomsk 
on the 23rd of September 1901. A.A. Argunov, ' lz Proshlago Partii 
Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov ' Byloe, Vol.10/22 October 1907, pp.11 o-
12. 
39 From its third number in January 1902, Revoliutsionnaia Rossia 
officially became the organ of the united party.The theoretical organ of the 
Party was to be Vestnik Russkoi Revoliutsiia (Herald of. the Russian 
Revolution}, a journal edited in Paris by K.Tarasov (N.S.Rusanov} it 
appeared irregularly between 1901-1903. Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia 
appeared between 1901 and 1905. Sotsialist-Revoliutsioner another party 
journal had just four issues from 1910-1912. 
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party organs, Revolitftsionnaia Rossiia and Vestnik Russkoi 
Revoliutsi.ia.40 The party also at this time, acquired its slogan. V' 
bor'be obretesh ty pravo svoe ( In Struggle thou Shalt Win thy 
Rights! ).41 
The Agrarian Socialist League finally merged with the newly 
formed party in 1902, although not without some trepidation. 
Several older populists were reluctant to place their faith in a new 
party, fearing the League's autonomy would be threatened. Some 
felt the League should remain a non-party organisation open to 
both socialist-revolutionaries and social-democrats. One social-
democrat, D. Soskis, did, in fact, join. But Volkovskoi, in particular, 
felt that if the League merged, it would lose Soskis and indeed, 
inhibit future social-democrats from joining.42 In fact, of course, 
C.A. An-skii together with Chernov had originally formed the 
League as a non-partisan organisation.43 Furthermore, old 
populists were reluctant to see their faith in agrarian socialism 
entrusted to a younger group, which did not seem to share their 
view of the significance of the peasantry for the revolutionary 
40 Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.3, January 1902, p.1. 
41 Sletov. p.108. A. Spiridovitch, Histoire du Terrorisme Russe 1886-
1917, (Paris,1930), pp.102-05. 
42 V.Che~nov, _Pe~ed _Bur_ei,_ pp.158-59. 
43 ibid. p.158. 
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cause.44 
Whatever their doubts, the merger was a fait accompli. No general 
party program was adopted by the SR's during the early years. Their 
views and demands were reflected in the pages of the newspaper 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, the journal Vestnik russkoi revoliutsii 
and the collection On Questions of Program and Tactics (1903). 
What was expected of Chernov was that he should work on the 
clarification of the party's prospects, program, strategy and tactics. It 
was a period that Chernov later described as a turning point in his 
life.45 
Despite the negotiations and attempts to reach a common cau~e, 
however, it is not surprising that within the newly formed SR 
Party there were divergent views as to the role of the peasantry in 
the revolution. The Northern Union, for example, placed its faith 
in the intelligentsia and the industrial proletariat as the vehicle for 
political liberty. The peasants' role in the contemporary movement 
was not of primary importance: 
The peasantry, representing as it does the overwhelming 
majority of the working population of Russia, is destined to 
play an important part in our economic and political future. 
But while assigning the peasantry such a role in the future, 
the social-revolutionary party cannot at present consider it to 
be a major support for the achievement of political freedom, 
nor as suitable soil-. for. social-revolutionary propaganda. 
44 ibid. pp.158-59. 
45 ibid. p.136. 
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Because of its political subjection, its poverty, its ignorance, 
and its dispersal over the vast territory of Russia, the 
peasantry is relatively inaccessible to conscious mass 
revolutionary propaganda and a movement of the peasantry 
is at present impossible.46 
The movement was to comprise the socialised intelligentsia and 
the urban proletariat, even though they conceded that the capitalist 
encroachment into agriculture was rapidly stratifying the peasantry 
into a class of exploiters and exploited, the majority of whom 
constituted the exploited 'working class'. Hence, the class position 
of such a rural proletariat was similar to the socialist aspirations of 
the urban proletariat. Agitation was therefore to be directed 
towards the more developed sectors of the peasantry - but according 
to the Northern Union, not at that moment. 
The Southern Union disagreed. 
We are convinced that without the sympathy and support of 
the peasantry, the class of factory and industrial workers, is 
incapable of destroying the power of the Russian government 
and of obtaining even political freedom, not to mention the 
economic transformation of society. And we must recognise 
that revolutionary activity among the peasantry is completely 
possible at the present time, since within the peasant estate 
[soslovie] numerous groups have already formed who are as 
interested in the abolition of the existing economic and 
political structure as is the industrial proletariat.47 
46 Nashi Zadachi (Our Tasks) 2nd edition. London, 1900, p. 60. 
-4 7 Manifest Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov (1900); quoted in 
Perrie, Agrarian Policy, p. 45. 
. 59 
Like their northern comrades, the Southern Union agreed that a 
differentiation or stratification had emerged within the peasantry. 
They identified three groups, the rural petty bourgeoisie (who 
exploited hired labour), the rural proletariat (who lived exclusively 
by hiring out their labour), and the 'land-short' peasantry, who 
occupied an intermediate position between the first two groups and 
comprised the great majority of the peasantry.48 While, this last 
group still owned their means of production they were being 
' ' 
squeezed into impoverishment and forced like the rural proletariat 
to sell their labour. Consequently their class position was that of 
the urban proletariat. However, the struggle for political freedom 
was to be a gradual long term process. The Southern Union like 
their northern union counterparts viewed the primary task as the 
agitation and organisation of the urban proletariat: 'However 
'. 
important and essential· revolutionary activity in the countryside 
may be, we shall at present, out of purely tactical considerations, 
aim to concentrate our existing forces in the towns - mainly 
because of the higher cultural level of the urban working 
population, compared with the rural, and the greater productivity 
of work in this milieu.'49 
48 
49 
ibid. p. 45. 
ibid. p. 46. 
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The Northern and Southern Unions, with the exception of the 
Agrarian Socialist League, and some of the Parisian "Old -Narodo-
Vol 'tsy" from whom the League had taken much of its 
_membership, viewed their immediate task as the revolutionary 
agitation and organisation of the urban proletariat. The desire to 
launch an immediate campaign amongst the peasantry that 
Chernov and others of the Agrarian Socialist League advocated fell 
on deaf ears. Not that Chernov was contradicting his earlier stance 
of a 'proletarian vanguard' when he attempted to enlist support for 
his work among the peasantry. Essentially the difference at this 
time lay in pragmatic considerations and tactics, not in theory. The 
diverse views represented a logical extension of policies in the 
revolutionary populist circles of earlier decades, rather than an 
outcome of the a new program.SO Thus, even the pro-peasant 
wing of the newly formed SR Party the Agrarian Socialist League 
itself, as stated earlier, displayed a lively interest in urban 
workers.51 
Until Chernov's party program was accepted at the First Party 
50 In the 1880's and 1890's, revolutionary populist (Narodo-
Vol'tsy)circles, disillusioned with the peasants after numerous failed 
attemts to lead them into revolt, concentrated for the most part on the 
proletariat. 
·. 51.- .Chernov had attempted earlier in 1898 to enlist these internal 
Russian groups for his work among the peasantry, but they had failed to 
hear his call. V. Chernov, Zapiski, pp. 332-5. 
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. Congress in Dec. 1905 - Jan·. 1906, programmatical formulations 
were expressed in the various party newspapers and journals. In 
mid-1901 the new journal Vestnik russkoi revoliutsii published 
an important editorial "Ouryrogram" which served as the basis for 
joint action among the Northern Union, the Paris Old Narodo-
Vol'tsy and the Workers' Party. "Our program" clearly assigned 
the major role in the struggle with autocracy to the socialist 
intelligentsia and the urban workers. The peasants, in this concept, 
'constituted only a broad area of secondary ~upport for the 
democratic revolution, which would be won primarily in the 
urban centres.'52 In early 1902 the new central SR paper 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia - representing the Northern Union and 
the Southern Party - stated its program as follows: 
The party devotes its attention primarily to work am~ng two 
strata of the population, the industrial workers in large 
centres, and the intelligentsia ... The working class, especially 
its more advanced sector, concentrated in large towns and 
industrial centres, constitutes the main support of the 
party.53 
Consequently,- the Agrarian League, many of whose members had 
viewed amalgamation with some suspicion, joined the ne}'V party 
52 'Nasha program ma', Vestnik Russkoi Revoliutsii, no.1 (July 1901 ), 
p. 12. 
- -
53 · 'Neotlozhnaya zadacha', Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.3 (Jan. 1902), 
p. 8. 
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only as individuals, and subsequently remained organisationally 
aloof precisely in order to have the freedom to pursue their 
foremost mission of propagandising the peasantry.,54 It is 
important however, to view the program of the Agrarian Socialist 
League, which gave primacy to peasant affairs, in its proper context. 
League members were aware that they were operating in a 
movement which showed opposite priorities that is, primacy to 
workers' affairs. The League, under Chernov's tutelage~ did not 
aim at a complete re~ersal, but at a compromise: attention to both 
workers and peasants. 
While the programmatical pronouncements of the various 
factions relegated the peasantry to a secondary position, .the whole 
question was a matter of degree and not kind. Not one of these 
groups advocated abandoning the peasantry. 
While the sentiments expressed within the new -sR party may 
have antagonised certain members, the year 1902 witnessed events 
/ . 
that accelerated the change in SR attitudes toward the peasantry. 
Peasant risings in the southern provinces of Kharkov and Poltava 
sparked a huge revolt that quickly spread along the Volga and into 
the Urals, finally engulfing the entire south of Russia. 
-Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, which had so recently proclaimed the 
54 V. Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.' 158-9. 
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workers as its primary focus of attention, now devoted its entire 
June 1902 is~ue to the peasantry.SS The Agrarian Socialist League 
at its First Congress in August 1902 found the attitude sufficiently 
conciliatory to put aside its former suspicions. It approved of 
federation with the larger party; and actual union soon followed.S6 
It has been argued that from this time forward the SR party 
devoted passionate attention to peasant affairs. Indeed, the SR party 
created armed peasant brotherhoods throughout widespread areas 
of rural Russia, and created the 'SR Peasant Union' in 1902. Great 
runs of peasant- orientated agitational literature were printed both 
abroad for shipment home through secret channels, and inside 
Russia on illegal presses. SR's founded peasant newspapers. This 
period has been described by M. Perrie as 'the triumph of Chernov 
and his "agrarian" faction over the narodo-vol 'tsy [pro-worker 
faction] in the SR party.S7 Most historians, whether before Perrie 
or after her, have concurred, resulting in the traditional 
interpretation of the SR's as a peasant orientated party. 
55 
56 
See Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.8, 1902. 
ibid. no.9, 1902. This represented the vindication of Chernov's advice 
to An-skii (who for a time refused· to cooperate with Rusanov the editor of 
Vestnik Russkoi Revoliutsil), that their best tactic was to go along in a 
united front, hoping that in the course of time their opponents would be 
converted to the League's point of view. It was a tactic that Chernov was to 
pursue throughout his revolutionary career, unfortunately not with the 
same degree of success. V. Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.160-61. 
57 M. Perrie, Agrarian Policy, p. 58. 
64 
In point of fact, Socialist-Revolutionaries continued to give serious 
attention to urban workers' affairs after 1902. Socialist 
Revolutionary attitudes, programs, and practical activities as 
regards workers have their roots in the intricacies of SR theory. It 
appears paradoxical, that an organisation which posterity has 
almost universally proclaimed a peasant party should have seen its 
initial neo-populist leadership centre their debate on the question 
of whether or not the peasantry constituted fertile ground for 
revolutionary propaganda. 
Populist programs of the 1870's and certainly neo-populists' of the 
1890's, rarely advocated concentration on the peasantry alone. As 
for workers, all agreed that the proletariat was the vanguard of the 
revolutionary movement. The chief theoriser of the worker 
vanguard concept was none other than Viktor Chernov, the doyen 
of the 'pro-peasant' wing of the party. 
Chernov's triumvirate of workers, ,peasants and intelligentsia 
represents a fundamental programmatical and theoretical 
statement which is unaltered throughout the history of the SR 
party. Also, the order of preference is of primary importance and 
marks yet another clear distinction between 'Populism' and 
Chernov's 'neo-populism'. Workers were given first preference, 
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while the peasantry were assigned a secondary place. In addition, 
' the intelligentsia, since it lacked a mass basis, was last. Its role as a 
third priority only is important since populist programs of the 
1870's had given a certain preeminence to the intelligentsia. But in 
any case, the conjunction of worker, peasant, and intelligentsia was 
not new among SRs even in 1902. An editorial in the very first 
issue of Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia in 190158 proclaimed the 
necessity of carrying on the struggle in the name of workers, 
peasants and intelligentsia. The official SR program worked out in 
1905 and approved by the First Congress of the SR Party in Dec. 1905 
- Jan. 1906, did not contain the precise phrase 'worker vanguard', 
but a quick glance through the planks of the program will dispel 
any notion that the SRs were restricting themselves in any way to 
the peasantry or even favouring them. In the section on 'National 
Economic Affairs', the question of workers' legislation is, in fact, 
addressed before the land question, and at just as great a length.59 
In general, the program of the First SR Congress carefully and fully 
reflects the triadic theory of the toiling class. The phrase 'toiling 
class' and the crucial concept it represented were for the most part 
58 Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.1, 1901, p.1. 
59 See Protokoly Pervogo Sezda Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov, 
(Proceedings of the First Congress of the Socialist Revolutionary Party}, 
Paris. 1906. 
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the products of Chernov's fertile brain.60 
When the SR Party achieved organisational unity in 1902, it 
immediately joined the Socialist International with its indubitably 
Marxist-proletarian orientation.61 From this time forward, the 
SR's maintained a full-time representative in the International -
first Volkovskii, later Rubanovich - and attended all its conferences 
and congresses. SR's took part in all International functions from 
the time they joined until 1917. At the 1904 International Congress 
in Amsterdam, the SR's were assigned one of the two Russian 
votes, while the Social Democrats were awarded the other. This 
was evidence of the International's recognition of the large 
proletarian component of the SR Party. In their report to the 
congress, the SR's proclaimed that they were ' defending their 
positions in the cities, where they sought to convert workers, while 
at the same time endeavouring to propagate their ideas among the 
peasantry.62 
Until the Party Congress of December 1905 - January 1906, the party 
leaders were so enthralled with the feats of the Fighting 
60 It is intriguing to note that Chernov's triadic 'toiling class' precisely 
foreshadows current Soviet definitions of its social base: workers, peasants, 
and toiling intelligentsia. 
61 See Protokoly Pervogo Sezda, p. 1. 
62 Rapport du Parti Socialiste-Revolutionaire de Russie au Congres 
Socialiste International d'Amesterdam (Paris, 1904), pp. 1 0-11. 
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Organ~sation that they accorded it full autonomy, not even 
presuming to dict~te the choice of victims, to say nothing of 
regulating its internal affairs or selecting its personnel. However, 
the wave of terror leading up to the Revolution of 1905 demanded 
some comment by Chernov, as many of the most spectacular 
terrorist acts were known to have been perpetrated by individuals 
and groups connected with the inchoate SR Party. After the 
assassination of the very powerful reactionary police chief, von 
Plehve, in 1904, Chernov wrote typically, that ' ... the stirring events 
of our day recall to elders among us the tremendous ,events of 
twenty five years ago, and the noble fortitude of those who 
sacrificed their lives at that time.'63 
It takes no very profound reader of Aesopian language to deduce 
that Chernov was praising terror in this article. From 1900 to 1905 
Chernov strongly favoured terrorist activity. In the 1890s, before 
the Socialist Revolutionary Party was organised, Chernov's 
activities in the black earth provinces of central Russia did not lead 
him to promote violence. On the contrary any .violence on the part 
of the peasant groups he was forming could have led to restrictive 
repression before the groups could resist. Recognising this, he 
63
' · , Chernov, - lutiilei Nikolaia Poslednago, 1894-1904 (Jubilee of 
Nikolai the last}, n.p. 1904, p.6. 
,. 
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counselled his subordinates to make sure that the peasants 
understood that the immediate future required restraint.64 This 
advice made no commitments about the period beyond the 
immediate future. 
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war at the beginning of 1904 
and the assassination of Plehve on 15 July, 1904 prompted the 
formation of a group within the party who felt that its terrorist 
activities were too exclusively political and should be more closely 
integrated into the mass movement by the sanctioning of 
economic terror. The outspoken faction who advocated this view 
were called 'agrarian terrorists•.65 
Chernov opposed the radical tactics the 'agrarian terrorists' 
advocated. He urged moderation and in response to the 'agrarian 
terrorist' ascendency, the official leadership of the SR Party 
presented a policy statement that was more specific about the 
party's attitude towards violence. It envisaged the organisation of a. 
network of peasant unions which would coordinate their activities 
with those of the urban party organisations and prepare for a single 
64 Chernov, Zapiski, p.79. 
65 
'Agrarian terror' was defined as the use of violence against the lives 
and property of the economic oppressors of the people, and included such 
measures as : illicit cattle grazing and woodcutting on the landowner's estate; 
the seizure of his property by the peasant communes, arson and other 
destruction of property; the murder of pomeshchiki; and armed attacks. 
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coordinated movement. As a preparation for this rising, the 
peasants should back up their political and economic demands by a 
boycott of the landowners and the authorities. Such a boycott 
- would, of course, provoke repressions, and the peasants .would 
then meet violence with violence. At this stage, the local peasant 
organisations would act as 'combat detachments' and lead the 
peasants' opposition. A series of such conflicts would amount to a 
partial or general uprising, supporting or supported by a similar 
movement in the towns.66 
This policy statement reinforced the town-country alliance, 
however the Revolution of 1905 caught Chernov and the SRs by 
surprise. Detached from events in Geneva, he could do little but to 
offer spirited advice. Chernov's optimistic hopes of the ability of · 
the SR Party to direct events failed to eventuate. 




In 1905 for the first time in Russian history a broadly-based 
liberation movement, feeding on age-old tensions and frustrations, 
boiled suddenly to the surface. Oppositionist political parties, which 
had until then laboured in the darkness of the underground, now 
found themselves thrust into the light of day. The task confronting 
them was truly awesome. As Chernov later recalled: 'the brief era of 
freedom revealed to us the depth of the masses.'1 None of the 
parties proved equal to the task and the chance of overthrowing the 
government slipped away. But, as Lenin often pointed out, the 
revolutionary movement of 1905 was the teacher of 1917. This was 
a lesson Chernov and the SRs failed to learn. Events outstripped 
theory and while the SRs were heavily involved in the proceedings 
they failed to direct them. Spontaneity remained the keynote of the 
peasant movement throughout 1905, and if its course sometimes 
corresponded to the blueprint set out for it by the SRs, this was due 
more to coincidence than to design. 
The events of 1905 reinforced Chernov's early views of a peasant-
proletariat, town and country alliance. While condoning the 
spontaneous actions of the peasants in their seizure of the land he 
advocated party intervention to guide and direct the peasantry. 
t ~- Protokoly pervoi obshchepartiinoi konferentsii partii sotsialistov-
revo/iutsionerov, avgust 1908. Paris, 1908. pp.96-97. 
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The SRs, he said, welcomed all spontaneous expressions of 
discontent, insofar as they revealed the growth of a revolutionary 
mood in the countryside. It would be pure demagogy, however, if 
they were actually to advocate the use of traditional peasant tactics, 
such as 'agrarian terror'; instead, they should urge organisation and 
coordination with the urban movement. Similarly, their slogan 
was not simply 'take the land', but involved the concept of 
socialisation. This could be achieved by direct action as part of the 
revolutionary peasant movement. The peasants should: 
seize the fields and have them ploughed by the commune; use 
the pastures and forests on the state and appanage lands and 
on the gentry estates, in an organised manner; and then drive 
out the authorities and take possession of the land. This 
possession of the land, however, should consist not in the 
arbitrary seizure of particular plots by particular individuals, 
but in the abolition of the boundaries and borders of private 
ownership, in the declaration of the land to be common 
property, and in the demand for its general, egalitarian and 
universal distribution for the use of those who work it.2 
The social democrats, while conceding the importance of the 
peasantry in the revolutionary struggle, nevertheless still adhered 
to the Marxist notion of the peasantry as petty bourgeois and hence 
antagonistic to the proletariat. Thus during the year 1905, Lenin 
advocated the view that while the peasant movement was 
2 
'Reaktsionnaia demagogiia revoliutsionnii sotsializm', 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.67, May 1905. p.3. 
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significant, the solution was 'to support the peasant bourgeoisie 
against any kind of feudalism and against the feudal landlords; to 
support the urban proletariat against the peasant bourgeoisie and 
any other bourgeoisie. •3 Yet this lacked the specifics of the SR land 
policy and, if anything, can be criticised as being opportunistic, 
leading to injustice and inequality of distribution. 
[On] ... the question: to whom shall the confiscated land be 
given, and how? ... There we shall certainly be with the rural 
proletariat, with the entire working class, against the peasant 
bourgeoisie. In practice, this may mean the transfer of land to 
the class of petty peasant proprietors wherever big estates based 
on bondage and feudal servitude still prevail, where there are 
as yet no material prerequisites for large-scale socialist 
production; it may mean nationalization, proviocd the 
democratic revolution is completely victorious; or the big 
capitalist estates may be transferred to workers' associations; 
for from the democratic revolution we shall at once, and 
exactly in accordance with the measure of our strength, the 
strength of the class-conscious and organized proletariat, begin 
to proceed to the socialist revolution. We stand for continuous 
revolution. We shall not stop halfway. The reason we do not 
now immediately promise all sorts of "socialization" is simply 
because we know what is actually required for that task and do 
not gloss over but reveal the new class struggle that is ripening 
within the ranks of the peasantry. 
At first we shall support the peasantry in general against the 
landlords, support it to the limit and by every means, 
including confiscation, and then (or rather not "then," but at 
the same time) we shall support the proletariat against the 
peasantry in general.4 
3 
'The Proletariat and the Peasantry,' Vpered, March 10, 1905, quoted 
in Vernadsky, A Source Book on Russian History, from Early Times to 
1917, 3 vols, Yale University Press , New Haven : 1972, Vol.111. p.715. 
4 
'The Attitude of Social Democracy toward the Peasant Movement,' 
Proletarii, no.16, September 1, 1905, quoted in ibid, pp.715-716. 
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One of the most visible and famous aspects of the revolutionary 
workers' movement in 1905 were the workers' Soviets, which 
sprang up in the capitals as well as in innumerable provincial 
towns. SRs participated from the outset, in forming their factions in 
the numerous Soviets. The peasant revolutionary movement 
similarly saw the creation of a body which was to rival the 
revoluti.onary parties in their claims to represent the interests of the 
peasantry: the All-Russia Peasant Union.5 The SR's attitude 
towards this union was defined by Ch~rnov in an article· in the 
party's central organ. The party, he said, welcomed the movement 
as a means of drawing into the political struggle broader strata of 
society than would be attracted to purely party organisations. SRs 
were encouraged to join the unions in order to exert an influence 
on their aims and tactics, and thus to ensure that the party gained 
the greatest possible advantage from their formation. -To. this end, 
Chernov welcomed the extension of the 'Union of unions' to 
include trade unions of workers and peasants, as well as unions of 
professional men which had originated the movement.6 These 
5 The congresses of the Peasant Union met in July and November 1905. 
The initiative for the formation of the All-Russia Peasant l,Jnion came in May 
1905 from a group of liberals in Moscow who sought to involve the 
peasantry in the campaign for the formation of professional unions, which 
were playing such an important part in the development of the revolution'ary 
movement at that time. 
6 Chernov. 'Organizatsionnii vopros', (The Organisational Question), 
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sentiments were fully in accord with his earlier pronouncements 
on a triple alliance. 
On August 6 an imperial manifesto created an elective Duma with 
consultative powers. The proposals were totally rejected by the SRs, 
who planned to turn a boycott of the elections into a general attack 
on the autocratic government. 
In the towns, Chernov proposed an active boycott to be backed up by 
a general political strike. In the countryside, the electoral gatherings 
of heads of households should be replaced by protest meetings of 
the entire village, and the villages should refuse to pay taxes or 
supply recruits for the army. The peasants should re-elect their own 
officials then launch a political strike and boycott of the authorities. 
Such a movement in the countryside, with the slogan 'land and 
liberty,' supported by a general strike in the towns, would constitute 
a major assault on the autocracy.7 
As always, Chernov was reluctant to predict in advance what might 
be the extent of the achievement of the forthcoming revolution. 
Before 1905, the party had assumed that the introduction of 
socialism would be preceded by a transitional period of 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.69 June, 1905, pp.2-5. 
7 Chernov. 'Vneshnii mir i vnutrennyaia voina,' 
Rossiia, no.73 August, 1905, pp.3-5. 
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indeterminate length, in which power would reside in the hands of 
the bourgeoisie. At the same time, the party hoped that the 
revolution would go beyond the framework of bourgeois 
democracy in its achievements in the field of social and, 
particularly, agrarian reform. The SR minimum program, which 
included the demand for the socialisation of land - an anti-capitalist 
measure - was designed as a guideline for this transitional period, 
although the SRs insisted that they could not predict in advance 
what form of state structure would replace the autocracy.8 
In January 1905, immediately after Bloody Sunday, Chernov argued 
that the party should aim to extend and expand !he revolutionary 
movement as far as possible, with no preconceived ideas 
concerning its possible limitations. For the true revolutionary, he 
claimed there were no limits except the degree of energy, 
preparedness and consciousness of the masses. It might well be that 
the revolution would be bourgeois in its outcome, but this did not 
mean that the party should restrict its program and tactics in 
advance to the achievement of a purely bourgeois revolution.9 
8 See 'krestianskoe dvizhenie,' Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.8 June, 
1902, pp.3-4; 'Sotsializatsiia zemli i kooperatsiia v selskom khoziaystve,' 
ibid, no.14 December, 1902, pp.5-6, no.15 January, 1903. p.7; 'Proekt 
programmy PS-Rov,' ibid, no.46 May, 1904, pp.1-3. 
9 All opposition leaders were convinced that they knew what sort of 
upheaval was in store for Russia. They all knew it was not to be a 'socialist' 
revolution. They all knew it would eliminate the absolute power of the Tsar, 
76 
The SRs should aim to achieve not only political but also social 
reforms from the revolution.10 
Marxists were criticised by the SRs for merely wishing to sharpen 
the bourgeois revolution instead of looking ahead to the socialist 
phase. Political freedom was a necessary first phase of the 
revolutionary process and in this sense the revolution would be 
analogous to Western revolutions. Liberty was a prerequisite for 
organising the masses. Nevertheless, those who championed the 
class struggle of the workers could not fight for the victory of the 
middle class. On this crucial point the SRs were in agreement with 
Lenin. although for social democrats this was a paradoxical position 
in their eyes. 
Thus, it was not the middle class who were to play the leading role 
(indeed, it must be prevented from doing so, according to Lenin and 
Chernov) but instead the urban proletariat. N. Onegin in an-article 
in Revoliutsionaia Rossiia, asserted that in view of the weakness 
of the liberal bourgeoisie, the revolution would have to be made by 
and transfer the power to a democracy, that it would inaugurate an era of 
personal and public freedom, and that it would end in the enactment of 
sweeping social reforms. Martov called it a 'bourgeois' revolution; Miliukov 
accepted the term though would not use it himself; Lenin insisted on calling 
it a 'bourgeois democratic' one; Chernov refused to accept or use the word 
'bourgeois' at all, and spoke of a 'toilers (trudovaia) or 'political' 
revolution. Treadgold. p.138. 
10 Chernov. 'Preddverie revoliutsii,' 
January, 1905, p.2. 
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the workers and peasants under the leadership of the revolutionary 
intelligentsia. The overthrow of autocracy would therefore also 
involve the overthrow of the landed gentry and the bourgeoisie 
who were its main supporters, and this would guarantee the 
introduction of socio-economic as well as political change.11 Put 
simply, the workers and peasants would destroy autocracy, seize 
power, prevent the entrenchment of the bourgeoisie, establish a 
democratic republic and sweep on to social revolution without a 
break. In essence, the attainment of socialism was a revolutionary 
process of 'permanent revolution', a concept not too dissimilar to 
Trotsky's concept of 'permanent revolution'. 
The forthcoming revolution will be achieved mainly by the 
efforts of the workers - the proletariat and peasants. They 
should take from this revolution all that the social conditions 
permit them to take - the most important of these conditions 
being the extent of their own consciousness. They should not 
restrict the scale of this revolution in advance for the benefit of 
the bourgeoisie, but on the contrary they should turn it into a 
permanent one, oust the bourgeoisie step by step from the 
positions it has occupied, give the signal for a European 
revolution, and then draw strength from there.12 
The socialisation of land - which was not socialism - would give 
the workers and peasants a strongpoint from which they could 
1 1 N. Onegin. 'Politika i sotsializatsiia zemliv nashe programme,' 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.67 (Prilozhenie), May, 1905, pp.6-8. 
12 M Gots. 'lz dnevnika chtatelia,' Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no. 70 July 
1905, p.12. 
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advance to build a complete socialist state. There were still to be two · 
phases, but no significant pause between phases. On this point 
Lenin and Chernov agreed. Tactically speaking a consensus can said 
to have been reached in regard to SR and SDs' (both wings) analysis 
of 1905. The enemy was tsarism; the temporary ally was found in 
the liberals; the leading force was the urban proletariat; the mass 
support was the peasantry; and the goal was initially that of a 
liberal democracy. The sole difference was on the agrarian question. 
Marxists wished to extend property in land, the SRs wished to 
socialise it. 
In October 1905, the revolutionary movement culminated in a 
extensive general strike. Paralysed in their essential activities and 
forced at last to recognise the immensity of the opposition, Nicholas 
ll and his gov~rnment finally capitulated. On October 17, the tsar, 
advised by Witte, issued the October Manifesto. This brief 
document guaranteed civil liberties to the subjects, announced a 
Duma with the true legislative function of passing or rejecting all 
proposed laws, and promised a further expansion of the new order 
in Russia. In short, the October Manifesto made the empire of the 
Romanovs a constitutional monarchy. 
Also, it split the opposition. The liberals and moderates of all sorts 
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felt fundamentally satisfied. The revolutionaries, such as SDs and 
SRs, on the contrary, considered the tsar's concessions entirely 
inadequate and wanted, in any case, a Constituent Assembly elected 
on the basis of the 'four-tailed' system - universal, equal, direct and 
secret-suffrage, not handouts from above. 
Nonetheless, a degree of liberation did occur after October 1905 and 
provided a freer atmosphere for revolutionaries to operate in. At 
the end of October the emigre SR leadership, with the exception of 
Mikhail Gots, who was too ill to travel, returned to Russia from 
Geneva to take over direct control of the party's activities there. 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia ceased publication, 13 and Chernov was 
entrusted with the task of establishing a legal party newspaper in St. 
Petersburg to take its place. Chernov was the first to travel to Russia 
on a false passport under the fictitious Jewish name of Arona 
Futera.14 Chernov arrived in Helsinfors (Helsinki), Finland, after a 
boat trip from Stockholm, which landed him originally in Abo 
(Turku)' in Finland. A train from Helsinfors to St.Petersburg 
completed Chernov's journey to Russia. While in Finland 
Chernov was able to meet revolutionary activists such as Tideman, 
Frankengauzer, Volter and Stenbek. 
13 
14 
The last issue being no.77 November, 1905. 
Chernov. Pered Burei, p.231. 
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Chernov arrived in St.Petersburg towards the end of October 1905 
.and went straight to the offices of Russkoe Bogatsvo (Russian 
Wealth), where he . was subsequently advised to explore the 
possiblity of taking over a legal populist newspaper Syn Otechestva 
(Son of the Fatherland) as the successor to Revoliutsionnia Rossiia 
and as the official SR newspaper. Indeed, Chernov later stated that 
of all the populist presses Syn Otechestva was the closest to his 
position. 15 After some preliminary discussion Syn Otechestva 
became the official SR newspaper and began publication in the 
beginning of November with the SR slogan prominently displayed_ 
on the front page. The new editorial board of Syn Otechestva was 
to consist of Shreider, its existing editor; Peshekhonov and 
Miakotin, from the board of Russkoe Bogatstvo; and Chernov and 
Rusanov, the latter being editor of the SR journal Vestnik Russkoi 
Revoliutsii. 
The relative freedom of the post October period engendered in 
many legal populists a desire to come out from the underground 
into the open and form a legal party organisation. Indeed, 
Annenskii wished to make it a precondition for the publishing of 
Syn Otechestva. Chernov urged ~aution as he viewed the future 
' 
more pessimistically than Annenskii. Events proved Chernov's 
15 ibid, p.237. 
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stance as being correct. The end of December saw the government, 
in a new wave of repression close the fledgling newspaper. Its 
survival can be measured in weeks.16 The issue of an open and 
legal party was to re-emerge at the party's First Congress which was 
to be held towards the end of December. The split that occurred 
then was to prove to be of a permanent nature and lead to the 
secession of the 'Popular Socialists' to form a separate party. 
Just prior to the party congress Chernov addressed the St.Petersburg 
Soviet, a proletarian organisation which arose in mid October 1905, 
largely under Menshevik auspices. The SRs were influential 
enough to have one of their party leaders, Avksentiev elected as co-
chairman of the Soviet.17 On the key issue of the eight hour day, 
the SRs, whose program had long sponsored this reform, rejected a 
Bolshevik resolution calling for the Soviet to demand the 
immediate introduction of the eight hour day in the capital's 
factories. In his speech Chernov responded with sarcasm and 
asserted that the Soviet had not yet· defeated the autocracy and the 
Bolsheviks were already wanting to take on the capitalists. SR 
16 For a detailed account of the period refer to Chernov, Pered Burei, 
pp.223-255, which is based on an article that appeared in 1923. See 
Chernov, 'Ot Revoliutsionnoi Rossii k Synu Otechestva,' (From 
Revolutionary Russia to Son of the Fatherland), Letopis Revoljucii, ed. 
Grzebin, Berlin 1923, no.1 pp.66-98. 
17 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.256. 
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opposition to the resolution calling for the i mm e di ate 
introduction of the eight hour day was tactical, since populist, 
Prqto-SR, and SR workers' programs had long included planks in 
favour of limiting the work-day and, in recent years, for the eight 
hour day. Chernov on several occasions claimed, in fact, that SRs 
had called for the eight hour day before the SDs. On the question of 
the eight hour day the SR leadership showed greater sensitivity to 
the desires of factory level activists and to practical realities than did 
their Social Democratic cohorts, since SR and SD workers in the 
\ 
factories, including Bolshevik, considered the immediate demand 
for the eight hour day impractical.18 Having passed the resolution, 
the Soviet almost immediately regretted it. The hasty and 
premature implementation of the demand caused factory owners to 
call a lockout devastating to workers.19 SRs responded by urging 
the use of forceful means 'to impel the owners to open the factories 
immediately.•20 SRs and SDs then codperated in forming the so-
called Unemployment Commissions to aid the 70,000 unemployed 
and locked-out workers in the capital. 
The primary lesson to be drawn from consideration of SR 
18 1905 god v Peterburge. Sovet rabochikh deputatov, (The year 1905 
in Petersburg. Soviet workers deputies). Leningrad, 1925, vol. II, pp.45-
59. Chernov, Pered Burei, p.252. 
19 ibid. p.211. 
20 ibid. p.112. 
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involvement in the Petersburg and Moscow Soviets is that both 
bodies, while jealously guarding their proletarian status, recognised 
the SR party as a major workers' party along with the Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks. The smaller workers' parties such as the Bund 
and the Polish Socialists were granted only minor representation. 
This alone is worthy of notice in view of long-held views about the 
SRs as a peasant party. 
I 
Chapter 4 
Marx and the Agrarian Question: 
Class Analysis 
84 
Marxism is a doctrine of revolution. Its theories of history, 
economic relations and class support a revolutionary end-in-view. 
Russians had been theorising about revolution and how to make 
one for some time before Marxism appeared to offer Russian 
thinkers support for the argument that Russia needed a revolution. 
Viktor Chernov was one of those thinkers. It is safe to say that he 
would have been a revolutionary if Marx had not ever lived. He 
did not question Marxist revolutionism. He merely posed the 
question : do Marx's sub-hypotheses on history, economic relations 
and -class support the major theory that revolution must occur as 
Marx said it would, for the reasons Marx offered, in every social-
poli tical unit? Chernov's critique of Marxist class analysis was 
based on the subjective method, the structure of which denies 
Marx's theory of ·history. For Chemov, Marx had started off in the 
right direction in his appreciation of subjective factors of knowledge 
and action, but had lost himself in economics. The causes of social-
historical phenomena would not reduce to the simple categories of 
economic relations. Chernov's revision in this area of the general 
theory fell within the larger question of whether Marxism was 
universally valid, that is, applicable to a nation in which, to use one 
of Chernov's recurring phrases, ' the overwhelming majority of-the --
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population ' derived their livelihood from toil on the land. The 
subjective method in sociology proved extremely -useful in this 
area, for he turned again to early Marxism to discover the source of 
Marxism's anti-agrarian world-view. In an essay entitled 
'Obshches tvenno-psikhologicheskie istochn iki pervonachal nykh 
agrarnykh vozzrienni Marksa i Engel 'sa' (Social-psychological 
sources of Marx and Engels' original agrarian views), Chernov 
attempts to apply psycho-social analysis to a given historical 
problem. It is an interesting early attempt: unfortunately the 
argument is unprovable. I 
Chernov, 'Obshchestvenno-psikhologicheskie istochniki 
pervonachalnykh agrarnykh vozzrienni Marksa i Engel'sa,' in Marksizm i 
agrarnyi vopros : istoriko-kriticheskii ocherk, ( Marxism and tha 
agrarian question: a historical-critical essay, Petersburg, 1906, p.132). 
Marksizm i agrarnyi vopros, cited here as Miav, is a collection of essays, 
many of which appeared at the turn of the century in Russkoe Bogatstvo 
(Russian Wealth) and Nakanunie (On the Eve). See 'Tipy kapitalisticheskoi 
i agrarnoi evoliutsia' (Types of capitalist and agrarian evolution), Russkoe 
Bogatstvo, Nos.4,5,6,1 O (April, May, June, October, 1900); and under 
B.Olenin (one of Chernov's pseudonyms), ' Stranichka iz istorii razvitiia 
sotsialisticeskoi mysli, ( Pages from the history of development of socialist 
thought), Nakanunie, from II, No. 19 (June, 1900) to Ill, No. 29 (May, 
1901 ), eight issues. When Chernov collected his essays, he gave them the 
titles cited here followed by Miav, and pagination from that collection. 
Chernov also developed his theory of a class and class struggle in a series of 
articles in Revoliutsionaia Rossiia in 1902 and 1903. In particular refer 
to 'K teorii klassovoi borby' (Towards a theory of class struggle), 
nos.26,27,34, 1903. Also see Krestianin i Rabochi kak ekonomicheskiia 
kategorii (Peasant and Worker as economic categories), Moscow, 1906 and 
Marksizm i slavianstvo k voprosu o vnieshnei politik sotsializma 
-(Marxism and Slavdom: toward the question of a foreign policy of socialism), . 
Petrograd, 1917. 
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For Marx and Engel's, he argued, Paris in 1848 was the centre of the 
world - the centre of revolutionism and radical thought. They had a 
large emotional stake in the revolution, especially Engels, w~o was 
in Paris during the summer. When the revolution 1failed, Engels 
found a scapegoat in the French pe~santry, who were propagandised 
' through the filthy canal of bourgeois leaflets .. .' .2 Engels' bitter 
accusations against the peasants were historically correct. The 
French peasants did cling to their plots of land, were drawn to the 
name Napoleon, and did display a kind of fanatic hatred of the 
Parisian proletariat. But why had not the spokesmen of the workers 
carried out their own propaganda? And who is to blame if the 
bourgeoisie realised the elemental power of the peasantry? All the 
peasants received from the revolutionary government was higher 
taxes. But Engels had drawn the conclusion that the peasants were 
reactionary. It was unfortunate, Chernov thought, that Marxism 
was developing as a world-view just during this epoch of sharpest 
conflict between village and city. This left its mark on Marxism, and 
' traces of it are still not eradicated to the present time.'3 
In his' judgment, as to the causes of Marxist 'peasantophobia' 
2· . Chernov, 'Obshchestvennp-psikhologicheskie istochniki,' Miav, 
p.1~5. 
3 Chernov, 'Obshchestvenno-psikhologicheskie istochniki,' Mia v, 
pp.136-140; Chernov, 'Popravki i ogovorki' (Corrections and exceptions}, 
Miav, p.144. 
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Chernov professed reluctance to question such authorities as Marx 
and Engels, but added that he did 'not particularly like the way of 
appealing to the 'church fathers'; it reminds one too much of 
scholastic orthodox theology.'4 Moreover, since Marx an,d Engels 
had drawn some correct deductions from the lessons of 1848, he 
proposed to ask a few questions through an analysis of three major 
Marxist documents which showed that in countries with divided 
toilers - urban workers and peasants - a revolution could succeed 
only through union of these forces.5 
Chernov thought that Marx was already by 1850 shifting his 
appreciation of the political role of the peasantry in 1848. In 
considering the 1848 revolution, Marx saw that anti-peasant 
measures emanating from the cities had turned the peasants against 
the revolution. And he came to believe that the working class could 
not carry out the revolution, could not make one step forward ~ntil 
the peasants and petty bourgeoisie accepted the proletariat as its 
vanguard.6 The battle between industrial workers and bourgeoisie 
4 
5 
Chernov, 'Popravki i ogovorki,' Miav, p.144. 
Chernov, 'Popravki i ogovorki,' Miav, p.145 and throughout. His 
analysis rests on Die Klassenkampfe in Frankreich, 1848-1850 (Berlin, 
1850); Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, third edition 
(Hamburg, 1885); Der Burgerkrieg in Frankreich, third edition (Berlin, 
1891 ). Excerpts from all of these are readily available in L.S. Feuer's 
(ed.), -Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Fontana, 
1978. 
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had failed to give the struggle a national content. Chernov drew an 
obvious conclusion. Since reactionary elements had been able to 
localise the movement in several large centres and create discord 
between city and village. 'It, seems more than clear that the single 
historical conclusion which we might draw from these events [ of 
1848 ] are as follows: in countries where the working population 
falls into two great parts - industrial proletariat and peasant 
agriculturists - in such countries only that movement can be vital, 
rational and successful which will synthesise with earlier 
unsuccessful movements and unify the concentrated power of the 
city and the support of the village peasant mass.'7 This was, of 
course, the revolutionary ideal. But did not peasants and 
proletarians fall into opposing classes? No, and Marx himself 
showed why. 
Marx had seen that 'the agricultural population of France is more 
than three-quarters of the entire nation, consisting for the most part 
of so called free landholders .... 'But [Chernov continued to cite 
Marx] under the system of parcellisation, the land is no more than a 
tool, a means of toil.' The peasants are exploited by mortgage, rent 
6 Chernov, 'Popravki i ogovorki,' Miav, pp.145-14a; see Feuer, 
Marx and Engels: Basic Writings, p.337, p.332-333, p.371. Chernov was 
working from Die Klassenkampfe in Frankreich and Der achtzehnte . 
Brumaire Louis Bonaparte. 
7 Chernov, 'Popravki i ogovorki,' Miav, p.149, p.171. 
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and national taxes, and ' ... the exploitation of the peasant is 
distinguished only in form from the exploitation of workers. The 
exploiter is one and the same - capital. Titles of ownership 
belonging to the peasant serve only as a talisman by means of 
which it [capital] could charm and bewitch the peasantry - and, on 
occasion excite the peasantry against the industrial proletariat ... •8 
In Chernov's view Marx was moving towards a view of peasants 
and proletarians as differing only in the form of their exploitation. 
In Marx's own terms, he continued, it is difficult to include the 
toiling peasantry, for whom the land is only a pure 'productions 
instrument' in the general category of middle class. The peasantry is 
not an estate, but a class of small independent producers who live 
by their own toil. They are not excommunicated from the means of 
production, but are undoubtedly only a part of the huge army of 
toil, a part of the toiling people, another part of which is the 
industrial proletariat. There are elements among the peasantry who 
carry some marks of exploiters, for they live in part by unpaid toil. 
They are not toilers who earn their bread by the sweat of their 
brows, but they have not yet become bourgeoisie who live entirely 
upon the labour of others. To number in the ranks of the 
8 ibid. pp.149-50. 
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bourgeoisie peasants whose exploitation in the words of Marx 
differs "'only in form" from [the exploitation] of workers - that 
commits violence on healthy thought. It ignores [peasants'] 
essential economic position.'9 Even in Das Kapital, Marx says 
that the land in the hands of the small producers is only a 
'productions instrument,' or, in other words ' a small means of 
production which serves the producer himself as a means of 
production and not growth in its value by means of the labour of 
others, [and is] in no sense capital.'10 
Consequently, Chernov continued, small producers are not petty-
capitalists and, hence not petty bourgeois. The latter are only 
quantitatively different from the large bourgeoisie. But between the 
' 
toiling peasantry and the capitalist class there exists a qualitative 
difference, a direct opposition, as between exploited and exploiters. 
On the other hand, between proletariat and peasantry there is only 
the difference in the form of their exploitation. Hence, it is artificial 
to tear the toiling peasants out of the common working mass and 
rele~ate them tp the petty bourgeoisie. 'In this lies ,one of the , 






ibid. pp.150-151; he cites Das Kapital, I, p.616. 
ibid. pp.150-151. 
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Chernov had built here a tight argument, a subtle combination of 
reason and authority which made him appear more scholastic than 
he might have wished. Again Marx had laid the snare which 
Chernov ~prung on the Marxists, and he had brought off this little 
coup in enemy territory, in 1economic analysis. For he had done 
nothing except show that if one were going to divide classes on the 
basis of economic exploitation, then Marx and reason demonstrated 
that peasants were as much exploited as their brother proletarians. 
It is this matter of exploitation which defined - economically -
membership in narod. 
At· the same time, Chernov was not blind. He knew that Marx and 
Engels had made statements about peasants and agricultural 
economics which were hardly in the spirit of the passages he cited 
to show how Marx had once accepted peasants in the legions of the 
righteous. Chernov, using an historian's device, explained the 
contradictions as a result of time: the views of Marx and Engels had 
changed as they moved through their lives, just as conditions 
around them changed their views. Marx in the last volume of Das 
Kapital saw that agriculture and agriculturists suffered from the 
inroads of 'capital,' yet he, in the Manifesto, spoke of the 'idiocy of 
'rural life,' and iri his- Der Achtzehnte Brumaire ·of Louis 
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Napoleon, referred to peasants as a 'class of barbarians standing 
half outside society.' Thus, Chernov thought it 'interesting' to trace 
the source of these changes in Marx's and Engels' agrarian views 
and 'at the same time ... trace the social-psychological motives of this 
evaluation.'12 
The 'evil of the day' when Marxism was taking shape was the 
collision between city workers and peasants, a collision which led to 
the failure of democratic movements. The reactionary tactic of 
divide and rule worked because the forms of exploitation were 
different, and, as a result, the most pressing demands of peasants 
and proletarians were different. The peasants were not formal 
proletarians but prey to the usurer, merchant, landlord and 
government, and were exploited no less and often more than the 
pure-blooded proletariat. They did not psychologically join the 
spirit of the proletariat because they were formally owners of the 
means of production and considered themselves entrepreneurs. 
They did not ever came naturally to the idea of a collective state as a 
means to peasant ends. It was clear to Chernov that the idea of state 
socialisation would have to come from outside, for the state was, to 
12 Chernov, 'Sviaz agrarnykh vozzrienii Marksa i Engel'sa c ikh 
pervonachalnym obschim mirosozertsaniem' (The bond of Marx's and Engel's 
agrarian views with their original general world-view), Miav, pp.110-




the peasants, an alien , external power. One could draw another 
conclusion: nothing good was to be expected from the peasants, that 
the peasant was a hopeless individualist, and therefore, bourgeois. 
Considering the peasants as conservative, even reactionary, Marx 
and Engels had thought the only hope was for the peasants to lose 
their narrow interests and assume the world-view of the 
proletariat.13 
It was assuming a great deal, Chemov wrote, to expect a whole class 
to forego its present interests for future, ideal interests.14 And 
Marx, with all his genius, was mortal: he could not deduce all 
development from the limited frame of his epoch. He generalised 
from the data before him but could not see the limitations to his 
generalisations which would derive from further development. 
Now, with the publication of Franz Mehring's Aus dem 
literarischen Nachlass van Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und 
Ferdinand Lassalle, (Stuttgart, 1902), one could discover Marx's and 
Engels' social-political expectations, and (one must draw Chernov's 
conclusion for him), if one knew their expectations, one could 
understand their low esteem for peasants.15 
13 Chernov, 'Sviaz agrarnykh vozzrienii,' Miav, pp.112-116; 
'Popravki i ogovorki,' Miav,pp.151-152. 
14 Chernov, 'Popraviki i ogovorki,' Miav,p.152. 
15 Chernov, 'Sviaz agrarnykh voszrienii', Miav,pp.118-119. The first 
three volumes of Mehring's Nachlass appeared in 1902, the fourth in 
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As concerns the problem of class interest, Chernov pointed out that 
Marx himself had noted that the proletariat had also voted for 
Louis Napoleon. ·And he asked why this also was not a 'brilliantly 
foolish anachronism, a joke of world history, a pathetic farce, 
etc.'16 His point is well taken. Why should Marx apply two 
measuring rods to one social action - one for peasants and another 
for proletarians? If proletarians were so much more politically 
aware than pe~sants, why had they also voted for Louis Napoleon? 
Had Marx erred in his assessment of what social factors were 
effective in determining class interests and action? 
Marx had argued that the mode of production of Parzellenbauern 
isolated them from each other. They acquire a mode of life more in 
exchange with nature than in relation to society. If millions of 
families live in economic conditions which isolate their form of 
life, interests and education from the life, interests and education of 
1922. Since the last contains many pre-1850 works, Chernov probably 
would have made a stronger argument had he had access to this further 
material. 
16 Chernov, 'Popravki i ogvorki', Miav, p.155. Chernov could have 
added more: 'The symbol that expressed their [the peasants] entry into the 
revolutionary movement, clumsily cunning, knavishly naive, doltishly 
sublime, a calculated superstition, a pathetic burlesque, a cleverly stupid 
anachronism, a world-historic piece of buffoonery, and an undecipherable 
hieroglyphic for the understanding of the civilised - this symbol bore the 
unmistakable features of the class that represents barbarism within 
civilisation.' See Feuer, Marx and Engels: Basic Writings, p.354. 
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other classes, then these millions of families constitute a class. H 
there exist between petty peasants exclusively local connections, and 
their individual interests do not become general, they in no way 
form a class. Chernov countered: the idea of class is relative. For 
example, the bourgeoisie is a class in so far as it oppresses workers. 
However, the bourgeoisie is itself a differentiated and complex 
aggregate. Witness the conflict between bourgeoisie "Yho live by 
rent and those who live by capital , an important and dramatic 
conflict in world history.17 
Furthermore, is it reasonable or real to divide society into just two 
classes? Chernov would argue in the negative, for society is to the 
highest degree complex, and was 'wary of an exclusively economic 
category .. .' To postulate inevitable struggle between classes 
necessitates smoothing out all differences within classes. There is 
no single class Parzellenbauern. It is a class only within the limits 
of social forces which oppose it, and is not a one-sided comparision 
of its constituent elements. As men become conscious of struggle 
between elements of society, their narrow personal, group, and 
professional interests recede before class interests. Society devolves 
into two powerful forces: the army of toil and the army of 
_exploitation. However, upon the banner of toil there is written the 
17 Chernov, 'Popravik i ogovorki', Miav, pp.155-158. 
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destruction of all classes and the triumph of the general human 
ideal, and this general ideal transcends class interests. 'The growing 
army of toil becomes more and more not only a great material force 
but, even earlier, a greater intellectual force in contemporary 
society. And this is because its cause is the cause of all humanity; its 
reign is not the reign of privilege but the reign of toil, which is itself 
the general human element.•18 
It must be recognised that the above statement expresses Chernov's 
vision of man as an individual integrity fulfilling his humanity in 
society, but the sympathy which informs them is within the spirit 
of the intellect which made them available to other minds. 
Chemov presented here an important qualification to the lines of 
the Manifesto which claim 'that in times when the class struggle 
nears the decisive hour ... a small section of the ruling class cuts itself 
adrift and joins the revolutionary class that holds the future in its 
hands.' In short, idealisation of class interests does not stop at the 
limits of economic categories. True, narrow interests coalesce into 
class interests, but class interests are only, to paraphrase Nietzsche, a 
' 
' 
rope across the abyss from individual to man. One may argue that 
middle class merchants and industrialists supported revolution in 
1789 and 1848 only to gain direct political victory over landed 
18 ibid. pp.158-159. 
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agriculturally based nobility, but the ideals of revolution were 
universalised. The Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen is not 
a class document. 
For Chernov, Marx and Marxists' insights into the causes of social 
action were limited by their economic analysis and, as a 
consequence, could not comprehend that one need not be a 
Hegelian to see the working of ideals in history. Chernov's 
understanding that the 'army of toil' was not only a great material 
force, but a greater intellectual force, is an essential qualification of 
economic materialism. In turning Hegel right side up , Marx, in 
effect, misunderstood the truly important thing Hegel had to say: 
ideas make history go. Chernov pointed out that ideas are not 
capitalised, not deified, but are no less real, and, while not solving 
the vast problem of the effect of ideals upon social action, the i~ea 
' 
of man as a mental and material individual integrity had at least 
cast the problem in terms permitting further inquiry. One, could use 
the term class interest and think in terms of economic classes, but it 
. was false to extract the effect of ideals from class structure and 
action, just as it was 'assuming a great deal to expect a whole class to 
-
forego its present interests for future, ideal interests.' Change would 
come, but how could ·one relegate peasants to Tartarus when they 
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had not yet conceived themselves as constituent elements of 
universal man with universal ideals? In the closing pages of his 
essay, Popravki i ogovorki, Chernov noted that only the 
Proudhonists had tried to lead and propagandise the peasants in 
1848. The peasants, earning their daily bread, heard only distant 
thunder.19 In retrospect, one may conclude that Chemov dedicated 
his life to the attempt to correct in Russia the failures of 1848 in 
France. 
Indeed Engels had apparently inadvertently seen that an even 
earlier pe~sant movement could have been successful if it had 
gained allies. Engels, in The Peasant War in Germany, analysed the 
peasant uprising of the early sixteenth century and concluded that 
decentralisation as well as poor communication had kept the 
German peasants from victory. Only an alliance with another estate 
could. have given them victory, but the petty burgers wavered, and 
the proletariat had little influence. Chemov was delighted Engels 
had made the peasant movement the locus of revolutionism. The 
bourgeoisie, with Luther and Melancthon at its head, was extremely 
superficial, but the sectarians had a completely different character in 
so far as they represented a direct expression of peasant and plebeian 
.. demands. They· 'demanded th~ restoration of primitive Christian·. 
. . 
19 ibid. pp.167-168. 
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equality between all members of the commune and accepted it as 
the norm of civil society.' Thomas Munzer, the leader of the 
peasant movement, considered 'the kingdom of God nothing but a 
social structure in which no longer existed class differences, private 
ownership and state power independent of and alien to the 
members of society.'20 
Munzer, as Engels said, was compelled to take over a government 
in an epoch when the movement was not ready for the domination 
! 
of the class it represented, but this meant, Chernov underlined, that 
the movement was not reactionary, but in fact, too far ahead of its 
time. Moreover, the movement was informed with a spirit of 
moral asceticism, again as Engels pointed out: 'Does this not mean 
20 Chernov, 'Krestianskiia voiny pered sudom Marksiza', (Peasant wars 
before the court of Marxism), Miav, pp.180-182, p.184. Chernov's 
citation of Engels was not exact. Again he had the meaning right, but he · 
combined passages. Compare the passages which Feuer includes in Marx and 
Engels: Basic Writings, p.465, p.474. ' ... this program demanded the 
immediate establishment of the kingdom of God ... by restoring the Church to. 
its original status and abolishing all the institutions that conflicted with this 
allegedly early Christian, but, in fact, very novel church. By the kingdom of 
God, [Thomas] Munzer understood a society without class differences, 
private property, and a state authority independent of, and foreign to, the 
members of society. All the existing authorities, in so far as they refused to 
submit and join the re.volution, were to be overthrown, all work and 
property shared in common, and complete equality introduced.' p.426. 
'Nevertheless, he [Munzer] was bound to his early sermon of Christian 
equality and evangelical community of ownership, and was compelled at least 
to attempt its realisation. Community of ownership, universal and equal 
-- .,,-.. · .;:,::·~ labor, and· abolition of -all rights to· exercise authority ·-Were proclaimed.',' 
p.436. 
- '. 
' \ .. ~ ~ 
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that a peasant movement can be progressh'.:e or even socialist and 
that a large measure of its drive stems from a sense of morality? 
Was it correct to consider, as the majority of contemporary Marxists, 
'the peasant movement of the past as only externally revolutionary 
but essentially reactionary?•21 
Chernov injected a new and important qualification into the idea of 
class, a qualification Marx had mentioned, but had not developed, 
in his attempt to found all social actions on the basis of economic 
theory. Chernov returned to the problem in two essays which are 
valuable because they provide a systematic analysis of the idea of 
social classes. Both essays also provide insight into the labours 
Victor Chernov was willing to devote to the task of getting his 
thinking straight and making his points clear. His references to 
numerous works are impressively scholastic.22 
21 Chernov,' Krestianskiia voiny,' Miav, pp.184-185, p.187. 
22 Chernov, K teorii klassovoi borby, (Towards a theory of class 
struggle), Moscow, 1906; Chernov, Proletariat i trudovoe 
krestianstvo,(Proletariat and toiling peasantry), Moscow, 1906. K teorii 
had its foundation in an article under the same title that appeared in 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, NOS. 26, 27, 34. Proletariat i krestianstvo 
duplicates much of the argument of K teorii, but adds material from 
contemporary socialist studies in Europe. Chernov's references in K teorii 
include: Charles Andler, Le Manifesto Communiste: Introduction historique 
et coromentaire, Paris, 1901; V. Cherkezov, Pages of Socialist History, no 
edition cited, evidently published in English with the author's name 
appearing as Tcherkes~ff; Benedetto Croce, Materialisme historique et 
economie Marxiste, Paris, 1900; Louis Blanc, Geschichte der zehn Jahre 
von 1830 bis 1840, Zurich and Winterthur, 1843. Friedrich Engels-, 
Herrn Eugen Duhring's Umwalzung in der Wissensc(laft, cited as Anti-
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To understand the idea of class, Chemov prepared a short history of 
the idea. He found Engels in his book about Ludwig Feuerbach -
noting that in England from 1815 onward many men were 
beginning to realise that the centre of gravity of political struggle lay 
between bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy. In' France, the same 
consciousness developed after the Bourbon restoration, and after 
1830, in both countries, the working class was recognised as a third 
element struggling to dominate. French historians such as Louis 
Adolphe Thiers, Francois Guizot, Francois Mignet and Jacques 
Thierry were beginning to see class struggle as the key to French 
history from the middle ages. Chernov called in Labriola to attest to 
Thierry's influence and saw that Louis Blanc and Guizot, although 
Duhring, third edition; Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach ... no edition 
cited; Friedrich Engels, Franzosiche und Englische Klassenkumpfe, 
included in Mehring's Nachlass; Eduard Fuchs, Wilhelm Weitling no 
edition cited; Nikolai G. Chernyshevskii, Sochineniia, Geneva, -1870,I; 
Aleksandr Herzen, Sochineniia, no edition cited, I; David Koigen, Zur 
vorgeschichte des moderne philosophischen Sozi/lalismus in Deutsch/and, 
Bern, 1901; Antonio Labriola, Essai sur la conception materialiste de 
/'histoire Paris, 1897; Karl Marx, Das Kapital ,no edition cited, Ill; Karl 
Kautsky, 'Klasseninteresse-Sonderinteresse-Gemeininteresse,' Neue Zeit, 
XXIV, No.24 1903; Chernov also refers to Kautsky's study on the Erfurt 
Program of the German Social Democratic Party; Iskra, Russian Social-
Democratic organ.several issues; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Wealth 
of Nations, Russian edition Petersburg, 1896; Werner Sombart, Die 
deutsche Vo/kswirtschaft im XIX Jahrhundert, no edition cited; Lorenz von 
Stein, Geschichte des Sozialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen 
Frankreichs, Leipzig, 1842. This study will cite Chernov's references by 
·-, author's name in parentheses, e.g. (Labriola), when -_the author is not . 
specified in the text. 
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displaying programmatic differences, were operating within a kind 
of class theory. In Chernov's judgement, Benedetto Croce was a 
judicious observer of the development of class theory, beginning. 
with Sir Thomas More and directing attention to Lorenz von Stein 
as an influence.upon Marx. In short, he concluded, the idea of class 
struggle was in the air before Marx used it in his theory of society. 
Victor Considerant, a Fourierist, had even divided society into 
possessing and disposed classes, and a secret society in the Babeuf 
tradition had almost exactly expressed the idea of proletarian 
dictatorship as the transitional stage between revolution and 
socialism' (Cherkezov). One should not forget, Chernov added, that 
this Societe des Saisons was affiliated with the Bund der 
Gerechten, from which later emerged the Communist League in 
whose name the Communist Manifesto appeared. Marx only 
added a new expression to an available idea.23 
Even some Russian thinkers had begun to talk in terms of class 
struggle. Herzen, who was reading Blanc, Saint-Simon, Thierry, 
Guizot and articles from the young Hegelian Deutsche Jahrbucher, 
already in 1842 had written that in the life of humanity two 
tendencies appear. 'Two groups struggle to maintain a monopoly 
over the fruits of labour. This polarity is one of the phenomena of 
23 Chernov, K teorii, pp. 4-8. 
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vital development of humanity, a kind of pulse ... that drives 
. . 
humanity forward.' Chernov argued that Herzen, under the 
influence of Hegel, had also been turning Hegel right side up, for 
Herzen had written that 'the philosophy of each epoch is an actual 
historical world, captured in thought.' Furthermore, Herzen had 
hailed the left revolutionary wing of the young Hegelians, saying 
that German philosophy was now leaving the auditorium to enter 
life, to become social, revolutionary, vital and~ consequently, direct 
action in the world of events.24 
One must note again Chernov's pattern of argument wherein he 
emphasizes that Russian thinkers were· participating in the 
movement of European thought. This instance is particularly 
compelling because it shows, not only that Chernov's intellectual 
roots were deep in the tradition of Russian idealism, but also 
because it indicates his insight into the generation of ideas. Martin 
Malia's study of Herzen also· draws attention to Herzen's Hegel 
period and cites some of the same passages Chernov considered 
important. In Malia's judgement, Herzen remained an idealist, and 
Malia considers it difficult to take seriously Soviet historian's 
treatment (following Plekanov and Lenin) of Herzen's rationalism 
24 ibid. pp. 9-10. 
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'as very near to the p~ilosophy - though not the economics or 
sociology - of Marx ... .'25 In K teorii, Chernov was concerned with 
economics and sociology, exactly those areas from which Russian 
Marxists excluded and exclude the labours of Alexander Herzen. H 
one looks through Chernov's eyes with the aid of Malia's 
magnifying lens, one sees immediately that Chernov. with the 
benefit of late nineteenth century social and psychological ideas, 
thought he saw in Herzen an expression, not of a formal 
philosophical scheme, but rather an insight into the sociological 
problems revolving around the action of ideals on social action. 
Chernov broke into his argument to blaze at Plekhanov, who 
discounted Marx's debts to his predecessors, and denied that he had 
ever claimed Marx wa,s a plagiarist. But 'to prove the greatness of a 
thinker does not mean to place him somewhere above the earth 
' 
like a deus ex machina.' The history of socialist teaching showed 
that Marxist scientific socialism did not leap into the world but 
developed from utopian socialism. Certainly there was a difference 
between them as abstract types. But to realise their connection is to 
help 'distinguish utopian elements fr<:?m positive-scientific 
[socialism].'26 Chernov used 'utopian' here in its broad, idealistic 
25 M. Malia, Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian 
Socialism, 1812-1855, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1961. 
p.250. 
105 
sense. For Chernov, Marxists, inexplicably, refused_ to understand 
the efficacy of ideals. Marx was not the only one who could read,· 
Hegel as mystified sociology and, coupling this reading with current 
social ideals, derive an entire 'positive scientific' system of social 
analysis. 
Chernov went on from this display of intellect to admonish his 
readers, in a familiar schoolmasterly tone, that the first rule 'Of 
scientific thought was to avoid vague terms which are unclear, and 
always to use the same terms to mean the same thing. He was 
aiming to show that the term 'class' had suffered an exceptional 
deprivation of scientific thought. Pre-Marxist social thinkers had 
rarely achieved the criteria Chemov established, partly because they 
confused class, caste, and estate, and partly because they did not 
distinguish clearly between classes and gradations within classes. 
They used distinctions such as deprived and privileged, poor and 
rich, persecuted and persecutors. 
Of the pre-Marxists, Louis Blanc and Lorenz von Stein had made 
the strongest attempts to clarify this confusion of terms. Blanc 
defined 'bourgeoisie' or 'middle class' as those who possessed the 
tools of toil and were, thus, to a certain degree independent. To the 
bourgeoisie he opposed 'people,' but twice used the term 'workers' 
26 Chernov. op cit. pp. 110-115. 
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in the same category, defining them as those who did not possess 
capital and are completely dependent in respect to elementary needs 
of life. Chernov said that the basis of Blanc's criteria was 
relationship to means of production and dependence on others. 
Equating means of production with capital was the fault of Blanc's 
analysis. He had put peasants into the class of industrial capitalists 
because both possess capital.27 Lorenz von Stein had improved 
Blanc's categories with an excellent characterisation of the modern 
industrial proletariat in comparison to classes of earlier periods. 
And Stein had made many accurate remarks about the 
psychological content and development of class antagonisms. Stein 
also included in the term 'bourgeois' the idea of possession. But the 
' proletariat had nothing except its labour and the desire to use it. 
The proletariat saw the owner as his enemy because the owner 
stood above it. The proletariat also understood inequality in labour 
and remuneration. Therefore, the European proletariat was the 
seedbed for social movement. Revolution was now social, although 
earlier revolutions had been political.28 Chetnov interrupted 
himself to argue against Werner Sombart, who claimed that-Marx 
had gone no further than Stein. Certainly Marx had used the 
27. ibid. pp.15-17. 
28 ibid. pp. 16-17. 
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categories 'exploited' and 'exploiter', but this did not mean that 
Marx had stopped at the limits of Stein's categories.29 
To show how Marxism built on these earlier ideas of class, Chernov 
turned to Engels' early Franzosische · und Englische 
Klassenkampfe. Engels used the expression 'two nations' when 
speaking of France; a nation of owners and a nation of toilers. The 
war between these two nations is war between classes. In the 
Manifesto. Marx and Engels had continued this pattern of division, 
using the terms 'bourgeoisie' and 'proletariat'. But they also 
recognised: the 'Lumpenproletariat', a remnant of old society; 
'aristocracy', also a remnant; and a middle layer consisting of small 
traders, small industrialists and rentiers, artisans and peasants. In 
Die Klassenkampfe in Frankreich, Marx further distinguished 
between the great landlords as a class, finance aristocracy, industrial 
... bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, peasantry, intelligentsia, 
lumpenproletariat, and working class. Finally Kautsky, a major 
inheritor of the tradition, tried to order Marx's classes into 1) 
29 ibid. p. 17. Tucker's, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge 
University Press, second edition, 1972 pp. 114-117, discusses Marx's 
debt to Stein and argues convincingly that in Stein's book (the same Chernov 
was using) Marx found the proletariat to fill in the real world his Hegelian 
category of alienated man. Tucker maximizes Stein's influence, but 
recognises that another position exists, referring to Sidney Hook. From 
Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx, (New 
York, 1950), p. 199. Hook minimizes Stein's influence on Marx. Chernov 
merely recognised Stein's system as part of a cimate of opinion. 
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possessing classes, either great landowners or exploited owners, and 
2) dispossessed; proletarians of capitalist industry, a transitional 
, 
layer of artisans, special class of servants, lumpenproletariat, i.e. 
beggar proletariat.30 
Remembering Chernov's 'first rule of scientific thought,' one can 
understand his sarcasm when he pointed out that Marxism had not 
settled on a class for peasants. Peasants appeared in the notion of 
workers, in the middle layer with petty traders and rentiers, as petty 
bourgeois, and, finally, among the possessing classes, along with the 
great owners and wealthy. Is there not something wrong with a 
system of analysis which shoves peasants around in its categories as 
Marxism has done? 
If one abandons juridicial bases of class division into estates and 
deals only with economic categories, is the problem then only to 
define relationship to production? Is the basis of class division, 
participation in wealth? Chernov contended that the acquisition of 
surplus value - the unpaid toil of others - is that criterion which 
unifies the bourgeoisie into a solid class. But Social Democrats 
consider it false to seek the basic distinguishing criterion of class in 
the source of income because, they say, this would mean allotting 
30 Chernov, K teorii, pp. 19-20. 
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first place to 'relations of distribution' which is actually a result of 
production relationships. Marx pointed out this error and named 
those who did not recognise it vulgar socialists a long time ago.'31 
Chemov countered this accusation by calling on Marx and Engels to 
testify that only in the 'final account' were conditions of production 
responsible for social phenomena. He added his own epitaph that it 
is 'vulgarised Marxism which wants absolutely to establish a direct 
parallelism between conditions of production and all other social 
phenomena.' Division of society is directly related to distribution, 
and this is the primary criterion for belonging to a class. This is not 
to .deny the connection of class structure with the entire productive 
I 
structure of a given society.32 Engels in An ti-Duhring said 
explicitly: 'Distribution is not simply a passive product of 
production and exchange; with them it also exerts a strong counter 
influence on production and exchange.' And Marx, as the la_st 
chapter of volume three of Das Kapital proves, had, in fact, not 
gone beyond the classical economists in respect to classes. 
Marx followed Adam Smith's delineation of classes according to 
c " 
their income from land rent, wages, and profits of capital, that is the 
three basic sources of income upon which the entire population 
exists.33 And, once more, Russian social critics were in the stream 
31 
32 
ibid. p. 22; Chernov cites Iskra (Spark), No.27. 
ibid. pp. 2-24. 
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of European thought. Chernov took time to point out that forty 
years earlier Chernyshevsky had stated almost exactly the position 
Kautsky achieved after study of Marx's statements in Das Kapital. 
People coalesce into classes according to ' the basic, particular source 
of their income .... ' 'Stating this opinion we do not pretend to say 
something new. We merely assume the point of view of N. G. 
Chernyshevsky.' Adam Smith marked out the solution to the 
question of class divisions which received its most 'profound 
statements in the works of socialists - N.G. Chernyshevsky, K. Marx, 
and K. Kautsky:34 
Where, it is necessary to ask, was Chernov going with his 
customary horde of citations? He was going to the land with 
credentials of citizenship for peasants in the community of toil. The , 
Russian Social Democrats (of Iskra) had a false theory of class 
struggle. They chose to throw the Russian muz-hik, this patient 
sufferer of toil and hunger, this native brother of the factory 
worker, from the midst of the workers into the ranks of the 
bourgeoisie. 'This false theory is not only a logical mistake; 'it leads 
inescapably to practical, political errors, each of which may have 
evil results for the cause or revolutionary socialism.' 35 In 
33 
34 
ibid. pp. 23-25. 
ibid. p. 25, pp. 27-28. 
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tnllt i ( 
Proletariat i trudovoe krestianstvo Chernov added i\hls inclusion 
of all our "peasantry, in its entirety" in the ranks of the bourgeoisie 
- even the petty [bourgeoisie] - seems to us a shameless attack not 
only upon reality but also upon human logic and human 
f 1. 136 ee mg .... 
Appeals to Adam Smith, Chernyshevsky, Marx and a host of others 
does not prove whether production or distribution is a more 
'primary' economic relationship. It may only prove that Smith and 
all the rest were wrong, and that Chernov could not distinguish 
between sound and unsound analyses. It must also be noted that 
Chernov was not, as he said, trying to prove absolutely the order of 
precedence between these abstractions. He was only attempting to 
show that one can distinguish classes by whether they live upon the 
toil of others. His point about the abandonment of juridicial 
categories to rely exclusively upon economic criteria is well put, for 
it was the dissolution of legal estates which made social analysis 
necessary. One may even say that the democratic revolutions made 
social revolution inevitable because the men who thought about 
society could no longer rely upon obvious legal limits between 
classes and had to invent new terms to deal with just as obvious 
35 
36 
ibid. p. 31. 
Chernov, Proletariat i trudovoe krestianstvo, p. 7. 
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inequalities. Chernov saw the problem in a different light. His 
problem was to find a way to use economic analysis that would 
include all who toiled on the side of the guiltless. Just as he did not 
exclude proletarians from the ranks of the innocent, he could not 
understand why Marxists insisted there was something evil about 
peasants who owned a piece of ground. Chernov inclined enough 
in this direction to view with dismay the post-1905 reforms, which 
seemed destined to make his peasants into exploiters of others' toil. 
In the spher,e of pure economics, whatever that may be, Chernov 
had hardly achieved a decisive victory, even if he could prove that 
'there is no kind of capital in modern society from which the 
toiling peasant does not suffer.'37 Nor was victory his if he could 
prove, with citations from a host of socialist thinkers in western 
Europe, that peasants, small-holders and country proletariat were 
excellent material for socialist propagal;lda and did not have the 
assumed bourgeois fanaticism for property.38 He could re-cast the 
problem, and of his achievement here there is no doubt, just as 
there is no doubt that he understood the political danger in making 
revolution in the name of a narrow section of the toiling masses. 
Perhaps it is best to permit Chernov to state his own case, which is, 
37 
38 
op cit. p.37. --· -- --- --- - --.-- ·-·~- . - - . 
Chernov, Proletariat i krestianstvo, pp. 3-15. 
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finally, a statement of a world-view which may or may not be 
supportable with economic data: 
[Many Marxists] want to defend the interests of wage labour; 
we are ready to defend the interests of toil generally; whether 
it is brought to market by its possessors or independently 
applied to the means of pro~uction (in fee simple~ communal, 
joint cooperative [tovarishcheskii], or leased ownership). 
Socialism wants only to raise the basis of his [the toiler's] 
personal life - toil - to the basis of the entire social order, the 
fundament of the entire social structure of the future.39 
To be just with Chernov's economics, one must admit that few 
serious economists would consider phenomena from only the 
production side of the economic equation. By emphasising 
distribution, Chernov, had, in fact, put demand into the equation 
and had, thus, demonstrated his appreciation of post-classical 
economic analysis, an appreciation now overtaking Marxist 
economic theorists. Chernov was struggling to articulate a 
humanist philosophy within the context of revolutionism and. 
modern social analysis. His thinking in economics is merely an 
adjunct to his demand for individual development and social 
justice. David Mitrany's opinion that Marxism was concerned with 
production, while populism was concerned with producers, is an 
appropriate statement of Chernov's position, although Chernov 
hardly figures in Mitrany's book.40 
39 ibid. p. 16,-·p.· 17. - "' -
40 David Mitrany, Marx Against the Peasant: A Study in Social 
Dogmatism (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1952). p. 52. 
114 
Chernov stated at the First Party Congress that, 'Marx is our great 
common teacher in the realm of economics, but we do not feel 
constrained to make him an idoJ•41 The SRs did not reject the 
theory of class struggle, they only believed that the basis for division 
of society by classes ought to be located in some more widely 
sociological principle, rather than economic consideration. They 
believed to a certain extent in the theory of increasing concentration 
of wealth but not in its application to small-scale enterprise in 
agriculture. About the only Marxian doctrine they accepted whole 
heartedly was the labour source of value.42 
41 
42 
Protokoly pervago se~da P.S.R., p.136; Chernov, Zapiski, p.105. 
Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.146. 
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Towards the end of December 1905 the party turned all its energies to 
the organisation of the SR's First Congress, held in the town of 
Imatra, Finland, from 29 December 1905 to 4 January 1906.1 The 
party had existed since 1901, when various neo-Populist elements 
coalesced to form the SR Party. It was to take five years to achieve 
formal organisational unity and the adoption of a party program. This 
delay is indicative of the SR Party's lack of organisational discipline, .a 
condition that was to perennially plague the party throughout its 
history. Any unity achieved was to prove to be momentary, tenuous 
and fragile. The First Congress was to see a two-fold split in the party. 
'Finland at that time was Russia and yet not Russia.' A remark made by 
Mark Vishniak, Dan proshlomo (Due the Past), New York, 1954, p.119, which 
accurately sums up Finland's status. Finland had been subject to Russian 
sovereignty since 1809 and only acheived its independence in December 1917. 
The delegates met in the 'Tourist' hotel in lmatra, which belonged to a member of. 
the Finnish Party of Active Resistance, a body sympathetic to the SRs. The 
sessions of the congress were held in the dining room of the wooden building, 
which stood on a snowy slope beside the waterfall which made lmatra famous as a 
beauty spot. V. Zenzinov, Perezhitoe, New York, 1953, pp.265-256. The 
congress had been prepared well in advance by an Organisational Bureau: this 
consisted of Viktor Chernov, Mark Natanson, llya Rubanovich, Evno Azef, Vasilli 
Leonovich and others. V. Zenzinov, Perezhitoe, pp.264-265. The 
Organisational Bureau had drawn up draft procedural rules for the congress, a 
draft agenda, and the draft organisational statute; the party program was 
compiled by Chernov. While the Congress was to be held in semi autonomous 
Finland secrecy was paramount and so all the delegates' names appearing in the 
published Protokoly were pseudonyms. V.M. Chernov's pseudonym during. the 
f - ' - • ~ • --
Con_g ress was 'Tuch kin'. 
116 
On the right was the 'Party of Popular Socialist~', while on the left 
was the 'Union of SR-Maximalists'. In contrast to the Bolshevik -
Menshevik schism of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party 
(RSDLP) Second Congress in 1903 which effectively split the party 
right down the middle, the schisms in the SR party were splinters on 
the periphery, leaving the majority of the party members united. 
The SR party since its inception had always been a heterogeneous, 
diverse amalgam of numerous organisations, incorporating a wide 
range of interpretations as to socialist principles and the best way of 
attaining them. A degree of unity nonetheless had existed prior to the 
First Congress in relation to theory. The central organ of the party, 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia edited by Chernov and M. Gots, published 
a series of articles between 1902 and 1905 which provided the basis for 
the development of party theory, program and tactics.2 Ostensibly it 
was this program with minor alterations, that was to be submitted to 
the First Congress for approval. 
The party's chief theoretician was undeniably Viktor Chernov. His 
distinctive and original theoretical pronouncements were based upon 
2 In May 1904 a draft program, compiled by the editorial board on the basis 
of -an earlier version-·which had been circulated to local party -committees for 
discussion and comment, was published in no.46 of Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia. 
'. • .. 
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a variety of ideological influences from Marx, earlier populist writers, 
Mikhailovsky and Lavrov in particular, the Russian 'subjective 
school' of sociology which drew heavily on Comte and Avenarius' 
empiriocriticism3 and Western revisionism. Consequently, the SR 
view of socialism differed from their Social Democratic rivals. For the 
SRs socialism was not only historically determined by the 
development of capitalism, but was also a moral goal which would 
permit the full development of the human personality. The SRs 
consequently placed more emphasis on the voluntaristic element in 
history, the role of the individual and the 'minority of initiative' in 
the revolutionary struggle. The SRs under Chernov's guidance 
accepted Marx's concept of class struggle like their SD rivals, but 
differed from the SD's exclusive identification of the working class 
with the proletariat. Yes, the proletariat would be the vanguard of the 
revolution, but it would be in alliance with the peasantry and the 
intelligentsia. And while the transitional stage to socialism would be 
a two stage process in the forthcoming revolution, it would be not 
dissimilar to Trotsky's concept of 'permanent revolution'. It would 
go beyond the limits of a bourgeois order, though the triumph of 
"3· ... For a detailed discussion of Chernov's sociological' ideas see· Judith E. 
Zimmerman 'Sociological Ideas in Pre-Revolutionary Russia,' in Canadian-
American Slavic Studies IX, 3 Fall; 1975, pp.302-323. esp. pp.311-314. 
-· .... • 
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socialism would not be achieved; a sort of limbo stage would be 
achieved, neither capitalist nor the collective society of the future. 
The question of terror as a revolutionary tactic further divided the 
SRs and SDs and although the SR's campaign of political terror was 
one of the main distinguishing features of their activities prior to 
1905, it would be wrong to categorise them as an exclusively terrorist 
organisation or to overemphasise this aspect of their revolutionary 
activities. Its use was only one of a number of other 'mass' forms of 
party activity. 
Chernov presiding over an amorphous grouping of diverse opinion 
continually utilised the tactic that a united front was the best 
organisational tactic to pursue, hoping in the course of time that their 
opponents would be converted to the compromise view. This tactic 
Chernov pursued throughout his revolutionary career, unfortunately 
with limited success. Splits continually occurred in the SR party and 
the First Congress was no exception. 
Vishnyak pays tribute to the role of Viktor Chernov in fusing 
together the different tendencies at the congress and reconciling 
various interpretations. Certainly Chernov dominated the Congress,· 
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especially in his role as the chief spokesman on the program: his 
speeches occupy more than one-third of the published texts of the 
proceedings.4 But these texts may exaggerate his role: he himself 
edited the proceedings and Vishnyak comments wryly that Chernov's 
own speeches appear in the published record 'in a stylistically 
polished, corrected and expanded form. •5 One function of the 
publication of the Congress proceedings was to serve as propaganda 
for the party, and in this respect it was certainly in Chernov's interest 
to ensure that his defence of the party program was as full and as 
eloquent as possible. But as Radkey accurately points out 
'unfortunately for his party, the deficiencies of Chernov are also only 
too faithfully reflected in the program which he formulated.'6 
Th~t the party program presented to the Congress was the work of 
one individual, V.M. Chernov, is adequately demonstrated by the 
accolade given by the Congress to the labours of 'the young giant who 
has borne on his shoulders for five years the whole burden of the 
4 Apart from the published proceedings of the congress, Chernov's speeches 
were later published as a separate pamphlet. K Obosnovaniiu Programmy 
Partii Sotsialistov-Re_voliutsioner:ov. Rechi V.M. Chernov (Tuchkina) na 
pervom partiinom sezde, (The basis of the Socialist Revolutionary Party 
program. Speeches of V.M. Chernov at the first party congress). Petrograd, 
1918. 
· 
5 M. Vishnyak, Dan proshlomu, p.123. 
6 0. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.24. 
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theoretical elaboration of our program.'7 
The draft of the party program submitted to the congress was a 
revised version of the earlier draft published in May 1904 and 
circulated to party organisations. The changes were rather superficial 
except in the area of the agrarian program where more substantial 
revision was undertaken. The program was divided into two sections 
- a maximum and minimum. The maximum section reflected 
Chernov's, and consequently, the SR's view of future society that 
would arise after the overthrow of autocracy. It is largely theoretical, 
focussing on the implementation of 'socialist measures after the 
victory of the working class.' Th~ implementation of the minimum 
program would necessarily precede the socialist revolution and 
hence, the maximum program. The minimum program would pave 
the way for the implementation of the maximum program. 
Chernov's maximum program seems to have involved at least two 
dubious assumptions. First, it assumed that the urban workers would 
lag behind the peasants in developing active, consciously socialist 
organisations and programs. Second, it assumed that the bourgeoisie, 
7 Protokoly pervago sezda Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov. (The 
-Proceedings of the First Congress of the Socialist Revolutionary Party),,-n.p. 
1906, p.294. 
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who according to Chernov's own plan were, to be in control of the 
central government between the two revolutions, would not use 
their position to take effective measures to forestall the second 
revolution. Chernov must have thought that the Russian 
bourgeoisie were a foolish and spineless lot. On his calculations, they 
did not have the vigour to carry through the first political revolution 
themselves, or to use the governmental power given to them after 
the first revolution to defend themselves against the second. Only 
when their own factories were being seized from under their noses 
would they be expected to make serious efforts at self-defence, and not 
necessarily even then. 
In these ways capitalism was first to be restricted, and then finally 
eliminated in Russia. The vagueness of this program was not simply_ 
the result of mental softness on the part of Chernov and the Socialist 
Revolutionaries. It was at least in part the result of a reluctance to 
plan and predict in detail the developments after the first revolution. 
Chernov had written that one could not plan in any detail what , 
would come after the Tsar, because so much could happen in the 
course of the first revolution.8 
8 Chernov, 'Programmnye voprosy', Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.15 
1903, p.6. 
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To characterise the program into two sections or stages proved to be a 
controversial undertaking. The majority of the debate at the Congress 
centred on defining what these divisions meant, and more 
' 
specifically, the demands incorporated in'the minimum program. 
Criticisms of Chernov's distinction between the maximum and the 
minimum program had appeared in the party as early as 1904. Some 
of the critics alleged that the minimum program was reformist rather· 
than revolutionary; others wanted to include the socialisation of 
industry in the minimum program along with the socialisation of the 
land - a proposal which would have made the distinction between the 
minimum and maximum program superfluous. 
During the First Congress a dispute arose within the party over the 
program which was fused with conflicts over tactics.9 Poroshin who 
9 M.I. Sokolov (Medved) and E. Ustinov (lozinskii), the leaders of the 
faction of 'agrarian terrorists', came to advocate the Maximalist program of 
simultaneous socialisation of the land and factories. The tactic of 'agr_ari_an 
terror' was extended to cover 'economic terror' in general; the future 
Maximalists called for the revolutionary expropriation, not only of the land, but 
of ~II private property, including factories. By the application of these means: 
they hoped that a socialist or semi-socialist revolution could be achieved in the 
immediate future. 
In the summer of 1905 Ustinov and other 'agrarian terrorists' in Geneva formed · 
a group of 'Young SRs', who published a journal, Volnyi Diskussionnii Listok 
(Free Discussion Sheet) ,which advocated the inclusion of the socialisation of 
industry in the minimum program. One of the ideas put forward in this journal, 
which was criticised for anarchist utopianism by the editors of 
. - , 
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represented the Maximalist position at the Congress, attacked the 
existing program for 'duality and inconsistency' in basing its agrarian 
section on the revolutionary principle of the abolition of private 
property in land, while the industrial section involved simply 
demands for social reforms, such as the .introduction of the eight 
hour day. In order to avoid this inconsistency, and to preserve the 
'revolutionary spirit' of the party, Poroshin argued that , the 
minimum program should include 'the revolutionary expropriation 
of factories and works, with the replacement of private property in 
them ,by collective and social property' .10 
Chernov's refutation of this argument was quite straightforward. The 
analogy drawn by Poroshin between the socialisation of land and the 
socialisation of industry was not, he alleged, a valid one: the true 
parallel to the socialisation of rural land was the socialisation of land 
in towns. The socialisation of industry involved the socialisation of 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, was that the forthcoming revolution would be 
socialist in both the towns and the countryside, with communes of peasants and 
workers socialising both agriculture and industrial production. In December 
1905, Ustinov's group seceded altogether from the party and called for the 
formation of a seperatei _'Union of Revolutionary Socialists'. This trend had 
considerable support within Russia, especially in Belorussia, where Belostok 
(Bialystok) became the headquarters of Maximalism. 
1° Protokoly pervago sezda... pp.105-107. 
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the entire means of production; but the socialisation of agricultural 
land did not mean that agricultural production would be socialised. 
The socialisation of the land was therefore a less revolutionary 
measure than the socialisation of the factories, since agricultural 
production would remain on a predominantly individual basis. The 
socialisation of the land would be a revolution only in property 
relations, whereas the socialisation of the factories would be a 
revolution in relations of production - a revolution which, since it 
would involve the creation of a totally new planned economy, 
required a high degree of organisation and maturity in the working 
class. It therefore belonged to the party's maximum rather than 
minimum program.11 
Chernov's concept of the minimum and maximum programs 
implied a two-stage perspective of the revolution which was rejected 
by Poroshin. The SD's, Poroshin pointed out, adopted a two-stage 
view of the revolution because they saw the proletariat as the only 
class capable of making a socialist revolution: the proletariat was still 
numerically small in Russia, but it would grow as capitalism 
developed. The minimum program of the SDs was therefore 
designed to encourage the development of capitalism in Russia, as -a 
11 ibid, pp.147-152. 
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means to the end of socialist revolution. However, the SRs could 
adopt a different attitude towards capitalism, because they believed in 
the socialist potential not only of the proletariat, but also of the 
peasantry, and these two classes together already comprised the 
majority of the Russian population. A socialist revolution was 
therefore immediately possible in Russia, and it was the duty of the 
SR party to agitate for such a revolution, raising the consciousness of 
the masses by advocating the immediate introduction of socialist 
measures.1 2 A position similar to Poroshin's was put forward by 
Rakitnikov, an influential member of the Central Committee, who 
was supported by one or two delegates. Rakitnikov argued that the 
minimum program should consist not of those measures which the 
party ought to demand before it came to power, but of the measures 
which 'the party would implement when it came to power. Such 
measures should include the socialisation of large-scale industry and 
the socialisation of the land, but not the socialisation of agricultural 
production, which Rakitnikov believed would have to be introduced 
gr'adually. He reminded the delegates that the SRs, unlike the SDs, did 
not see the forthcoming revolution as a bourgeois revolution; 
12 ibid, pp.272-276. 
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instead, they thought that the revolution ~ould go beyond the 
framework of a bourgeois society, especially in the realm of agrarian 
property relations. It was inappropriate, therefore, he argued, for the 
party to base its minimum program on the reforms which could be 
gained from the non-socialist parties.13 
In his reply to these critics, Chernov agreed that the SRs, unlike the 
SDs, did not set limits in advance to the achievements of the 
revolution.14 But in his defence of the minimum program against 
( -
the Maximalist critique, Chernov implied that in practice he believed 
that the 'backwardness' of the Russian workers, that is, their low 
level of organisation and consciousness, would, . in the immediate 
future, limit the gains of the revolution to bourgeois reforms. This, 
I 
he argued, was a realistic position: to reject the necessity , for a 
minimum program of acceptable reforms was to adopt an 'all or 
nothing' stance.15 
Decisively defeated on the Congress floor the disillusioned 
Maximalists decided. to sever their c:i.ssociation with the party. 
Immediately after the Congress, in January, 1906, the Maximalist 
13 ibid, pp.109-115. 
14 
-ibid, p.156. ;..:' . ·'- -
15 ibid, pp.253-269. 
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leader Sokolov, convened a small conference which decided to leave 
the SR party and form ~ separate Maximalist organisation .. The 
'Union of SR Maximalists' was not officially formed until the 
autumn of 1906.16 
The SR minimum program was divided into two sections: 
political/legal and economic. In general, the demands of the SR 
minimum program were in line with those of the Russian Social 
Democrats, and indeed, of most European socialist parties. The 
political section demanded full civil liberties and other democratic 
reforms; the economic section contained demands for progressive 
social reforms. 
16 Two of the most notorious Maximalist exploits were: the explosion at 
Stolypin's villa on Aptekarskii Island in August 1906, and the expropriation on 
Fonarnyi Pereulok of 600,000 roubles being transported from the St. 
Petersburg Customs Office to the State Bank. The Union proved to be stillborn. 
Sokolov was arrested on 1 December and summarily executed the next day. The 
loss of its leader demoralised the Union, and many other prominent Maximalists 
were to share Sokolov's fate in the following months. By the middle of 1907, 
Maximalism as an organised movement had virtually ceased to exist, although 
some former Maximalists, such as Lozinskii, moved close to an anarchist 
position in the years following the defeat of the 1905 Revolution. For 
adiscussion of Maximalism see; Chernov, 'K Kharakteristikie Maksimalizma', in 
Sotsialist-Revoliutsioner (Socialist-Revolutioary), no.1 191 O, pp.174-307; 
B.I. Gorev, 'Apoliticskiia i antiparlamentskiia gruppy', in Obshchestvennoe 
dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka, (Social movements in Russia at the 
beginning of the 20th century), edited by L. Martov, P. Maslov and A. Potresov, 
4 vols: Sf. Pete·rsourg ·1909-1914. vol. 111,· pp.511-523; M. Perrie, Th·e-
Agrarian Policy, pp.153-159. 
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The most distinctive feature of the S:R program was its agrarian 
demand for the socialisation of the land, and it was this point which 
provoked most debate at the Congress.17 The version presented to 
the Congress went into great detail concerning the actual mechanism 
by which the socialised land would be controlled. This was necessary, 
the party leader explained, because the revolutionary events of the 
past year had brought the party's agrarian prog;ram closer to 
' . 
' 
realisation. Whereas previously the primary need had been to stress 
the general principle of socialisation, the expropriation of private 
land was now accepted, at least in part, by both the SDs and the 
Kadets. It was, therefore, appropriate for the SRs to explain their 
positive, constructive proposals for the disposal of the confiscated 
lands in the greatest possible detail.18 
In the course of the debate, some of the delegates expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the new formulation, and especially with its 
17 For specific discussion of the SR agrarian program see, M. Hildermeier, 
Die Sozialrevolutionare Partei Russlands, pp.83-105; M. Perrie, The 
Agrarian Policy of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, pp.143-152; and O.H. 
Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, pp.24-46; 'An Alternative to 
Bolshevism: The Program of Russian Social Revolutionism', in The Journal of 
Modern History, no.1, March 1953, pp.25-39 and 'Chernov and Agrarian 
Socialism before 1918', in Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet 
Thought, edited by E.J: Simmons ·cambriage, Mass. 1955,· pp.63-80. 
18 Protoko/y pervago sezda ... pp.85-86. 
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definition of the socialisation of the land. By introducing a reference 
to the role of the state, where the first draft had spoken only of 
'democratically organised communes and unions of communes', the 
revised version, its critics objected, paved the way for nationalisation 
rather than socialisation.19 
In his defence of the revised agrarian program, Chernov claimed that 
his critics had misunderstood ,the concept of socialisation. Socialised 
land would not be owned by either central or local government 
bodies, since property in land would be completely abolished. The 
functions of these bodies would simply be to regulate the rights of 
individuals to use the land. But in general, he added, the SR party 
accepted that a democratic state could play a role in the egalitarian 
allocation of land; unlike the anarchists, the SRs did not reject the 
state as such; although they were critical of the powers of the 
autocratic state, and of bourgeois states in Western Europe.20 
The issue of the relative competence of local and central government 
bodies in regulating the use of the socialised land led on to the 
question of how the land was to be socialised. The Legal Populists21 
19 
20 
ibid, pp.181-184, 186-188, 202-205. 
ibid, pp.218-24_0. 
21 The Legal Populists desired the formation of a new, open and legal party of 
'Populist tendency'. A small conspiratorial organisation could be preserved for 
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had argued that land could not be socialised 'from below' by 
revolutionary land seizures, but only 'from above' by legislation by 
the Constituent Assembly. The Legal Populists feared that land 
seizures by the peasants might lead not to socialisation, but simply to 
a redistribution of the land as the private property of individual 
terrorist acts, but simultaneously a new mass party should be formed. A major 
aim of the new- party was to attract those who rejected the SR party's terrorist 
tactics. The new party would not be called the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, 
but would have a· separate name (probably, the Popular-Socialist Party). The 
Legal Populists were critical of what they saw as the excessive influence of 
Social Democratic ideas, one could say Marxist ideas on the SR program. In 
particular, they criticised the distinction between the minimum and the 
maximum programs. Instead of the minimum, they would have preferred to see a 
more modest set of demands which could realistically be implemented in the 
immediate future. The Legal Populists also disagreed with aspects of the SR 
agrarian program: they preferred the term 'nationalisation' to 'socialisation' of 
th~ land; and they r~jected the SR view that the land could be socialised 'from 
below' by peasant seizures of landowners' land. The Legal Populists gained little 
support for their views. 
In the spring of 1906 the Legal Populists decided to go ahead without SR 
agreement and formed a separate 'Party of Popular Socialists', whose program 
was limited to immediate demands which were considered practical under 
existing conditions. The new party, however, gained little mass support, 
although its leadership was able to exert quite a strong influence over the 
Labour Group of deputies (Trudoviki) in· the first two Dumas. In general, the 
secession of this group of literary intellectuals caused little harm to the SR 
party organisation, or to its popular support: in the election to the Second Duma 
in 1907 the SRs were considerably more successful than the Popular Socialists. 
No Popular Socialists were elected to the Third Duma, and the party as such 
ceased to exist after 1907, although it was to re-appear on the political scene in 
1917. On the Popular Socialists, see, P .P. Maslov, 'Narodnicheskiia partii', in 
Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka, (Social movements 
in ·Russia at the beginning of the 20th Century}. edited·,byd.L.:.~ Martov, P. Maslov 
and A. Potresov, 4 vols. St. Petersburg 1909-1914, vol.111, pp.151-158. 
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villages. 
The remainder of the debate on the agrarian question was concerned 
with relatively minor details, such as the hiring of labour and the 
payment of compensation for expropriated land. Eventually the 
revised version of the agrarian program was approved by the 
Congress with only one opposing vote.22 
The entire party program was finally approved on the evening of 2 
January. Chernov referred to the program as the 'result of our 
collective work', a 'symbol of party unity' and asked the Congress to 
approve it unanimously. In the event there was only one abstention -
that of the Maximalist Poroshin. 
A number of tactical issues were listed on the Congress agenda, but in 
practice the debates on the program and the organisational statute 
occupied so much time that the tactical debates were somewhat 
truncated. 
The Congress resolved unanimously to boycott both the First Duma 
and the pre-electoral meetings, which only registered voters could 
participate in. Chernov vigorously defended a tactic advocated by 
Iuanenkov that the party could use the election meetings to agitate in 
22 Protokoly pervago sezda ... p.253. 
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favour of a boycott.23 He was unable to convince the rest of the 
delegates, at least on this issue.24 
The Congress devoted surpr~singly little time to the issue of political 
terror. Political terror had been halted by the Central Committee 
immediately after the publication of the October Manifesto, and the 
activity of the Boevaia Organizatsiia (Fighting Organisation - the 
terrorist wing of the SR party) had been suspended. However, this 
decision had not been rigidly obeyed by the party's terrorist 
organisations. Acts of political terror, in particular, had continued.25 
The resolµtion on tactics proposed by the tactics commission 
welcomed these acts as evidence of the involvement of the masses in 
political terrorism, but expressed concern that they often occurred 
without the control of local party committees. The resolution also 
asserted that terror should be,continued until true political freedom 
was obtained.26 Thus the Congress resolution marked an important 
23 
24 
ibid, refer to pp.11-12, 16-21. 
The amendment was defeated by 28 votes 'to 20, and the congress resolved 
to boycott both the Duma itself and the pre-election meetings. Protokoly 
peNage ezda ... , pp.9-23. The Second (Extraordinary) SR Congress, meeting in 
February, 1907, reversed the boycott decision of the First Congress, and 
thirty-four SR deputies took part in the Second Duma. 
25 B.V. Savinkov, 'Vospominaniia' (Memoirs), Byloe, no.3, 1917. pp.116-
120. 
26 Protokoly peNago sezda ... p.314. 
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decision by the party to resume political terror and to restore the 
activity of the Boevaia Organizatsiia. There was, however, no real 
discussion of the issue by the delegates. Savinkov tells us that the 
decision to restore 'central' terror was taken behind the scenes at the 
Congress, by the newly elected Central Committee.27 The issue of 
economic terror, that is, the extension of the party's terrorist tactics 
from the political to the economic sphere either in the agrarian area, 
namely the use or threat of violence against the life and property of 
the landowners or the use or threat of violence against the life or 
property of factory owners was rejected by the Congress.28 
The First Congress of the SR party offers little illumination on 
contemporary events in Russia in 1905. The main aim of the congress 
\ 
was to approve the party program, but even on issues such as 
organisation and tactics, which feature on the agenda, the debates 
often appear abstract and unreal, detached from the immediate 
situation in Russia. 
27 
28 
Savinkov, 'Vospominaniia', Byloe, no.1, 1918. p.69. 
On agrarian terror· see M. Perrie, The Agrarian Policy, pp.91-97 also 
Perrie, 'Political and Economic Terror in the Tactics of the Russian Socialist-
Revolutionary Party before 1914', in Social Protest, Violence and T,error in 
Nineteenth - and Twentieth - Century Europe, edited by W.J. Mommsen and G. 
Hirschfeld, London, 1982, pp.63-79. 
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The main achievement of the Congress was its approval of the party · 
program, and the Congress proceedings serve as a major source for SR 
theory and ideology. In particular, they provide evidence of Viktor 
Chernov's ideological dominance in the party. On virtually every 
issue concerned with the party program Chernov's views 
predominated, and his ideas were expressed with an eloquence which 
it would perhaps be unfair to attribute entirely to his editing activity 
after the Congress. 
However, although the views of the two main dissident factions 
within the party, the Legal Populists and the Maximalists, gained little 
support from the majority of delegates, the Congress showed that 
many members were drawn toward these extreme poles. While 
Chernov can be credited to a certain degree for maintaining party 
unity despite the secession which did take place in 1906, it was 
achieved through compro~ise and organisational flexibility. 
Chernov was able to provide his views with a consistent, if somewhat 
abstract, theoretical justification which no other party leader was able 
to challenge effectively, and the preservation of a core of unity within 
the party was a maj~r practical achievement of the First SR Congress. 
As Radkey correctly states, 'it was their misfortune, and the 
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misfortune of their popular following, that [the party program] was 
more a declaration of general principles than a carefully thought-out 
plan of action, more a statement of objectives than an indication of 
how they were to be attained'.29 The SR party survived the 
revolutionary upheaval, yet the inherent weakness of its party 
program, namely the lack of a plan of action was to prove in later 
years to be the party's nemesis. 
29 O.H. Radkey, 'An Alternative to Bolshevism: The Program of Russian Social 
Revolutionism', in The Journal of Modern History, no.1 March 1953, p.39. 
Chapter 6 
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If the year 1905 witnessed the fury of a revolution that the 
government managed to quell, it also saw the beginning of another 
more solid movement that lasted several years with fateful results 
for Russia. Revolutionaries later referred to the years 1905-1907 as 
'the era of freedom', since the government's brief flirtation with 
constitutional liberties allowed oppositionist parties considerable 
' leeway in organising the mass elements of society. Even while party 
leaders were forced to withdraw again into European exile, the 
Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries conducted massive 
recruitments into organisational structures which spanned the 
empire. Chernov in a speech to the SR Party's London conference 
in 1908 said of his party's efforts that: 
Before the revolution we were an insignificant handful.. .. The 
brief period of freedom revealed before us the depths of the 
masses of the p~ople: ... the results of our work far exceeded 
our boldest expectations. We gained many positions amongst 
the proletariat, who the SDs considered to be their monopoly. 
In the countryside we had no rivals .... 1 
Chernov, having first expatiated on successes, then immediately 
conceded that much of the organisation had already been swept 
away. 
But our successes were only ideological. We could engage only 
in propaganda; not in organisation, and even that more 
Protokoly pervoi obshchepartiinoi konferentsii partii sotsialistov-
revoliutsionerov,. avgu$.t. 19Q8, Paris 1908, pp.96-97 .· Chernov; .. Pered 
Burei, p.283. 
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extensively than intensively. Our influence on the masses 
grew daily, to such an extent that we could not consolidate it 
organisationally .... Now ... the counter-revolution has again 
forced us to return to our former secret conditions of work, to 
our former forms of organisation and struggle.2 
The reports to the conference showed clear! y that by the middle of 
1908 the party organisation in Russia had been virtually destroyed. 
Maslov's analysis of this disintegration is quite perceptive and 
indeed correct, when he states that the exponential growth and 
decline of the party can solely be attributed to the spirit of the times.-
During the election campaign for the Second Duma and during 
the activity of the Duma the PSR was in full flower; later it 
faded rapidly. Because the party was illegal, and because its 
growth in the revolutionary period was not so much due to 
organisational construction as to the upsurge in mood, with the 
decline of which the party faded away, it is fairly difficult to 
assess the strength of the party organisation ... 
In the period of social upsurge, when the party grew to such 
dimensions, its growth was mainly due to this upsurge. The 
mass of SR (and SD) members who had joined in this period 
grew tired of everyday cultural-political work, which seemed 
too petty, non-revolutionary and opportunistic to hold much 
attraction for those members who had joined the party under 
the influence of the revolutionary mood of 1905-06. Amongst 
the SRs, where militancy was particularly respected, the process 
of party disintegration was partict1larly noticeable.3 
These developments are clearly demonstrated by Maureen Perrie's 
study of the Party's composition. Using a sample of 1,029 
2 
3 
ibid, p.97. also V.M. Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.281-284. 
P.P. Maslov, 'Narodnicheskiia partii', in L.Martov, P.Maslov, 
A.Potresov (eds.), Obshchestvennoe dvizhenei v Rossii v nachale 20-go veka, 
4 vols. St.Petersburg, 1909-1914, vol.3, p.125, p.128. 
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participants in the SR movement, Perrie shows that students and 
other intelligenty predominated until 1904; then from 1905 to 1907 
all elements of society contributed to the expansion in 
membership.4 Worthy of special note is that even during that 
period workers, students, and minor professionals predominated 
over peasants, in a party traditionally considered to be the 
champion of the peasantry above all. However, this is not so 
surprising when one considers Chernov's triadic theory of a 
proletariat, peasant and intelligentsia alliance, which was firmly 
imprinted on the mind of the party. Furthermore, workers were 
relatively easier to organise than the peasantry, their heavy 
concentrations in factories facilitating organisation and sustaining 
party ties. In the cities these advantages were further enhanced by 
many other factors. For example, the presence of students apd 
superior communications facilities made it easier both to reach and 
to maintain contact with supporters. Moreover, from the 
standpoint of the SR party membership, the _education and ( 
politicisation that could be brought about with urban resources, best 
of all in university towns, could bring the nonintellectual segment 
of party supporters much sooner to a level of sophistication, which 
4 M.Perrie, 'The Social Composition and Structure of the Socialist-
Revol,utionary Party Before 1917' in Soviet Studies, vol.24, 1972. p.227. 
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would make them acceptable as full-fledged party members. And to 
reiterate the point once more the large proportion of workers in the 
party's membership was considered to be equally as important as 
the peasantry as a revolutionary force. 
Social Democrats found it difficult conceptually and emotionally to 
deal with SR successes among workers, since their theory held that 
Social Democracy was by definition the party of the urban workers. 
As it turned out, by 1907 SRs had stolen the initiative in the 
workers' movement from the SDs in many important industrial 
centres and in many others were vying on more or less equal terms. 
The rapid growth of the party during the 1904-06 period added to 
the already heterogeneous nature of the party. Schisms appeared as 
to the means of attaining the socialist revolution. In 1906 the 'SR 
Party experienced a two fold split, the Popular Socialists on the 
extreme right and the Maximalists on the extreme left. 
The main significance of Maximalism was that it highlighted 
several apparent inconsistencies which existed in the SR theory, in 
spite of Chernov's ingenious formulations. While admitting the 
advent of capitalism in Russia, Chernov asserted that the Russian 
revolution would be both anti-feudal and anti-capitalist, and that by 
soGialising the-larid it·could go beyond·the frameworkuf'a bourgeois.-. 
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revolution. The Maximalists claimed that the existence of the 
minimum program meant that the party, in fact, envisaged that the 
revolution would be democratic in form, but bourgeois-reformist 
rather than socialist in content. 
Although the Maximalist viewpoint might appear to be more 
consistently revolutionary, the official party line was certainly more 
realistic; the reforms which emerged from the revolution of 1905 
fell far short even of the SR minimum program, and the 
Ma.ximalist perspective of a socialist economy run by free labour 
communes of agricultural and industrial workers seems totally 
utopian in the context 0£1905-07.5 
The Party of Popular Socialists derived its origin from the literary 
group. of 'Legal Populists' working on Russkoe Bogatstvo, to 
whom Chernov had turned for assistance in establishing a legal SR 
newspaper in Russia after the appearance of the October Manifesto. 
The 'Legal Populists' sought an open, legal party and rejected 
Chernov's distinction between the minimum and maximum 
program, envisaging the transition to socialism as a single process, 
albeit a prolonged one, and disagreed with aspects of SR tactics, 
rejecting terrorism and conspiracy and the party's attitude towards 
" . 5 For the Maximalist critique of the SR Party program and Chernov's : -- e '- '- .( ,... ~•:_·_,I 
defence refer to the di,scussion in the previous chapter. 
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land seizures by the peasants.6 
The Second (Extraordinary) Congress of the SR party met at 
Tammerfors in Finland on 12 February 1907. The main task of the 
Congress was to decide on the party's tactics towards the Second 
Duma. Several delegates still favoured a Duma boycott. However, 
any equivocation in regards to participation was dispelled by a 
forceful speech by Gershuni, who had recently escaped from Siberia. 
Gershuni asserted that the party leadership must be responsive to 
the masses: 
For what is the SR party? Is it little groups who sit in 
committees? The party is the organised working class of 
workers and peasants. Its will is the will of the party. And when 
the party decides whether or not to enter the Duma, this in 
practice means that the workers and peasants are deciding 
whether or not to elect. And if the voice of the proletariat and 
peasantry organised by the party clearly and definitely decides to 
enter, the committees and central institution~ of the party, as 
executive organs of the working class, should implement its 
decisions. 7 
In the end it was agreed to utilise the Duma for the ·party 
revolutionary ends, by forming a fraction of SR deputies.8 It was a 
6 For the Legal Populist critique of the SR Party program refer to the 
previous chapter. A group of Legal Populists, including Annenskii, Miakotin 
and Peshekhonov, were invited to attend the First Congress of the SR party 
with the right to speak but not to vote. 
7 Protokoly vtorogo (ekstrennago) sezda Partii Sotsialistov-
Revoliutsionerov, St.Petersburg, 1907, pp.83-84. 
8 The decision was virtually unanimous, with only one delegate dissenting. 
ibid, p.163. pp.160-162. 34 SR deputies were elected to the Second Duma; 
for a biography of delegates with portraits refer to M.M. Boiovich, 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy (portrety, biografii) Vtoroi sozyv 1907-1912g. 
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short lived experiment and on the 3 June 1907, the Second Duma 
was dissolved like its predecessor. The boycottist tactics were 
resumed in connection with the Third and Fourth Dumas. 
Among the objects of the SR attack in the Second Duma were the 
proposals for agrarian reform introduced by the Prime Minister 
Stolypin, in his decree of 9 November 1906. The Stolypin reforms 
sought to encourage withdrawal from the commune by enabling 
peasants to claim title to their holdings and consolidate their strips 
into enclosed individual farms. As an attempt to destroy the 
communal solidarity of the peasantry, and to foster individual 
proprietorial attitudes, these measures ran directly counter to the 
aims of the SR agrarian policy. The fundamental cornerstone of the 
SR agrarian policy was socialisation of the land. Many veteran 
populists continued to link their hopes of socialisation to the 
survival of the repartitional commune. Chernov's agrarian, theory 
gave primacy to the class position of the peasantry as the basis of 
socialisation. According to Chernov's theory, SR hopes for 
socialisation of land derived not from the existence of the 
repartitional commune, but from their view of the mass of small 
peasant producers as members not of the petty bourgeoisie but of 
the working class, and their c~nsequent receptivity to socialist ideas. 
Moscow, 1907. 
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The peasants' desire for land was a progressive aspiration, with 
both an anti-feudal and anti-capitalist content, and it was the duty 
of a socialist party to ensure that any agrarian reform which 
transferred the land to the peasantry created class solidarity and 
' 
cohesion and prevented the development of 'property fanaticism'. 
For this reason, the SR minimum program advocated the transfer 
of the land not to individual peasants as private property, but to 
democratic communal organisations for egalitarian utilisation.9 
Chernov made it clear that his arguments in favour of the 
socialisation of the land applied to Europe as a whole and not 
specifically to Russia. All European socialists, Chernov argued, 
should advocate collective rather than individual possession of the 
land, but the form of collective property in land would depend on 
individual circumstances in individual countries. Indeed, the 
scheme of socialisation had been taken over by kindred parties of 
other nationalities which had no institution resembling the 
commune.10 If the central theme of the party had so much appeal 
9 
'Sotsializatsiia zemli i kooperatsiia v selskom khozyaystve', 
Revo/iutsionnaia Rossiia, no.14 December, 1904. pp.6-7. 
10 The English Social-Democratic Federation was in favour of 
nationalisation; whereas the Dutch socialists, preferring greater 
decentralisation, proposed the 'communalisation' of the land, whilst the 
Belgians envisaged some kind of balance between local and central control. 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.15 January, 1903. p.7. 
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where the obshchina did not exist, why should its fortunes in 
Great Russia be inseparably linked to the fate of that institution? 
It is quite clear that for Chernov's agrarian program, in stark 
contrast to that of some of the earlier populists, the existence of the 
peasant commune played only a secondary role to the 'objective' 
class position of the peasantry as a basis for the socialisation of the 
land. And insofar as they did take the commune into consideration, 
the SRs saw its main significance not in the institution itself, but in 
the complex of attitudes which it engendered. These attitudes 
represented the 'subjective' basis of SR hopes for land socialis~tion. 
The SRs always insisted that, unlike some of their Populist 
predecessors, they did not idealise the contemporary commune. 
They recognised that its operation was as much bureaucratic as 
democratic, and that repartition had not prevented the growth of 
individualism and social differentiation in the countryside in the 
post-Emancipation period. Nevertheless, they believed that the 
tradition of communal ownership and disposal of the land, and the 
practice of its egalitarian redistribution, created attitudes in the 
peasantry which had more in common with socialist than with 
individualistic principles. Thus, in one essay from 1908, Chernov 
··urged his fellow Socialist Revolutionaries not to lament" the legal · 
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abolition of the village commune too much, because they should 
remember that 'the old commune' had 'many dark, backward, 
oppressive sides'. The old commune, for example, had served the 
autocracy as an instrument of fiscal oppression and was 
incompatible with the emancipation of women. 'But in spite of its 
many faults, the old commune was an institution that tended 
toward human equality, rather than the reverse'.11 
The commune had both positive and negative features; the positive 
aspects however were a 'wild plant which could bear fruit only after 
skillful grafting by socialist hands'.12 Chernov, as a consequence of 
the Stolypin reforms, now stressed equality rather than collectivity. 
The egalitarianism of the rural life, engendered by the 
collective practices and the common misery of the peasants in 
the village communes, will prove a lasting benefit, because it is 
built into the very nature of the peasantry .... Communes may 
live or communes may pass away, but the peasants, no matter 
how they carry on their appointed duties, will live together in a 
manner so similar that a feeling of ide~tity will always obtain 
among them. Some peasants may gain more, some peasants 
may lose all, but the peasants in a village will always be roughly 
equal.13 
This rather optimistic passage is quite definite that peasant 
egalitarianism would survive, even though he admitted that the 
11 Chernov, 'Sotsializatsiia Zemli kak takticheskaia problema', 
(Socialisation of Land. Tactical problems} in Zemlia i Pravo; Sobranie 
Sochinenii, (Land and Law. Collected works}, Petrograd, 1917. p.218. 
12 ibid, p.210, p.208. 
13 ibid, p.220. 
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actual equality of the peasants would be diminished. Thus Chernov 
abandoned the former stress on the services of the obshchina in 
conditioning the peasantry against private property and sought 
support for the agrarian program in its egalitarian features.14 
Chernov demystified the romantic ideals of the peasant commune 
which the veteran -populists had cradled. In essence, Chernov was 
able to illustrate to the party that their agrarian program was not 
solely reliant on the existence of a peasant commune at all. 
Chernov stressed the primacy of the class position of the peasantry 
as the basis for socialisation and stated that even in the West, where 
there was no commune, agrarian capitalism was making little 
headway among the peasantry, and that indeed, many Western 
Marxists shared the SRs view on agrarian policy. In addition he also 
stressed the egalitarian views associated with the commune. By 
demonstrating flexibility of mind and revolutionary will and by 
creating a distinct, original and separate revolutionary populism, he 
was clearly rejecting the populism of old and was able to restore a 
semblance of faith in the SR program. 
At the First Party Conference which met in August, 1908, in 
London 15, the debates on the agrarian policy illustrated that not all 
14 O.H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.84. 
15 In August, 1908 the Central Committee called for a All-Party 
Conference in London. The Conference opened on the 4 August and sat for 11 
days; of the 74 delegates present, 45 travelled from Russia. Chernov, Pered 
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delegates were persuaded by Chernov's rhetoric. Rushing to the 
defence of the commune from external attack, the c~nference 
resolved to conduct a c.ampaign in the countryside to encourage the 
collectivist aspect of peasant psychology; to combat the 
government's efforts to strengthen individualism; to seek the 
improvement of working procedures within the commune; to 
facilitate the struggle by means of communal decisions, against 
demands for the separation of holdings; and to obtain the boycott of 
kulaks and those members of a commune who desired the 
separation of holdings, so as to seize a larger amount of land than 
would fall to their family in the event of a new repartition.16 
However, in theory, the survival of the commune was not essential 
for the socialisation of land. 
Stolypin's attempts at a fundamental agrarian reform coincided 
with a program of 'pacification'. This policy aimed at an all-out 
struggle against the· revolutionaries. Increased police suppression 
after the dismissal of the Second Duma in 1907 forced a precipitous 
decline in overt party activities. The period of relative freedom 
which preceded the repression had enabled the SRs to agitate widely 
Burei, p.280. 
1 6 Protokoly pervoi obshchepartiif!Oi konferentsii Partii Sotsialistov-
Revoliutsionerov, avgust, 1908. Paris, 1908. pp.228-229. 
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and openly among the masses and the relaxation of censorship led 
to a plethora of party publications pamphlets, newspapers, and 
books in Russia. In 1907, the party publications continued on a 
predominantly -illegal basis. In July, 1907, Partiinyia Izvestiia (Party 
News), was replaced by Znamia Truda (Banner of Toil), as the 
main party organ. From the beginning of 1908, severe repressions 
led to the confiscation of most of the party's presses in Russia, and 
the main focus of the party's publishing activity once again moved 
abroad. 17 An organisational crisis enveloped the party; the party 
organisations languished more· or less permanently in a state of 
paralysis. According to Chemov, 'an ideological stupor, a condition 
of confusion and incomprehension' reigned in the party.18 Like 
the SDs, the SRs witnessed the elimination of vital segments of its 
organisational structure by 1908. After listening to bleak reports 
from local representatives at the 1908 Conference, Chernov 
summarised the matter as follows: 
Our party has suffered very severe damage; ... The general crisis 
has created immensely difficult conditions for party work, 
which have greatly hampered the activity of the CC [Central 
committee]. There are extremely few local workers left, and as a 
result of this the intermediate links between the masses and the 
central organs of the party have become weak. 
... Almost all [of those presenting reports] note that over the 
17 A. Spiridovich, Histoire du terrorisme russe, 1886-1917, Paris, 
1930. pp.498-499, p.503. 
18 Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.281-285. 
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current period we have unfortunately become estranged from 
the masses - not because the masses have become disillusioned 
in revolution and have abandoned it, but because the 
organisation has melted away and evaporated .. ~ The party is not 
living through a political crisis, its program and tactics have 
not been undermined by stern experience, but there is no doubt 
that it is experiencing an organisational crisis, and a very 
severe one.19 
In other words the Okhrana (Tsarist Secret Police), had wiped out 
many intermediary regional oblast and provincial guberniia 
committees, cutting off regularised communications. Adding to the 
party's gradual disintegration were the arrests and imprisonment of 
many SR activists, while many others were forced to flee abroad to 
escape persecution. . 
The real tragedy of the party's situation in 1907-08 in Chernov's 
view, was that its organisation had become isolated from the 
masses at the very time when the masses themselves, as a result of 
their experience of the revolution, were more receptive than ever 
before to SR ideas. 
In an era of repression it was t~e proletariat which offered the best 
opportunities for revolutionary work.20 As a consequence, for 
19 
'Report of Comrade Olenin on the activities of the Central Committee'. 
'Olenin' was one of the pseudonyms of V.M. Chernov. Protokoly pervoi 
obshchepariinoi konferentsii Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov, avgust, 
1908. Paris, 1908. pp.56-57. 
20 That this occurred i~ not all that surprising. Urban workers had 
achieved a higher degree of literacy, a higher consciousness; and were 
inherently better organised, concentrated as they were in cities and factories, 
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some years after 1907, SRs, like Social Democrats, devoted much of 
their propagandistic and organisational efforts to urban workers. 
The renowned Chernoviali theory of 'toiling class', holding that 
workers, peasants, and radicalised intelligentsia, united of course 
under the banner of the SR Party, constituted the social base of the 
coming revolution, and provided a programmatic justification 
(indeed injunction) for agitating among all three groups, depending 
on opportunity and resources. The conditions prevailing in Russia 
after the onset of the Stolypinist reaction necessitated a temporary 
narrowing of practical activities to workers, drawing the appropriate 
response for SRs. 
The revelation of Azef's treachery soon after the 1908 party 
conference completed the process of demor~lisation which had-
begun after the Stolypin repression. Evno Azef unbelievably, 
successfully combined the roles of the chief informer on the SR 
party and head of the Boevaia Organizatsiia from 1903 to 1908.21 
than the peasantry. This is not to say that the SR party had abandoned the 
peasantry; despite all the difficulties, SR organisational contact with the 
peasantry was never completely disrupted, even in the darkest days of the 
repression. 
21 For a detailed discussion of the whole sordid affair refer to,V. 
Meshcheriiak, Partiia S-R. Sotsialistov Revoliutsionerov. Moscow, 1922. 
pp.48-83; B. Savinkov, Memoirs of a Terrorist, trans. by J. Shaplen New 
York, 1972, this is a translation of Savinkov's Vospominaniia terrorista; V. 
Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.285-294; 0. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of 
Bolshevism, pp.71-74; P.E. Shchegolev (ed.} Provokator: Vospominaniia i 
dokumenty o razoblachenii Azefa, (Agent Provocateur: Memoirs and 
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The use of terror as a revolutionary tactic was to be only one of the 
many means employed to change the course of Russian life. This 
was a position Chernov had reached on the utilisation of terror in 
his student days at Moscow University when he compared terror to 
'artillery preparation which clears the way for the storm columns of 
the mass movement'. 'Terror is to be considered as a subordinate 
weapon of the movement'.22 In a pamphlet Terroristicheskii 
element v nashei programme (The terrorist element in our 
program), Chernov made the subordinate status of terror even 
more explicit. Terror was not to be any single-handed combat of the 
gods which decided battles in antiquity; 'terror is merely one kind of 
weapon in the hands of one part of the revolutionary army'. The 
SR party did not consider terror as some mystical panacea, the 
pamphlet continued, but one of the most 'energetic means of 
struggle with autocratic bureaucracy, a restraint on administrative 
arbitrariness, [a means] to disorganise the mechanism of 
government, [a means] of agitation and excitation of society to 
create enthusiasm and a fighting spirit ... .'23 Until circumstances 
Documents on the Unmasking of Azef). n.p., 1929; B. Nicolaievsky, Aseff: The 
Russian Judas, translated by G. Reavey, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1934. 
This is a translation of Nicolaievsky's lstoriia Odnogo Predatelia: terroristy i 
politicheskaia politsiia. Berlin, 1932. 
22 Chernov, Zapiski sotsialista-revoliutsionera, Berlin, 1922. pp.142-
143, pp.184-185. 
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(Evno Azef's treachery and Grigori Gershuni's death) brought 
terror to an end, the party centre continued to insist on absolute 
control of all acts of terror. The reason for insistence on absolute 
control was that party leadership, particularly Chemov, demanded 
that terror be used only against representatives of the regime and 
not against private persons who displayed neutrality in 'the war 
between the government and the revolutionary people ... .'24 
Contrary to Chernov's expectations the Boevaia Organizatsiia, 
with its need for secrecy, enjoyed considerable autonomy within the 
party's organisational structure. Although this was supposed to 
contribute to the effectiveness of its conspiratorial activity, the 
organisational autonomy of the Boevaia Organizatsiia· lessened the 
degree of party control over terrorism. In SR theory, party control 
served to integrate political terror with the mass movement, and 
this integration s_erved as a major justification for terrorism .. But, in 
practice, neither control nor integration was achieved. From 1906 to 
1908 the problem of terrorist activity was a major issue for the SRs, 
with implications both for party organisation and for tactics. But 
23 Chernov, Terroristicheskii Element v nashei programme, (The 
terrorist element in our program), n.p. 1902, pp.6-7; the pamhlet was 
reprinted directly from Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia (Revolutionary Russia), 
no.7, June, 1902. pp.2-5. 
24 Znamia Truda; (Banner of Toil), no.3, August 1, 1907. p.12. 
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these questions were barely discussed at the First Party Congress. 
Terror had many possible justifications. The most consistently used 
and perhaps ·the, most thoughtful was, as Chernov's pamphlet 
Terroristicheskii Element v nashei programme explained, that 
one is not always ' ... free in the selection of means. We do not know 
with what horrors our government fills this land. But we do know 
that every horror and brutality - which they commit with easy 
hearts - will be turned on themselves'. And Chernov protested that 
he would welcome arguments which would save one from 
' ... exchanging the weapon of the living word for the deadly weapon 
of murder·.25 The use of terror was a means of self-defence 
' ... without which the debauch and unrestrained autocratic 
arbitrariness passes all limits and becomes unendurable'.26 
Another justification, was terror's propaganda effect. Chernov 
argued that, if terror strikes an official who has caused thousands to 
suffer, then it is more effective than months of propaganda in 
directing the thoughts of the sufferers to revolutionaries and their 
actions.27 The use of terror as a disorganising weapon is closely 
linked to the idea of artillery before battle. Terror disorganises the 








to-miss the point that terror is not minor when considered in the 
context of the whole movement. He then asked rhetorically 'that if 
the party considered abandoning terror as a policy then why should 
it not consider giving give up its other means of struggle, for 
example, unions or co~peratives.28 
When Evno Azef's treachery came to light, Chernov hammered 
out four articles in which he claimed that the Azef affair acted to 
disorganise the government's attack as much as it was harmful to 
the revolutionary movement. Chernov took some glee in telling 
the truth about Azef to embarrass the government, which denied 
Azef's participation in the assassination of Interior Minister von 
Pleve and Grand Duke Sergei. He could not explain his blindness to 
Azef's treachery except to say that the party needed such organisers. 
For Azef's motives he could find no explanation except that Azef 
liked money.29 Azef was a pragmatist and never concealed his 
contempt for questions of theory and program. He had boasted 
28 Dokumenty po istorii Partii Sotsialistov-Revolutsionerov: Vopros o 
terrore na V Sovete Partii, Mai 1909 god. (Documents on the history of the 
Socialist-Revolutionary Party: The question of terror at the fifth Party 
Conference. May, 1909) in Sotsialist-Revoliutsioner, no.2 Paris, 1910. 
pp.32-33. This, is from Chernov's speech. 
29 All of the four articles appeared in Znamia Truda, no.15 February, 
1909. Their titles, with Chernov'.s pseudonyms are: B. Tuchkin. 'lz temnago 
taststvo', (From a dark realm), pp.12-14; lu. G., 'Tysiacha i odna gipoteza', 
(A thousand and one hypotheses), pp.7-10; B.T., 'Stolypin ob Azefie', 
(Stolypin on Azef), pp.14-18; B. Tuchkin, 'Evgenii Azef', (Evno Azef), pp.2-
7. 
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openly that he was not a 'theorist, and that he regarded theorising 
as mere "idle chatter".' He was no less sceptical in his view of 
socialism, and he made no bones about it. According to Chemov, 
'he put socialism into the distant future•.30 And he differed on 
many points from the program laid down by the Central 
Committee. 'He had no belief whatsoever in the masses or mass 
movements as an independent revolutionary force', Chernov 
wrote about him. 'His only immediate reality was the struggle for 
the political freedom and his only revolutionary means, the terror. 
He would seem to have regarded propaganda work, agitation and 
mass organisation with contempt as mere educational work, and 
recognised as "revolution" only the active fighting done by the few 
members of a secret organisation•.31 
Azef was the most famous of police spies, but he was by no means 
the only one. In September of 1905, the party was informed of the 
infiltration of two police spies, Taratov and Azef.32 The_ 




B. Nicolaievsky, Aseff; The Russian Judas, p.98. 
ibid, pp.98-99. 
A copy of the letter received in August, 1905, by the Central Committee 
denouncing Tatarov and Azef as traitors is reproduced in Savinkov, Memoirs 
of a Terrorist, pp:313-314. The anonymous letter of 1905 was written by 
the chief of the St. Petersburg Okhrana, Colonel Kremenetsky. Savinkov, 
Memoirs of a Terrorist, p.325. 
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possibility of treachery on the part of the organiser of von Plehve's 
assassination. No investigation was conducted into the charge and 
Azef remained free to operate. As for Taratov, the Central 
Committee in its wisdom set up a committee to investigate the 
allegations of betrayal. The committee was composed of Bach, 
Tiutchev, Chernov and Savinkov.33 It was Chernov who was to 
lead the questioning which was to last for several days.34 In the 
end the allegations were proved to be correct. The Central 
Committee of the party agreed with Savinkov's suggestion that the 
sentence of death be carried out, the plans of which were privy to 
Chernov.35 
While there is no evidence to implicate Chernov directly in any 
terrorist activity, he certainly was aware of, and indeed, involved in 
the planning of terrorist acts. Prior to the elections to the Second 
Duma the question of a possible assassination attempt against the 
Tsar was mooted. Chernov and Natanson concluded that while the 
time was ripe for such an attempt, the moment was unfavourable, 
as the parties were gaining heavily in the elections for the Second 
Duma. 36 Chernov was to deny such an attempt was being 
33 Nicolaievsky, Aseff: The Russian Judas, p.123. Savinkov, Memoirs of 
a Terrorist, p.158. 
34 For an account of the interrogation refer to Savinkov, Memiors of a 
Terrorist, pp.159-167. 
35 ibid, p.223. 
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formulated, when Stolypin exposed their plans during a meeting of 
the Second Duma.37 The question of the Tsar's assassination was 
brought before the Central Committee again immediately after the 
dissolution of the Second Duma. This meeting took place in 
Finland. Chernov supported Gershuni who argued in favour of an 
attempt. The Central Committee unanimously decided that the 
time was ripe for the Tsar's assassination, and that the Party should 
immediately proceed to organise this.38 The resolution was mor~ a 
statement of principle than any firm resolve to actually carry out 
the assassination. Organisationally the party at this time was 
incapable of carrying out such a proposal. 
In May, 1908, Vladimir Burtsev, editor of the historical 
revolutionary journal Byloe (The Old Days), informed the Central 
. Committee that he had reason to suspect Azef of being an agent-
provocateur. Burtsev's allegations were violently attacked by 
Chernov who rushed to defend Azef's reputation, extolling his 
revolutionary services.39 The Central Committee of the SR party at 
a party conference in London, in 1908, decided to have Burtsev tried 





Nicolaievsky, Aseff: The Russian Judas, p.206. 
ibid, p.210. 
ibid, pp.216-218. 
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although Lopatin was the official chairman, the inquiry was in fact 
conducted principally by Chernov.40 After a month, the inquiry 
found some substance to Burtsev's allegations, and began an 
investigation into Azef's activities, though with some dissent. 
Tchernov [Chernov], Natanson and I decided that in the event 
of Bourtzev's [Burtsev] acquittal we would openly challenge the 
court and fight its decision: we still refused to entertain th~ 
slightest suspicion of Azev [Azef].41 
The subsequent investigation produced incontrovertible evidence 
and convinced even the most ardent of sceptics. On 5 January, 1909, 
at a meeting of the Central Committee, the evidence was presented 
and a proposed course of action decided. Opinion was divided. 
Zenzinov, Prokofiev, Sletov and Sa vinkov voted for the 
immediate death of Azef. The majority equivocated, with Chernov 
amongst them, and argued that the killing of Azef would cause a 
split in the party. They also feared repercussions from the Fighting 
Organisation, that is, attempts on their own lives as many members 
of the Fighting Organisation remained loyal to Azef. It was also 
feared that Azef's execution would lead to reprisals against the 
emigres. Only Natanson remained unconvinced as to Azef's guilt. 
A compromise was reached. The meeting decided to continue the 
40 
41 
Nicolaievsky, p.252; Savinkov, ibid, p.327. 
Savinkov, Memoirs ... , p.332. 
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investigation of Azef, while at the same time to prepare for his 
killing with the least possible damage to the party. The execution of 
Azef was to take place outside France at a secluded villa. He was to 
be enticed to the villa under an appropriate pretext by Chernov and 
Savinkov.42 In the meantime, Chernov, Savinkov and Panov 
were to continue their interrogation of Azef - under strict 
instructions not to kill Azef. In essence, the Central Committ~ had 
decided upon a purely juridical course abandoning any 
revolutionary solution to the question.43 The initial interrogation 
of Azef in Paris, on 5 January, 1909, was sufficient enough to 
confirm his feelings of anguish and Azef fled the following day. 
The exposure of Azef dealt a heavy blow to the party and to the idea 
of terror. 'If one had not lived through those days, it would be 
difficult to even imagine for oneself the dimensions of how 
dumbfounded the party was and the (eeling of a moral 
catastrophe'.44 At the Fifth Party Conference in May of 1909, 
Chernov spoke at length on terror, its justifications, and moral and 
ethical considerations. It is an attempt that failed as he reduced the 
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Out of the mire of the Azef affair, Chernov attempted to salvage 
some form of party credibility. The party was compromised by its 
inability to see a provocateur in their midst for so long. But this did 
not compromise terror itself: the ideas of terror and execution of the 
idea are distinct. 
Chernov swept away all 'rational' justifications of terror and 
reduced the problem of terror to individual responsibility. 
I have always personally carried the profound conviction that, 
in general, not only a terrorist as such, but also a socialist-
revolutionary terrorist, could only be a person wJ:lo did not 
enter the Party "especially for" terror, did not enter the party 
"through terror', but who in his own practice understood, 
knew, esteemed and sympathised with the total value of o:ur 
basic organic work.45 
Chernov continued on with his analysis by drawing the matter of 
terror down to the fine point of who directs and who executes the 
decisio~ to kill. It is not a matter of whom the government will 
hang, because the ' ... "entrepreneurs" will swing by the neck for the 
same thing as the actors'. One never knows what punishment will 
be; the government never acts the same. But this does not concern 
moral values: 'I do not understand how one can introduce in a 
moral problem some principle of mechanically equal justice .. .'. 'It 
45 Dokumenty po istorii Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov: Vopros o 
terrore na V Sovete Partii, Mai 1909 god. (Documents on the history of the 
Socialist-Revolutionary Party: The question of terror at the fifth Party 
Conference.May.1909) in Sotsialist-Revoliutsioner, no.2 Paris, 191 o. 
pp.35-36. 
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simply does not concern us; that is, it concerns our bodies, but our 
spirit can never be subordinate to it'.46 Those who write of terror 
are a thousand times safer than organisers and doers. Yet, 'they 
know, they cannot fail to know, that every written line in defense 
of terror may be a life surrendered in terrorist struggle in the 
future'. I say: in a party which practises terror, before each stands, in 
especially clear relief and with singular force, the moral problem: 
are you, can you be, ready at any moment to give up your life?' And 
this problem does not only exist in a terrorist party. Any party 
which looks to ·armed rebellion but denies terror faces this problem 
but forgets it. For 'every line in defence of armed rebellion can . 
perhaps also be a life, and not one, but perhaps hundreds and 
thousands of lives'. To be a terrorist party means to open the 
problem, to be reminded of it 'every day, hourly, as a memento 
mori standing before every member': To be a member of a terrorist 
party means to face this problem. 'And he who does not decide this 
~~nn~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I 
ethical problem, and does not have the right to say that he can be a 
member of such a party•.47 






conscience. When the members of the conference _voted, Chemov 
stated that he was for cessation of terror, but, because of his position 
on the central committee, he abstained from voting. The conference 
voted six to one with three abstentions, to continue the terror.48 
To justify terror in individual subjective terms in the end is no 
justification at all. Shortly after the party conference Chernov 
attempted to expand the question of terror to a societal , more 
'objective' problem. He argued by way of analogy. A commune 
decided to remove grain from its common barn. However, the local 
zemstvo put the barn under lock. A strong peasant was needed to 
break the lock. This strong peasant acted alone in the interests of all. 
The analogy applied to terrorists. 'But terror as a system of struggle 
can arise only when the popular conscience speaks an unwritten 
death sentence to its persecutors. Only an atmosphere of general 
sympathy can give birth to that stream of selflessness which [leads 
to] the replacement of one. fallen terrorist by_ a second, a third -
endlessly, fearlessly, calmly. Terror is only apparently 
individual...' .49 The in~eraction between terrorist and the mass is 
intimate. The terrorist had to know he was getting results, he could 
48 ibid,pp.51-52. 
49 Chernov under the -pseudonym B. Olenin.'Zamietky· terrorie'~ (Notes on 
terror), Znamia Truda, no.19 19 July, 1909, pp.6-11. 
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not exist cut off from popular sympathy. 'By introducing terror into 
its program, by accepting before the whole country, nay, -before the 
whole world, responsibility for terrorist acts, a revolutionary party 
is somewhat nearer to realising the communal "all are 
responsible". •50 
Chernov's analogy of the strong peasant was not sufficient, for he 
could not explain the strong peasant's motives. Moreover, the 
whole question of terror is insoluble in the context of formal ethics 
which posits some absolute against killing. It is not clear whether 
Chernov realised that he had run up against a_ stone wall in 
pursuing the question of terror in a framework of formal ethics and 
then leaped over that wall by considering the problem as a result of 
societal, and not individual imperatives, wherein the hero is 
'moved' even though he considers himself to be the 'mover'. 
Essentially, that is what he had done; terror-is only apparently 
individual; all are responsible. By reducing criteria .for action to an 
individual level he. had lost the possibility .of action for any but 
narrow, self-contained, and perhaps unknowable motives. 
The question of terror died a natural death in party activity, leaving 
Chernov to work out his solutions alone. Nicolaievsky relates a , 
comment Chernov once m~de_. that 'terror was not begun by .Aseff 
50 ibid. 
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[Azef], and will not end with him•.51 Only the former part of this 
sentence is correct. The exposure of Azef pronounced the death 
sentence on the party's terrorist campaign. The attempts by Sletov 
and Savinkov to revive the terrorist campaign made little headway 
and collapsed. The party was even unable to carry out the death 
sentence on Azef that the Central Committee ordered. The labours 
of Chernov in justifying terror rapidly became irrelevant. The 
whole tardy episode shattered the mystique of moral avengers 
against an immoral regime forced to rely on repression to survive. 
It was a mystique that lulled so many SR leaders into such a false 
sense of security that it confused their judgements. As a 
consequence, they allowed virtual autonomy of terrorist enterprises 
and staunchly defended a viper within their midst. By doing so they 
undermined their own credibility and authority. While they 
revelled in their successes, the unmasking of the Azef's treachery 
shattered their party. 
The conclusion is inescapable that the practice of terrorism had not 
paid off in the long run, all the more since its primary purpose, at 
least in theory, had been to provoke a popular uprising which 
would sweep the old regime into the dustbin of history.52 
51 
52 
Nicolaievsky, Aseff. The Russian Judas, p.266. 
Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.74. 
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From the defeat of the 1905 revolution until the outbreak of the 
war, the party experienced internal crises, repression and treachery. 
The party under Chernov had foundered and no amount of effort 
by him could save it. The ship that Chernov had attempted to steer 
a middle course, a compromise course under a flag of convenience, 
was one which virtually no one recognised, let alone saluted. 
Outside of Russia the leadership in exile was divided into three 
groups, of which one approached the Maximalist position, another 
leaned towards Popular Socialism, and a third fell in between the 
two. The intermediate group under Chernov hewed to the 
orthodox SR line in spite of hell and high water.53 
53 ibid, p.81. 
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The outbreak of the war in July 1914 confronted Socialist 
Revolutionaries in the European emigration with a· terrible 
dilemma. Separated from home by hundreds of miles and two 
military fronts, they were forced to make fateful decisions about the 
war when deprived of first hand knowledge of what its effects were 
in Russia. The SR party, of course, was a party already split by 
dissension on major issues, even on the cardinal question of 
whether or not to continue operating as an underground 
revolutionary party. Naturally, individuals already treading such 
divergent paths could not achieve unanimity on so divisive an 
issue as the war. On the one hand, moderate SRs, called 
'liquidators' because of their desire to 'liquidate' the underground 
party organisations, and who believed in the possibility of 
evolutionary development in Russia, .chose to support the 
government in its time of trial. On the other hand, the cadres of 
party activists who had not relinquished the revolutionary cause 
found it difficult to overcome the effects of years of frustration and 
hostility toward the government now that it had engaged the 
country in a potentially ruinous war against which they had long 
-warned. They either lapsed into a tortured neutrality, gradually 
edging toward opposition as the war dragged on, or came .. out 
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against the war from the very beginning. 
Nonetheless, the SR party as a whole remained firmly coD;l.mitted 
to its former revolutionary tradition, as demonstrated by its policy 
of rejecting participation in the Duma. SRs refused to make a 
compromise with the liberal, moderate, and evolutionary policies it 
symbolised. The SRs basically uncompromised stance on the issue 
of revolution found its reflection in the party's program on the war 
issue between 1907 and 1914. SRs like most socialists, had 
committed themselves to take action against a war if it came. The 
First Party Congress had pledged the party to oppose by the 'most -
decisive means' in its power the entrance of Russia into war.1 
Such commitments, of course, were as common as grains of sand 
on a beach and, as it turned out, signified little when the patriotic 
slogan to 'defend the fatherland' reached the ears of numerous 
socialists. There were, however, anti-war stances and anti-war · 
I 
stances. The party reaffirmed its anti-war stance at the 
Internationalist Socialist Congress at Basel in 1912. The official SR 
resolution read as follows: 
modern war is the inevitable result of the capitalist system .... 
The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries declares war against 
war ... [and] will with all its force oppose drawing our country 
into a fratricidal war .... The duty of the party is to protect the 
working class ... [against] the insatiable appetite of Russian 
Protoko/y pervago sezda ... , pp.290-291. 
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imperialism .... The party should utilize growing political 
unrest in the struggle against tsarism and capitalism.2 
The party's resolution on war,when considered in the context of its 
generally radical stance on major political and social issues, carries 
the suggestion that the SR party might not renounce its anti-war 
commitments as easily --as many socialists, Russian and non-
Russian, found possible. Certain SR positions at the Stuttgart and 
Copenhagen Congresses of the International, the last twq before the 
war, also indicate that this was so. On the basis of such resolve one 
would therefore expect numerous SR's to oppose the war when it 
came. 
On 22 August, 1914, in the village of Beaugy-sur-Clarens near 
Geneva on the dairy farm of E.E. Lazarev, a contingent of 
distinguished SR emigre leaders gathered for the first time since the 
outbreak of the war to discuss what to do about the shattering 
event. The conference was an attempt by the party to ac;:t in a unified 
manner during the war. In the end, it laid the foundation for 
internationalism and even defeatism (the call for Russia's defeat in 
the war), a development worthy of note since, according to most 
historical opinion, only Bolsheviks were supposed to have been 
defeatist. 
2 
--A.I. Spiridovich, Partiia Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov · --eia 
Predshestvenniki 1886-1916. Petrograd. 1918. pp.509-510. 
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The right wing at the conference consisted of V. Banakov, N. 
Avksentiev, and V. Rudnev, while the left wing had as its most 
forceful spokesmen V.M. Chernov and M. Natanson, with the 
balance of the fifteen or so delegates standing somewhere in 
between. 3 The rightists, whose first speaker was Bunakov, took 
the position that the democratic entente of France and England was 
threatened by German militarism. Since Russia, whose existence 
was also threatened by Germany, had formed an alliance with these 
powers, her war effort deserved support. Only reform, rather than 
revolution, could strengthen Russia during the war. As a 
consequence, socialists must abandon their normal role for the 
duration of the war; the only goal for socialists was 'the war and its 
successful conduct'. Chernov, opening speaker for the left, in a 
statement utterly at odds with tha.t of the· right, put the matter as · 
follows:- 'Our front [as socialists] is against the war, in defense of the 
socialist international, which is threatened by it'. This war claimed 
. Chernov, was not defensive for Russia, since she had dynastic 
rather than national goals. The defeat of Russia, which Chernov 
conceded as a possibility, should be seen as the defeat of the Russian 
government, the result of which would be a 'people's government'. 
3 ibid, p.524. 
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The party, stated Chernov, cannot remain as a mere onlooker, but 
must set about to influence events. 'It must prepare arms and ... 
influence the masses to the extent possible. We must be ready for 
revolution and plan it. We must send an active group into Russia, 
a kernel around which the party forces we have sown will gather. 
[We must] be prepared for appropriate action'.4 Although he was 
later to deny it, Chernov had outlined in unmistakable terms a 
revolutionary defeatist stance for the SR party during the war. 
' 
The position of the venerable Natanson, who had in the late 1860's 
formed the very first full scale revolutionary organisation on 
Russian soil, was even more radical. Natanson approved of 
Chernov's idea of sending groups of activists into Russia and urged 
the party to put aside all internal strife. Furthermore, Natanson, felt 
that, 'a great evil would result if Russia defeated Germany. This 
would be against the interests of the people since it would preserve 
the present order.' Natanson recommended that the party turn not 
to the bourgeois intelligentsia, but 'to the workers and peasants. 
Reveal to them the corruption of the government and the 
4 V.V. Rudnev, 'lz istorii partii (zagranichnoe soveshchan)e tsentralnykh 
rabotnikov P .S-R. Po voprosu o linii povedeniia v usloviiakh mirovoi 
voiny}', (From the History of the Party [Conference Abroad of Central 
Workers of the PSR to Determine the Line to be Taken in theWorld War]}, in 
· "· ."S.v.oboda (Freedom},-· no.4 December, 1935, ._pp.13'-18; .no.5 
July, 1936,pp.6-10. 
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criminality.' The party should wait for the right moment for the 
revolution, but, concluded Natanson, 'this is hard to imagine 
without Russia's defeat'. Chernov, evidently inspired by 
Natanson's unshakeable dedication to revolution, even ventured a 
little later to proclaim a Russian victory 'dangerous', since it would 
carry the empire to Constantinople (Russian war aims included the 
Dardanelle Straits). 'Our role in victory or defeat is to protest 
nationalism with extreme means as do Liebknecht and 
Luxembourg. •5 
The response of the moderate SRs like Rudnev, Avksentiev and 
Bunakov to what seemed to them irresponsible extremist views 
was one of incredulity; they found it difficult to reconcile that party 
comrades could think about war other than they did. In any case, 
Chernov and Natanson calmly explained the program they 
espoused to their old party comrades. As Chernov put it, 'it is 
necessary to reveal in a socialist manner the anti-people's character 
of tsarist policy in the war .... We should work not for the victory, 
but for revolution.' Natanson pointed out that, from the socialist 
point of view, 'the problem is what to tell the people; the war is not 
in their interest. The interests of the ruling classes and the people 
are contrary in spite of the war .... If the masses rise against the war, 
5 ibid. 
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this is more impor,tant than victory of one side or another'.' After 
gruelling debate, a vote was taken on the issue of whether or not to 
send activists into Russia, with the leftist resolution approving this 
measure winning the majority of votes.6 There then ensued a 
shorter discussion, followed by another vote, on the question of 
'how the party should relate to the International. Chernov and 
Natanson felt that the old International, having failed to live up to 
its commitments to oppose the war, was bankrupt, and required the 
summoning of another through a conference of socialists opposing 
the war. This clearly foreshadowed, by the way, the Zimmerwald 
and Kienthal conferences of a year or two later. As Chernov 
described the matter: 'The old International is dead, Long live the 
International!' Speaking for the right wing, Rudnev praised the old 
International for failing to oppose the war, drawing an acerbic 
comment from Chernov that such praise was !worse than any 
burial.' The extreme right wing represented by Bunakov. 
Avksentiev, arid Rudnev opposed the idea outright, while 
Chernov and Natanson voted for an immediate convening of a 
conference of the International; the majority, however, felt that 
such a conference, while desirable in principle, was premature since 
passions were still running too high. 7 
6 ibid, no.4 pp.14-17, no.5 pp.6-10. 
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Radkey has claimed that the conference was inconclusive since the 
major decision - to send a group of activists into Russia - proved 
unattainable for the time being because of wartime disruption of 
underground channels of communication and travel. 8 To be fair, 
it must also be pointed out that the decisions of the conference were 
not even binding on the emigre comrades, let alone on those at 
home. In fact, the Beaugy Conference revealed a split in the party 
on how to relate to the war so profound that the two positions 
clearly represented not just differing views of the war, but antipodal 
perceptions of a whole range of crucial political issues. This was a 
development that did not augur well for the possibility of ever 
; 
conciliating the two sides of the division. It is of interest that the 
most ardent propon,ents of the war at the conference, Bunakov, 
Rudnev, and Avksentiev, had long associated themselves with 
and had indeed founded, the liquidator movement in the party, 
while Chernov and Natanson represented the central core of party 
activists who, as mentioned, remained dedicated to revolution. All 
of this notwithstanding, the Beaugy conference was most 
noteworthy for the fact that it revealed that, from the very earliest 
7 ibid. 
8 O.H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism. Columbia University 
Press. 1962. pp.92-93. 
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days of the ·terrible conflict consuming the youth, wealth, and spirit 
of Europe, SR leaders of the very greatest influence such 'as 
Chernov and Natanson not only opposed the war, not only 
favoured revolution, not only expressed the intention to continue 
to work toward revolution, but rejected even the idea of a Russian 
victory and raised (even praised) the prospect of Russia's defeat as a 
necessary prelude to revolution. This position, erroneously 
attributed exclusively to Lenin and some Bolsheviks, came to be 
known' as 'defeatism' and represented the most extreme position 
on the war. 
Chernov's doctrine of the Third Force, enunciated by him as early 
as the Beaugy conference in August, 1914, argued that it should be 
the duty of true socialists to organise and lead a Third Force of the 
working masses of Europe, and 'that they must intervene in order 
to force a settlement that would be fair and equitable, and hence 
beyond the ~apacity of either imperialist trust to achieve.•9 True 
socialists only could lead such a movement for Chernov was 
disgusted by the wholesale rush of bourgeois pacifists in 1914 to 
support their respective countries' war machines, and was so 
repelled by the nature of the remaining bourgeois 'pacifists' like 
Caillaux of France, since individuals like him were only against war 
9 ibid, p.107. 
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and not against private property.10 
The Third Force was to form in the various bellig~rent countries, 
set up mutual contact and be given direction by a revived socialist 
international. Chernov regarded these as gigantic tasks. It was to 
propagandise for an end to the dreadful war, and for a just peace 
without annexations and indemnities. But, more than this, the 
Third Force was to seize power in any country where it could. From 
the immensely powerful position of controlling a belligerent 
government, the Third Force was to expand the pressure for a just 
peace - an example which, Chernov thought, would surely spread 
revolution across the whole of Europe.11 
Important in this theory was Chernov's conviction that Russia, 
with the least popular regime and the worst class struggle in 
Europe, would be the first country to present revolutionary 
opportunities. Hence, Russia might well be the standard bearer of 
revolution and peace, a singular honour and· an awful 
responsibility. Revolutionary Russia would then have to tread the 
10 Chernov under the pseudonym lu. Gardenin 'Lozungi momenta: I. 
Patsifizm i sotsializm' {Slogans of the Moment: I, Pacifism and Socialism), 
in Voina i 'Tretia Si/a: Sbornik Statei {The War and the 'Third Force': A 
Collection of Articles). Geneva, 1915. pp.25-28; 'K obosnovaniiu nashego 
lozuna.' {On Providing a Basis for Our Slogan) in ibid, pp.31-40. 
11 Refer to Chernov, 'Tretia sila' {The Third Force), in Voina i 'Tretia 
Sita': Sbornik Statei. Geneva, 1915. pp.17-20; and Chernov 'Dva techeniia'" 
{Two trends), in ibid, pp.7-11. 
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thin line of continuing the fight against imperial Germany -
defensively only - while inspiring and aiding the birth of 
revolutionary Germany.12 
. . 
It is important to realise that Chernov had formulated the 
substance of this program and these predictions as early as the 
Beaugy conference in August, 1914, and had enunciated them 
clearly, .many times over, before the international conference at 
Zimmerwald in September 1915.13 
Yet it has been argued that Chernov's formulations of Russia in a 
revolutionary vanguard role owe their origins to Lenin. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is clear that interpretations of the 
Bolsheviks' rise to power in 1917, and indeed in the arena of action, 
have given them a certain preeminence in many aspects of theory. 
It would however, be presumptuous to let events ov~rshadow 
Chernov's role in theory. 
Undoubtedly, similarities in outlook occurred in their evaluations 
of imperialism, the effects of war ~nd proposals in favour of the 
new international.14 It is unfair that history, it seems, has chosen 
12 Chernov, 'Komu nachat' (Who Shall Begin), in ibid, pp.40-47; and 
Chernov, 'lmperativy morali i imperativy zhizni', (The Imperatives of 
Morality and the Imperatives of Life), in ibid, pp.47-55. 
13 A. Senn, The Russian Revolution in Switzerland 1914-1917, Madison, , 
University of Wiscon~in Press, 1971. p.20. 
14 Chernov, 'Lozungi ·momenta : II, Nash takticheskii lizung' (Slogans of 
the Moment: II Our Tactical Slogan) in Voina i 'Tretia Si/a', pp.28-31 and 
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to illuminate only Lenin's daring projections with the lustre of 
prescience. 'In order to exculpate Chemov entirely from the charge 
of theoretical subservience to Lenin, it is necessary only to 
remember that affinity does not constitute identity.'15 
There were, however, differences between the two. In Chernov's 
plan Russia would play the vanguard role in revolution, but it 
would have to be matched with similar action in Germany and 
Austria. For unless Russia provided the revolutionary catalyst for 
imperial Germany, the war would continue and the existence of a 
revolutionary Russia would be tenuous. 
If on one side of the boundary the proletariat rises as one man 
against the war and deranges the whole machinery of 
mobilisation, but on the other side the proletariat as one man 
shoulders its rifles and marches docilely into action, then it 
turns out that the revolutionarily inclined proletariat has 
done something that is not at all revolutionary but has simply 
played into the hands of a foreign aggressor.16 
Hence, an integral part of Chernov's tactic was the concept of 
reciprocity. 
After the Beaugy meeting Chernov soon departed for Paris, where 
the Okhrana considered his arrival a major turning point in the 
emergence of an internationalist position among the socialist 
'Komu nachat?' in ibid, pp.40-47. 
15 Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, pp.111 . 
- - . 16 Chernov 'Komu nachat', in Voina i Tretia Si/a', p.41. 
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emigres.17 Throughout the autumn of 1914, SRs of both factions 
continued to meet in various European cities to discuss the 
possibility of a unified position on the war. In October, 1914, the 
Paris group of SRs , with Boris Voronov-Lebedev as right wing 
leader, and Chernov and Lavretskii as leftist spokesmen, met to 
debate the war. Voronov stated that every socialist living in free, 
democratic France should volunteer into the French Army in order 
to fight German imperialism and bring democracy to the German 
people. 'Volunteerism,' turned out to be another right-left issue in 
Russian emigre socialism. In any case, Lavretskii replied that it was 
a senseless mistake. A second speaker from the right felt that 
Germany's defeat would end militarism in Europe. Finally, 
Chernov summed up the the two sides of the discussion and then 
lectured those present about the duties of socialists, which he 
defined as acting in such a way that at the end of the war socialists 
could exert influence in redrawing the map of Europe. 'If German 
militarism is bad,' he concluded, so is Russian tsarism.'18 A few 
weeks later, in November, a second conference took place, this time 
in Chernov's apartment in Lausanne, Switzerland. According to an 
Okhrana report, it consisted of 'an intimate discussion among 
17 Senn, The Russian Revolution .. ., p.20. 
· · , 1 B Archive of the Imperial Russian Secret Police (Okhrana), Hoover 
Institute, Stanford University, SR File, XVI b(3}, box 1, report dated 
October 1914. 
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leaders,' (one of whom, it so happened, was a provocateur). 
Attending were Avksentiev, Rudnev, Bunakov, Lazarev from the 
right and Natanson, Varvara Natanson (Mark Natanson's wife), 
Ilia Sidorych, Chernov and others from the left. As usual, Chemov 
chaired the meeting, summarising in an opening speech the 
various views on the war prevalent among SRs. Some, according to 
Chernov, such as Natanson, espoused full opposition; others, such 
as Avksentiev, held that Russian revolutionaries should take part 
in this war; still others felt that socialists should remain neutral, 
working toward summoning a socialist conference to work out a 
position for all socialists.19 Since Chernov did not ascribe this last 
moderately leftist position to anyone in particular, it is reasonable 
to assume it to be his own. If so, his views, perhaps under the 
influence of news of enormous Russian losses, had moderated 
somewhat. It was also altogether characteristic of Chernov to 
attempt to reach ·compromises between two opposing positions, 
while flirting with leftism. In any case( Chernov's anti-war work 
had barely begun in November 1914. Slight differences between his 
views and, those of the extreme left (Natanson) surfacing at this 
time are perhaps more important for explaining his actions in 1917 
19 - -- -ibid, report dated November 1914. 
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than for the war-time era. 
By the end of the month, pro- and anti-war SRs nq longer met 
together. In late November, an exclusively rightist conference 
issued a statement, signed, among others, by Voronov, favouring 
continuation of the war and calling for a Russian victory. A leftist 
conference then issued a counter-resolution, signed by Chemov, M. 
Rakitnikov, his wife Olga Rakitnikova, and several others, .against 
the war. This state of affairs, in which right and left worked 
separately and at cross purposes, characterised SR life in the 
emigration until the February Revolution, when an uneasy 
marriage of convenience temporarily bound the two sides together 
until the final official split in late 1917 gave birth to two SR parties 
instead of one. 
Chernov and N atanson did not restrict themselves to speeches· at 
confere~ces in defence of the~! position. The eve~t _occurring 
precisely at the middle of the month making further joint work of 
the two sides impossible was the appearance on 15 November, 1914, 
' .. 
in Paris of the internationalist daily Mysl (Idea) under the 
editorship of V.M. Chernov.20 Mysl, along with the left 
Menshevik Golos (Voice) and the Bolshevik Sotsial-Demokrat, 
set th~ tone for the powerful Russi~n internati~nalist movement_in 
20 Spiridovich, Partiia Sotsialistov- Revoliutsionerov, p:530. 
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Europe in the first year of the war. Lenin, who followed Mysl and 
its successors Zhizn (Life) and Otkliki zhizni closely, fretting 
when he missed an issue, nevertheless denigrated their content. In 
a letter to Bolshevik activist G. Shliapnikov dated 28 November, 
1914, Lenin commented that, in 'Paris a daily S.R. Mysl (arch-
philistine phrase-making, playing at "Leftism"). An abundance of 
papers, phrases from the intelligentsia, today r-r-revolutionary, 
tomorrow ... ? (tomorrow they will make peace with Kautsky, 
Plekhanov, the liquidationists "patriotic-chauvinist-opportunist 
intelligentsia" in Russia).... You cannot trust them in the 
slightest.'21 
Lenin's attack notwithstanding, throughout its existence from mid-
November 1914 to March 1915, Mysl occupied a staunchly 
internationalist position, espousing the immediate convening of a 
new Third International and a revolution at home, coupled with 
frequent bitter attacks against the government. The list contributors 
to Mysl was large, but the main figures were Chernov, usually 
writing under the pseudonym Iu. Gardenin, M. Rakitnikov, Olga 
Rakitnikova, Olga Chernova (Chernov's wife), V. Angarskii, and 
Boris Kamkov. The stern French censorship, applied freely to the 
21 V.I. Lenin. Collected Works Letters Feb.1912 - Dec.1922. Vol.35, 
Progress Publishers, Moscow 1966. p.176. All linguistic oddities in the 
original. 
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pages of Mysl, greatly complicates the task of fully ascertaining its 
positions on some issues, a problem pertaining to the left 
Menshevik Golos, also originating from Paris, but not to Lenin's 
Sotsial-Demokrat, which appeared in Geneva, where the Swiss 
police displayed sublime indifference to what Russian socialists 
were saying or doing. (Switzerland , of course, was neutral, whereas 
France was a participant in the war.) The censors in Paris simply 
whited out the most radical articles. A large blank space appeared 
on the first page of the 25 November, 1914 issue, while by February 
' 
and March the pages were as much white as black. An editorial in 
one of the last issues warned readers, who could have had no 
doubts about it, of a growing problem with the censors. A few days 
later the paper closed down. 
Despite the obstacle posed by the French censors, Chernov and the 
other contributors managed to disclose in the pages of Mysl their 
views on a wide range of important issues of the day. One of the 
first questions discussed in Mysl was 'volunteerism.' Socialists. 
from various countries had been volunteering in sizeable numbers 
into the allied armies, especially the French Foreign Legion, with 
the goal of defeating German militarism.22 
. 
Among prominent SR volunteers ·were Sletov Chernov's, brother-in-
law, who was soon killed. 
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Articles in Mysl unanimously condemned the phenomenon as 
futile, a violation of the spirit of the International, and 
disorganising to the socialist cause. An unsigned editorial, 
obviously written by Chernov, on 28 November stated that, 'Life 
has taught us too much for such enthusiasms.'23 Furthermore, 
wrote Chernov on another occasion, 'we are opposed to entry into 
the Russian army except with explicitly revolutionary aims.'24 
On the war issue there were some differences in nuance among the 
contributors to Mysl, but articles published in the paper were 
unquestionably internationalist.25 Most articles escaping the 
censors were left-centrist in tendency - that is, they did not agitate 
openly for Russia's defeat, but were hostile to the war, backed 
revolution during the war or immediately after it, as the case might 
be , and openly criticised the government. They also raised the 
possibility of Russia's defeat, a matter pro-war socialists did allude 
to. In the very first issue (15 November 1914), a lead article 
polemicised with the right Menshevik Iordanskii, who proclaimed 
23 
24 
Mysl, no.12, 28 November, 1914. 
ibid, no.49, 13 January, 1915. 
25 Chernov was at pains to make clear that Mysl was a 'private 
endeavour,' rather than an official party organ. In truth the party was too 
split to allow for a single line, allowing Mys/ writers. some freedom in 
exploring various strains of internationalism. Mys/ published no pro-war 
articles. 
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in a moderate socialist journal the necessity for the national masses 
of Russia to take part in the war. The unidentified Mysl writer 
(evidently Chernov) responded sarcastically, ' "a national war". Oh 
yes, we know from history examples of such wars. The wars of the 
French Republic and of Garibaldi were real peoples' wars. But there 
could be no question of a national war in tsarist Russia, where 
people were not free.'26 The writer then pointed out that on the 
Russian side the war depended entirely on draftees, there being few 
volunteers. 
Mysl consistently promoted the cause of revolution for the 
duration of its existence. Chernov wrote on 19 December, 1914, that: 
... we must not stand aside from social organisations w,orking 
in the rear of the army an~ in the country, even from those 
shot through with a spirit of chauvinism, but on the contrary 
we must enter them. Enter, not losing ourselves in them ... 
enter assigning ourselves one task - to reveal to the eyes of 
society the inescapableness of the conflict [revolution] that is 
already in the womb of the future.27 
For, as Chernov expressed it a little later, although, 'at the moment 
we can't open the revolutionary struggle against the war,. .. the time 
may come when this will be obligatory.'28 
This theme of impending revolution arose constantly on the pages 




Mysl, no.1, 15 November, 1914. 
ibid, no.30, 19 December, 1914. 
ibid, no.49, 13 January, 1915. 
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... the interests of the people and the interests of the 
government don't coincide and can't coincide in this war .... 
The conflict between the government and the country in 
embryonic form is already contained in the nature of things, in 
essence of the whole present situation.29 
In articles in late December, Chernov reverted on a daily basis to 
this topic. On 20 December Chernov, advised that 'the conflict with 
the government is inevitable. What form? Who knows .... Be ready 
for anything!!' Again on 22 December he. stated that 'the interests of 
the regime and the people are headed for a clash. Enter social 
organisations .... The benefits: contact with the broad masses.•30 
While Chernov employed biological and other circumlocutions, 
the germ of his thought was that the war was creating the 
revolution which would overthrow the government. On 1 January 
1915, SR activist Ivan Derevenskii attacked pro-war elements 
calling for socialists to disarm themselves and make an alliance 
with the tsar. After reciting a list of tsarist abuses, Derevenskii 
concluded, 'if you like all of this - please, make peace with tsarism. 
but we prefer to struggle against it even during the war. With this 
wish we meet the new year of 1915.'31 Finally, on 14, February 1915, 




ibid, no.30, 19 December, 1914. 
ibid, no.31, 20- Dece_J'!lber, 1914; and no.32, 22 December, 1914. 
ibid, no.40, 1 January, 1915. 
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conditions are ripe for peace and revolution... and "Be 
prepared!"'32 
Mysl also had an, impeccably leftist position on the International. 
Chernov in various articles fought for and defended the co:q.vening 
of an international conference.33 Chernov warned on 31 January, 
1915, that the new International must break sharply with the 
traditions of the old: 'we need not repeat the same mistakes.' On 7 
February, Boris Kamkov explained that the crisis of· the 
International was brought on by the war and that the war had done 
harm to the solidarity of the working class and of socialism. Finally, 
'A.V.,' writing from London on 8 February, 1915, gave the correct 
leftist slogan (the very one used by Chernov at Beaugy): 'The 
International is dead. Long live the International!'34 
In early 1915, with much fanfare, the London Conference of Allied 
Socialists gathered. This conference, despite the publicity preceding 
it, turned out to be something of a non-event. The concept of such a 
meeting, that socialists from one side of the war gather, was not a 
felicitous one from the left-socialist standpoint, since it smacked of 
a division of socialism along lines prescribed by the war-time 
32 ibid, no.77, 14 February, 1915. 
33 Chernov, especially his long article 'A socialist evaluation of the war 
(several theses)', Mysl. no.6, 21 November, 1914. 
34 Mys/, no.25, 13 December, 1914, no.42, 5 January, 1915, no.65, 
31 January, 1915, no.71, 7 February, 1916, no.76, 13 February, 1915. 
187 
alignment of forces. This was precisely what right socialists· 
advocated. Not surprisingly, few leftists and not one Bolshevik 
attended. From the SRs, A. Argunov and, I. Rubanovich of the right 
and Chernov and Natanson of the left showed up. The conference's 
resolution called, in fact, for an Allied victory over German 
militarism.35 The two right SRs voted for the resolution, while 
Chernov and Natanson abstained. drawing Martov's ire in Nashe 
slovo (Our Word), the left Menshevik newspaper. When Martov 
inqui_red why they hadn't voted against the resolution, there 
resulted a brief polemical flurry between Chernov and Martov. T~e 
SR internationalists, claimed Chernov, had repeatedly appealed for 
an all socialist conference aimed at the creation of a new 
International, while Social Democrats had shown no interest. He 
and N atanson had decided, therefore, to refrain from voting in 
order not to jeopardise their· effectiveness in the founding of the 
Third International at a later date.36 
The resolution offered by Chernov and Natanson at the London 
Conference as well as a statement published by them in Mysl 
reveal the leftist SR position on the war as of early 1915. 
35 The text of the conference's resolution is reproduced in 0.H. Gankin and 
H.H. Fisher, The Bolshevik and the World War: The Origin of the Third 
· ·i'· , · International. Stanford tJniversity Press Standford, 1960. pp.278-279. 
36 Mysl, no.79, 17 February, 1915, and no.94, 6 March, 1915. 
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The declarati~n in Mysl stated simply that the task at hand was the 
rebirth of the International and an end to the war. It warned against 
the idealisation of war or any warring camp. The correct slogan, 
announced Chernov and Natanson, was not 'peace at all costs,' but 
I 
'peace on conditions favourable to the working classes.' This latter 
qualification signified that they dissociated themselves from 
pacificism, espousing instead a revolutionary end to the war - the 
only outcome which could be 'favourable to the working classes.'37 
The Chernov-Natanson program outlined here, with its rejection 
of civil peace and pacifism, was tantamount to an appeal for general 
revolution in all warring countries or, as Lenin put it, 'to turn the 
war into a civil war.' 
In the aftermath of the London conference, during the month of 
March, Chernov travelled through Switzerland to confer with 
representatives of both the Organisational Committee and the 
Central Committee, as well as with SR groups. Lecturing in the 
Eintracht House on March 12, he called for greater pressure by 
workers' groups on the governments of Europe. On March 15 in 
Lausanne, he called for peace, to be contracted not by the present 
government of Russia but by a constituent assembly.38 
37 ibid, no.87, 26 February, 1915. 
38 Cited in Alfred E. Senn, The Russian Revolution in Switzerland 
1914-1917, Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1971. p.42. 
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Meanwhile, by mid-March 1915, the French police were subjecting 
Mysl to such harsh treatment that it was forced to close down. 
Chernov later complained that 'the pages had come to look like a 
map of unexplored Africa. •39 The Chernov group almost 
immediately replaced it with a new paper Zhizn (Life).4° French 
authorities, under pressure from the tsarist government, soon 
qpplied repressive measures against Zhizn as weU.41 The police 
forbade meetings, the reading of reports, public lectures, , or any 
other -activities aimed at raising funds for Zhizn. When the editors 
raised the possibility of moving the paper to Switzerland, which 
exercised no censorship whatsoever, the printers, perhaps loath to 
lose the business, warned that if they did so the French government 
would ban the paper. This confronted leftist SRs with a dilemma, 
since the socialist public in France was much larger than in 
· Switzerland. Non·etheless, in the latter part of May, the editors, 
faced with an almost impossible censorship, moved Zhizn to 
Geneva, where it became a weekly instead of a daily. As predicted, 
the French government blocked entry of the paper into France. 
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Zhizn continued publication until early 1916, when it was replaced 
by two new internationalist SR organs, Na chuzhbine (On· Foreign 
Soil) and Otkliti zhizni (Echoes of Life), appearing in Geneva and 
Paris respectively.43 In this way, the internationalists attempted to 
reach as much of the socialist public as possible. 
Like the SRs the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks all experienced deep 
divisions over what to do about the war. Block alliances were 
, formed among all Russian socialist parties. French secret police 
reported in the autumn of 1914 that the leading figures in Paris 
emigre circles were Martov, Lunacharskii, Chernov and Trotsky. 
They usually marked Cher~ov as the leader, the others as his 
lieutenants; the four constantly appeared together at meetings, 
'arguing the same case.'44 As perplexing as it may seem, the anti-
war elements of the three parties had more in common with one 
another than with the pro-war forces of their own parties. 
Cooperation in support of, or in opposition to, the war formed 
along those lines, rather than along party lines. 
By the autumn of 1915, the idea of a conference aimed at creating a 
new International finally reached fruition. The SR internationalists 
43 The last issue of Zhizn came out on 2 January 1916. 
44 Michael Shaw, 'The Nas(le Slovo group and Russian Social Democracy 
"· · dur:ing World War··One: _the Search .for Unity,' Ph.D.-, thesis,- Indiana -· · ·., ---- -.. _, __ 
University, 1975. p.84, p.98, p.107. 
- .. 
191 
were enthusiastic participants in· what came to be known as the 
'Zimmerwald movement' (named after the town in which the first 
confere.nce met). This was only natural since Chernov and 
Natanson had come out for this concept as early as August 1914 and 
had actively promoted it ever since. It is simply not possible to 
ascertain whether their sponsorship played, a major role in the 
summoning of the Zimmerwald Conference, but, at the very least, 
it is possible to state that the balance of European anti-war socialism 
at last came around to a point of view long held by internationalist 
SRs. The context in which the Zimmerwald movement arose was 
one of increasing hardening of views in both the pro-war and anti-
war camps. For socialists opposed to the war, carrying out actions 
against the war was now more important than which side of the 
battle lines fellow socialists came from, rendering possible a 
conference of like- minded socialists of all warring and neutral 
nations. 
The rise of the Zimmerwald movement came at an opportune time 
for the leftist SRs, since they too were experiencing a further 
radicalisation. On 17 September, 1915, a general meeting of anti-war 
SRs from Berne, Lausanne, and Geneva took place, with Chemov, 
Vnorovskii,- J.Dikker. Koniushin, Natanson, Staryrikevich,,-
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Gavronskii, A. Ustinov, and 'Poliak' (the Pole) in attendance. This 
group once again decided to coordinate actions and to establish 
contacts-in Russia. Despite references to- this sort of activity at 
Beaugy in August, 1914, SR meetings in the intervening months 
had not devoted much attention to the question of maintaining ties 
with the internal Russian movement and the sending of groups 
there; the truth was that the war had so disrupted communications 
that socialists were impelled to postpone such plans. But, by the 
autumn of 1915, the mood in Russia had begun to change, a 
circumstance about which emigre SRs, as well as SDs were 
informed. It is not accidental that Bolsheviks too began to take steps 
to re-establish contacts with Russia in this very period. In early 
October, a second expanded conference of SR internationalists from 
Geneva, Berne, Zurich, and Lausanne took place. The 1 main topic 
was the carrying out of agitational and organisational work in 
Russia. Chernov, as usual the chief speaker, raised a number of 
issues for discussion, including the ministerial crisis, the State 
Duma and its legitimacy, the war as an issue turning the masses 
against the government, the rise of a mass revolutionary 
movement in Russia, and the advisability of carrying out 
propaganda among the masses and in the armed forces. Another 
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speaker raised doubts about the willingness of the Russian people to 
continue the war in view of reports of growing social and political 
unrest, as a result of which he recommended setting up routes to 
forward revolutionary literature into Russia. A final speaker 
summed up by pointing out that whereas the outbreak of the war 
had initially weakened the revolutionary movement, its 
continuation ultimately caused dissatisfaction and distrust among 
the working masses toward the government. The discussion among 
SRs at this time, it is worth rioting, began to take a more practical 
turn. A conference such as Zimmerwald, having the goal of 
working out joint anti-war measures amongst all internationalist 
socialists, fitted their thinking perfectly. 
The Zimmerwald Conference opened on 5 September in Geneva 
with thirty-eight socialists from eleven countries in attendance. Of 
these twelve were from Russia and Poland, including Bolsheviks 
Lenin and Zinoviev, Latvian SD la. Berzin, Mensheviks Akselrod 
and Martov, leftist SD Trotsky, Bundist P. Lemanskii, and SRs 
Chernov and Natanson.45 The Zimmerwald Conference, as well as 
its successor at Kienthal, was conducted very much in the spirit of 
I 
45 Gankin and Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War, p.320. Senn, 
The Russian Revolution, p.92. Natanson represented the SR Central 
Committee, while Chernov was the delegate for the SR Internationalist 
newspaper Zhizn. Chernov Pered Burei, p.310; Senn The Russian 
Revolution, p.92. 
194. 
socialist cooperation.46 There were, of course, differences of 
opinion at Zimmerwald, even between the two SR representatives. 
Chernov reported to the conference that the SR Foreign Delegation 
of the Central Committee and local party committees inside Russia 
were internationalist and that the latter were issuing anti-war 
proclamations.47 Chernov's estimate of the extent of anti-war 
sentiment among SRs at home, considered by the Bolsheviks to be 
' ' 
an exaggeration, were not inaccurate.48 When the time came to -
vote on 'the famous Zimmerwald Manifesto,49 Chernov criticised 
46 The site of Zimmerwald was chosen for its isolation and to avoid 
French and German newspaper correspondents. Delegates were forbidden 
from sending letters, and they received no news from the outside world. For 
recreation they could take mountain walks, or else listen to Grimm's 
yodelling and VikJor Chernov's rendition of Russian folk songs. Senn, The 
Russian Revolution, p.91. 
4 7 Chernov's report on the Zimmerwald Conference was published in 
Zhizn, '26 September, 1915. 
48 A hostile Bolshevik account stated: 'From his report [Chernov's] the 
whole world would be led to think that the Central C.ommittee· of the 
Socialist-Revolutionists stands firmly and solidly on the basis of 
internationalism .... Further, it appeared that the local committees of all the 
large towns in Russia issued internationalist appeals, while the Conference 
of the Narodniks in Russia adopted internationalist resolutions. Briefly; 
"Praise, praise, the brave Russian Socialist-Revolutionist." As is known, 
the Socialist-Revolutionists were always proficient in phrases and boasting.' 
Shklovsky, 'Tsimmervald,' Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, no.9 (44), 1925, 
pp.73-106. Quoted in Gankin and Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World 
War. p.344. 
49 The Manifesto is reprinted in Spiridovich, Partiia Sotsialistov-
Revoliutsionerov, pp.530-534. The proceedings of the conference can be 
found in Gankin and Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War. pp.322-
326. 
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it. for failing to emphasise Russian dynastic interests in starting the 
war and for claiming that the principal burden fell on the 
proletariat, whereas in Russia· the peasantry suffered more.50 
Chernov ultimately voted for the Manifesto, but refused to sign it, 
whereas Natanson not only voted for it, but, along with Lenin and 
Akselrod, signed the document as wen.st 
At the end of the conference, N atanson speaking for the SRs 
requested that an announcement be added to the protocol of the 
conference that he and Chernov represented both the 
internationalist and defensist (social-patriotic, as he put it) wings of 
the party, since the SRs had been unable to convene a properly 
constituted conference to determine a single line regarding the war. 
Natanson may have wished to give the impressfon that all SRs 
supported the Zimmerwald movement, which was certainly not 
the case. Right SRs roundly criticised, in fact, condemned, or 
perhaps one should say anathematised, the Zimmerwald 
Conference, its Manifesto, and the Kienthal Conference that 
followed it. Chemov retained his reserve; on 28 September, 1915, he 
told an audience in Geneva that the Zimmerwald Conference had 
not succeeded in founding a new International, since 
50 Senn, The Russian Revolution, p.100; see also Gankin and Fisher, 
The Bolsheviks and the World War. _pp.324-325. 
51 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.31 O; Spiridovich, pp.534-535; Senn, 
p.101. 
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representation had been inadequate. Two days earlier in Zhizn he 
had subjected the Zimmerwald resolutions to the same criticisms_ 
he employed at the conference itself, charging them with failure to 
mention the peasantry and special conditions of ,Russian 
imperialism (dynastic tsarism); in all, the manifesto was irrelevant 
to conditions in Russia.52 Frankly, Chernov seemed to cavil on 
these issues; reference must be made to slight ambivalences in his 
attitudes toward the war, which, became more important later. 
Natanson, on the other hand, evinced unbounded enthusiasm, 
later claiming that Zimmerwald gave birth to the new 
International, while Kienthal christened it. SRs as a whole, both 
' 
inside and outside Russia , sided more· with Natanson than 
Chernov. 'Zimmerwald' and 'Kienthal,' the names of the two 
obscure Swiss towns, became the battle slogans for most SRs, 
excepting of course the right wing of the party. 
By the middle of autumn of 1915, right and left socialists had 
formed their alliances, held their respective joint conferences, and 
issued their manifestos. One would expect increasing definition of 
battle lines to sharpen the war of words, which is precisely what 
happened in SR circles. In the winter of 1915-1916, the Foreign 
52 . . . Senn, The Russian Revolution; pp.132-133. 
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Delegation of the Central Committee, now having a four-two 
majority against the war,53 issued a declaration officially admi~g 
that its members were divided on the war issue; 'these tendencies 
have by the present time split to such an extent that neither orie can 
take responsibility for the political actions of the other.' Under these 
circumstances, stated the declaration, the Foreign Delegation, the 
de facto Central Committee, 'could no longer make decisions and 
would therefore limit itself to technical aid for party organisations 
inside Russia. •54 The Okhrana mistook this for the formation of 
two separate parties. 55 
The defencist SRs named Chernov and Natanson as the villains in 
dividing the party.56 Each side, then, charged the other with guilt 
in the split; they both also laid claim, by the way, to the loyalty of 
53 At the beginning of the war, the Delegation Abroad of the Central 
Committee of the SR Party(which consisted of eight members), had split 
four to four on the· question of the proper position toward the war. By 1916, 
the balance had altered in favour of the internationalists, owing to the 
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The depth of feeling among right SRs about the leftist SRs was quite 
strong. Two decades after the events, Argunov stated in an interview with 
Oliver Radkey that Chernov's views, while less strident than Lenin's were 
for that very reason more dangerous since they were accepted in quarters 
turning a deaf ear to Lenin. In a similar interview Rudnev expressed a 
similar view: 'what Chernov had done to extinguish national sentiment in the 
breasts of the armed defenders of a youthful and immature people was the one 
-.;- thing that could never be forgiven him.' Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of 
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the majority of comrades at home. With respect to the emigres, the 
split extended all the way from the Central Committee down to 
local party groups, with the Zimmerwald Conference and the right 
SR entry into the Prizyv group forming the watershed. 
News from Russia, as reported by Chernov at Zimmerwald, 
disclosed that numerous local Socialist Revolutionary 
organisations had come out against the war and were engaged in 
revolutionary agitation. On the basis of information about the party 
and the general state of affairs at home, several important leftist SR 
leaders, including Chernov, Natanson, Kamkov, and several 
activists from Italy, hatched a scheme to travel through 
underground channels to Russia. Their aim was to provide 
leadership for the growing revolutionary movement at home. 
Chernov, Kamkov, and Natanson already had false passports and 
indeed the plan for the whole trip was so far advanced that it even 
entailed the closing down of the internationalist paper Zhizn, 
which was in financial straits in any case. Regardless, for reasons 
unknown, the trip fell through. Chernov seems to have gone 
instead to Italy, while Kamkov and Natanson remained in 
Switzer land. 57 
When party leaders decided to abandon publication of Zhizn in 
57 Delo naroda, no.107, 22 July, 1917. 
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early 1916, the emigre leftist,organisations were determined to 
replace it with two monthlies, Otkliki zhizni in Paris and Na 
Chuzhbine in Geneva. For no accountable reason, Otkliki zhizn 
dropped into complete obscurity. 
Throughout the 'thirteen issues of Otkliki, its writers polemicised 
with right socialists, triumphantly reported manifestations of the 
waxing revolutionary movement at home, _supported agitation 
among the armed forces, and so forth. 58 The first issue of Na 
chuzhbine came out on 14 January, 1916. According to an Okhrana 
report, initiative for publication of the paper came from Chernov, 
N atanson, and Kamkov, while the editorial board consisted of 
Jacques Dikker, Alexander Tsivin, B.I. Nalivaiskii, Vladimir 
Vnorovskii, A. Cherniavskii, and B. Kliushin.59 An editorial in 
the 14 January, 1916, inaugural issue greeted its readers with the 
opinion that if the 1905 Revolution had prevailed, the country 
would not have found itself in the middle of the current war.60 
The inaugural editorial set the tone for future issues of the paper. 
The Russian government was so concerned about the SR 
internationalist journal, which was distributed to the public as well 








several occasions that Swiss authorities close down Na chuzbine 
for its revolutionary activities. Responding that, 'the contents can 
perhaps be designated "revolutionary' by Russian conceptions, but 
not ours,' the Swiss government rejected the demand.61 
Fortunately for the leftist SRs, the Swiss government took a 
remarkably insouciant attitude toward revolutionary activities, also 
ignoring Lenin's Sotsial-Demokrat. 
By April of 1916, the long germinating plan to send people to Russia 
_ came at last to life with the dispatching of Aleksandrovich by the 
Foreign Delegation. If other SRs travelled to Russia, specific 
information about it is lacking. Obviously, a good deal of coming 
and going was not possible in war time conditions. In any case, 
Aleksandrovich went. 
What happened to Chernov in 1916, both in the sense of his 
physical whereabouts and his ideological convictions is a complete 
mystery. When Chernov arrived in Petrograd in 1917, his views 
had moderated. This defection from the left, while not leading him 
to embrace the right fully, was a fateful one for the SR party, since 
Chernov commanded vast loyalty among party activists. For the 
time being, there is no evidence to suggest why Chernov shed some 
61 Senn, ibid. p.137. 
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of his anti-war fervour between early 1916 and early 1917. Where 
then, did Chernov disappear to for most of the year 1916? In early 
1916, after plans for sending a sizeable group of activists to Russia 
fell through, Chernov supposedly travelled to Italy. But did he 
actually go there, and if he did, did he remain there? One cannot 
help notice Chernov's absence from the SR internationalist 
movement throughout 1916; reports of the various conferences do 
not mention him as present, nor did he publish articles in Otkliki 
zhizn and Na chuzhbine, although he had helped set up the 
latter. One might be tempted to suggest that a change of attitude in 
early 1916 led to this uncharacteristic silence. Interestingly, Tsivin 
another provocateur reported to his Austro-German mentors in 
May, 1916, that Chernov had travelled incognito to Russia.62 
The so-called project to send a group of activists to Russia in early 
1916, replete with forged passports, false identities, etc. may have 
been a cover to divert the Okhrana!s attention from a modest but 
more realistic plan to send c;hernov into Russia alone. 
Alternatively, he may have simply gone alone after the plan was 
abandoned. If he did go, perhaps his exposure to the sufferings of 
the Russian people wrought a spiritual change, accounting for his 
62 Z. Zeman, Germany and the Russian 
'Documents from the Archives of the German 
University Press, London 1958, pp.18-23. 
Revolution, 1915-1918. 
Foreign Ministry,- Oxford 
202 
eventual softening on the war issue; such a transformation would 
be very characteristic of Chernov. If one takes the position that he 
did not go, there is still the thorny problem of accounting for his 
whereabouts. Chernov's memoirs strangely fail to provide a hint of 
what he was doing in the last year before the outbreak of the 
revolution. Again, it would be just like Chernov to keep his 
counsel, even years and decades later, about a secret trip, cloaked in 
high intrigue, for mysterious purposes and with incalculable 
results, to war time Russia. 
The SR anti-war movement was a very serious phenomenon in the 
emigre circles, where most party leaders were residing. The issue of 
the war split the party and while a number of individuals of great 
importance in the party's history supported the war, the list of those 
opposing the war was just as lengthy and, frankly, since it included 
people like Chernov. Rakitnikov, and Natanson, even more 
impressive. Chernov preached an anti-war doctrine that arose early 
and firmly, growing out of long-held international socialist 
convictions. He asserted his position by publishing newspapers and 
literature espousing his revolutionary anti-war stance, participated 
in the anti-war conferences in Europe, and attempted, as much and 
as often as possible, to influence events at home with a view to 
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overthrowing the government and ending the war. When 
considered in light of the February Revolution of 1917, with its 
undeniable anti-war animus, Chernov's pronouncements are by no 
means an unimportant aspect of the Russian revolutionary 
movement. Yet, 1917 was to see Chemov in power over a split and 
divided party, with a tenuous and fragile unity. It should have been 
an opportunity for Chemov to put theory into practice, yet that 
theory had undergone a transformation. When confronted with the 
responsibility of authority he was to prove impotent. 
Chapter 8 
Descent to Bolshevism 
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The call by Chernov to revolution during the war years raises 
related questions about his conception of the nature of the coming 
revolution. Russian socialists had long agonised over the problem 
of what the long-heralded revolution would be like in Russia when 
it finally came. Would it, for instance, merely overthrow the 
existing regime, replacing it with a liberal bourgeois (non-socialist) 
government like those in Western Europe, or would it advance 
rapidly towards socialism? Populist and neo-populist (SR) theory 
had held that Russia was evolving along a separate path from the 
West. The original populists argued that Russia would completely 
bypass capitalism, or as Chernov and the SRs maintained, that it 
would move quickly through the capitalist stage to the socialist. The 
latter position was inherently radical, since it forecasted a socialist, 
rather than a liberal revolution in Russia. According to Chernov, 
Russia would not, therefore, experience 8: long phase of capitalist 
development once tsarism had been overthrown, but would 
quickly embark on the construction of socialism. Here possibilities 
for confusion multiply. For instance, it is difficult to reconcile this 
'radical' version of SR theory with standard accounts of quite 
moderate SR policies in 1917. 
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At least some of the confusion can be dispelled by a consideration of 
the fact that already in 1908-1910, a group of quite influential party 
leaders adopted a moderate evolutionist stance towards Russian 
development, en tai'ling a rejection of the need for further 
underground revolutionary work and, implicitly, an abandonment 
of the traditional SR call for a rapid achievement of so.cialism. 
Among both SRs and Social Democrats, adherents to this tendency 
were known as 'liquidators', that is, they wished to 'liquidate' the 
underground illegal party organisations. However, as the formation 
of a 'liquidator' wing in Social Democracy did not mean that all 
Social Democrats had abandoned the cause of socialist revolution, 
so an analogous development in SR Party did not imply that all SRs 
had turned moderate on this crucial issue. In fact, party leaders of 
the greatest prestige such as Chernov, Rakitnikov, and Natanson, 
together with most of the remaining party organisation inside 
Russia, adhered to the original radical view. The SRs continued 
their commitment to the overthrow of both tsarism and capitalism. 
Unfortunately, commitment and adherence to principle were not 
enough in 1917 for its implementation. 
It is impossible to understand Chemov's actions in 1917 without 
understanding that the revolutionary tradition led· directly to the 
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idea of a two-stage revolution. At its First Congress, Chernov 
outlined the party program which was to be divided into maximum 
and minimum sections. The minimum section contained those 
demands that could be readily obtainable after the overthrow of 
tsarism, while the maximum program would only be implemented 
when the masses had attained a sufficient consciousness, 
organisation, and economic achievement. Only after the 
socialisation o'f land had been achieved under the minimum 
program would the party proceed to the collectivisation of 
agriculture, to the socialisation of industry, and to the eradication of 
all aspects of private economy. 
Although these demands in the Party program as outlined at its 
First Congress were revolutionary and socialist, they were not really 
very extreme within the context of the political spectrum then 
emerging. It is worth noting that the last part of the program is 
liberal-democratic in tone. 
The SR Party, waging a direct revolutionary struggle against 
autocracy, agitates for the convocation of a Constituent 
Assembly, based on ... democratic principles, for liquidation of 
the autocratic regime and the reconstruction of all 
contemporary regimes in the spirit of the establishment of free 
popular government, the necessary personal liberties, and 
defense of the interests of labour. The Party will defend its 
program of reform in the Constituent Assembly and will 
strive to move immediately to the revolutionary period.1 . . 
Protokoly pervago sezda Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov, 
1'" • ~ ( ~". ... f' ' 
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The Party distinguished clearly between immediate and distant 
goals, and that the immediate goal was political freedom.2 At its 
First Congress, the SR P~rty put political freedom before economic 
demands, and in April of 1917, Chemov declared that the slogan of 
the party had to be: 'Land through the Constituent Assembly.'3 
The future socialist order was predicated on political liberty in a 
decentralised state. 
Revolution to Chernov was a political act to make possible 
individual choice in governing oneself and electing one's 
governors. The social revolution in property relationships was to 
come afterw£l!dS, as a result of these individual choices. To preserve 
positive attributes of the commune was merely one aspect of an 
entire program which tried to ensure that events of the political 
revolution would not prejudice possibilities of social revolution. 
Chernov had formulated a fairly accurate blueprint of the future 
social order, but he was understandably reluctant to draw it in any 
. detail because he believed that, with adequate propaganda, all those 
(Proceedings of the First Congress of the Socialist Revolutionary Party), 
n.p. 1906. p.365. 
2 ibid, pp.361-362. 
3 ibid, pp.361-365. Chernov, Agrarnyi vopros i sovremennyi 
moment (The Agrarian question and the immediate moment). Moscow, 
· " 1917, pp.13-14.The latter was a public lecture- presented ·by Chernov on 
his arrival in Petrograd. 
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individual choices would draw it for him. 
In the period preceding the revolution, Chernov relied heavily on 
cooperatives, both producer and consumer in nature, as institutions 
which would ease transition to socialism. The difference between 
Chernov's vision of ultimate goals and western European ends in 
view is apparent in his consideration of the cooperative 
movement. For Chernov, both communes and cooperatives were 
never ends in themselves. He looked at such institutions as means 
to individual ends; these were necessary means, of course, but 
subordinate to the requirements of individual development. In a 
·detailed article, he traced the history of the cooperative movement 
back to Proudhon and Louis Blanc, and offered statistics to support 
his contention that the movement was growing in nearly all 
western European countries. He thought German Social-Democrats, 
l 
under August Bebel's direction, had taken an important step at the 
Hanover Party Congress (l899) by accepting the idea that in 
cooperatives the working class learned and developed the talent of 
economic self-government. The SR Party at its London Conference 
in 1909, accepted cooperatives as equal to political and union 
organisations. For each mass organisation, the party accepted full 
·autonomy as the necessary -condition for healthy and universal 
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development. Chernov used a quaint example to illustrate the 
position of cooperatives in the party program: five times eight 
equals forty; but which is more important - the five or the eight.4 
Cooperatives were another school for democracy, or as Chernov put 
it, the masses had been asleep for a long time and were unable to 
use democracy once they had achieved it. 'But the forms of 
democracy are not dead and useless; they do not remain empty, but 
are gradually filled by more and more real content. •5 
The most crucial problem of instituting the new order was how to 
act once the revolution had occurred. There is a gradual shift in 
Chernov's position from 1905 to 1917, a shift in the direction of 
permitting wider alternatives in land organisation during the 
revolutionary period. He understood that in all probability the 
peasants would seize land indiscriminately when the bonds of old 
bureaucratism were released, an action made even more likely 
because growing capitalist agriculture increased attraction for land. 
Analogies with the French revolution were sometimes appropriate, 
wrote Chernov but with the difference that our chief slogan must 
be equalisation of land and not destruction of feudal obligations, 
which long ago were destroyed in Russia and replaced with various 
4 Chernov, 'Kooperatsiia i sotsializm' (Cooperation and socialism), 
Sotsialist-Revoliutsioner, no.2 Paris 191 O, pp.266-267, pp.273-278. 
5 ibid, p.299. 
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forms of economic servitude. What should the party do, h~ asked, if 
in the Constituent Assembly the question of legalising peasant 
seizures arose?6 Farsighted defenders of the bourgeois regime 
dreamt of creating broad strata of economically strong peasants 
imbued with traditions of private property. But socialists could 
never support this. There was nothing more dangerous, Chernov 
continued, than the growth of the idea of private property as one of 
the elementary civil rights of man. A socialist party could not 
permit the development of the bourgeois spirit even in its 
minimum program, that is, in goals to be achieved during 
revolution.7 This is where his program of socialisation becomes 
important, for socialisation would, by placing political and 
economic power in local government, protect the interests ot' the 
toiling and struggling peasantry in the transitional period when 
state power might be far from the hands of the people. This would 
prevent centralisation of decision making and was opposed to the 
Marxist formula of nationalisation, which would place land 
ownership in the hands of the state, even a bourgeois state. 8 
The operation of socialisation envisaged no compensation to 
6 Chernov, Proletariat i trudovoe krestianstvo, (Proletariat and 
toiling peasantry) Moscow, 1906. p.40, pp.43-44. 
7 ibid, pp.45-49. 
8 ibid, p.53. 
211 
landlords, for they also would receive land in use tenure. The 
comµlune would gain importance as socialisation progressed 
because communalists were accustomed to redistribution as 
population increased, a~d not because of old romantic ideas, as 
Chernov had made explicit. He understood that the program 
contained complex problems in equalising rights to land on the 
basis of the principle that everyone has_ the ·right to toil, and he 
proposed three means of making equalisation functional: 1) 
taxation of surplus land above an accepted norm of income derived 
from it, that is, a progressive landed income tax; 2) settlement and 
resettlement, where he expected a fund of land from landowners 
who held more land than they could cultivate themselves; and 3) as 
a last resort, if other means failed, changing boundaries, evidently 
by some system of arbitration between communes.9 In a speech at 
the First SR Congress, Chernov explained that socialisation would 
encompass all land, including land in cities, so the program was not 
narrowly agrarian. Socialisation of land in cities would place 
ownership of factories, plants, and even homes in greater 
dependence on the municipalities, an act which could have been a 
9 Chernov, (under the pseudonym B.lu} 'Razrushenie obshchiny i nasha 
programma' (Destruction of the commune and our program), Z_namia 
Truda, no.37, July, 1911 . pp.4-8. 
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favourable fundament for further organic and creative work in 
municipalisation, bringing under municipal control those 
enterprises which by their very nature were suitable for this.10 
As mentioned above, Chernov had devised, a fairly accurate 
blueprint and he strove to make it as exact as possible with the 
inevitable consideration that the new order would result not only 
in guidance from above but also in individual choice from below. 
In 1917, Chernov spelt out in more detail how the party would 
attempt to guide land relations. In criticising the Marxist position 
on the peasantry, he returned to a bas~c problem of the revolution 
by asking how the proletariat could lead and the toilers of the land 
could follow without betraying themselves? If it were possible for 
proletarians to lead and peasants to follow, then peasant or agrarian 
socialism could be thought of as the 'basic, non-capitalistic path to 
"socialisation from below" of agricultural labour and ownership, 
[and] as the prime method of "rooting" the peasantry in the hoped 
for future government.' If it was not possible to synthesise agrarian 
and urban socialism, then the proletariat could only use the 
peasantry as a means to an end which was alien to them. Chernov 
added that the original sin of Marxism was unprincipled politic~ 
intrigue in relation to the peas_antry within nations, as well as ,in 
10 Protokoly pervago sezda ... _ pp.148,-149. 
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relation to agricultural nations by industrial nations. Marxism is so 
much concerned with industrial socialism that it is not a fully 
integrated socialism and instead is easily 'socialistic 
imperialism' .11 This prophetic statement underlines Chernov's 
insistence on getting the people into government to decide how 
they would deal with the land problem. 
On 30 April, 1917, at Shaniavskii University in Moscow, Chernov 
spoke on a projected new land law without once mentioning 
socialisation. The main argument of this speech was that reform 
was inseparably bound to self-government, or in Chernov's words: 
'Such a land order includes in itself the great ideal of popular self-
government. Its objects become not only abstract, unknown 
freedom, but a definite possession - our land. This is the best and 
clearest application of the principle of p9pular authority in relation 
to the land ... .'12 The new land order, he continued, had to be 
completely elastic. 'Where there is communal land tenure, there 
the commune will become a land cooperative which will receive 
land as a whole from the most immediate organ of government. 
Where personal homestead use [of land] applies or where the 
11 Chernov. Marksizm i slavianstvo. (K voprosu o vneshnei politike 
sotsializma). [Marxism and Slavdom:(Towards the question of a foreign 
policy of socialism)]. Petrograd, 1917. pp.90-91. 
12 Chernov, Agrarnyi vopros i sovremennyi moment, p.17. 
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population is not accustomed to the communal ,order, the land 
holder, as it were, will receive the land individually. We 
sufficiently consider all the difficulties of realising a single legal 
norm of land holding together with contemporary chaos in that 
realm.'13 He went on to propose three norms for land distribution: 
toil, need and average. The toil norm referred to the land norm a 
given family could work. Land above this norm would revert to the 
administration of governmental organs. He understood the need 
norm as that norm according to which land would be added to the 
plots of those who had little or no land. The average norm would 
be established only after a precise, general registration of land and 
labour power. This average was to become the final, ideal norm for 
each kind of land, for various soils, etc. 'In time it will replace the 
first two norms which are called forth by the needs of the moment 
but [which are] incomparably cruder.'14 
Chernov appeared to be aware of the difficulties of applying the idea 
of socialisation to Russian reality. At the First Party Congress, he 
said that he had left socialisation as a general formula because he 
feared to leave the personal imprint of a foreign literary group (i.e., 






whole.15 As a matter of fact, Chernov had begun to work out the_ 
specifics of applying socialisation even during this earlier period, 
and one can see the influence of Marxism in sharpening Chemov's . 
thinking, for he opposed socialisation, or the demand for the 
broadest decentralisation and harmony of individual rights, to 
nationalisation, which would centralise ownership in state hands. 
The 'nationalisers', he said at the Congress, saw private property 
and competition as the normal order of the human community. 
Socialisation, which escaped the terminology of Roman law, was 
characterised by the starting point as in Chernyshevsky's definition, 
that the land is his who works it.16 As Minister of Agriculture in 
1917, Chemov was to prove this mere rhetoric. 
Chernov was in Switzerland during the February Revolution of 
1917. Its spontaneity and the ease with which it was achieved 
surprised Chernov, though he stressed how the government of 
Nicholas had collapsed of its own weakness and nullity. 
Revolutionary parties throughout the spectrum could not claim 
responsibility for initiating events. 
15 
16 
Neither the Bolsheviks, nor the Mensheviks, nor the 
Workers' Group, nor the Socialist Revolutionaries either 
separately or collectively, led the workers of Petrograd on the 
street. It was someone mightier than they: Tsar Hunger.17 
Protokoly pervago sezda ... pp.85-86. 
ibid, pp.224-225, pp.227-228. 
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The February revolution found the bulk of the SR leadership 
abroad and while those who had professed a defensist stance during 
the war were virtually unhindered in their return journey. to 
Russia, those that held an internationalist position found the road 
strewn with obstacles. Chemov returned to Russia via France, then 
Britain. In Britain, his name had appeared on a proscribed list held 
by the English authorities due to his opposition to the war, but after 
some hesitation, the authorities released him in what can only be 
described as a clandestine operation. He departed from Britain in 
the company of Avksentiev and Savinkov, two .defensists, from a 
'secret' port in northern Scotland on a cargo steamship under the 
escort of ~wo torpedo-boats. After arriving in Stockholm, Chernov 
proceeded by train through Torni~ on the Swedish-Finnish border, 
after passing through Helsingfors (Helsinki) and Vyborg, and 
17 Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, translated and abridged by 
Philip E. Mosely. New York. Russell and Russell, 1966. p.101. The Great 
Russian Revolution is an abridged translation of Chernov's, Rozhdenie 
Revoliutsionnoi Rossii (Fevralskaia Revoliutsiia), (The birth of 
revolutionary Russia: the February Revolution) Jubilee Committee for the 
Publication of the Works of Viktor Chernov, Paris, Prague, New York. 
1934. p.215. In a sense we are lucky to have Rozhdenie Revoliutsionnoi 
Rossii. Whilst in hiding from the Cheka in Moscow in 1919 a police raid 
late one sub-zero night saw Chernov escape via the window and Olga (his 
wife) managed to conceal the manuscript inside a coat she was wearing. It 
was not discovered. See Olga Tchernoff, New Horizons. Reminiscences of the 
Russian Revolution. translated by Crys1a1 Herbert. Hyperion Press, 
Westport, Connecticut. 1975; reprint of 1936 edition , published by 
Hutchinson, London. p.157. · 
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finally arrived in Petrograd on 8 April, five days after Lenin.18 
N. Sukhanov and A. Gots were delegated by the Petrograd 
Executive Committee to welcome Chernov on his triumphant 
return. To what seems to be an ecstatic welcome, Chernov 
answered their greetings with a speech, about which Sukhanov 
comments as follows: 'Not only I, but many other Social 
Revolutionary party patriots wrinkled our brows and shook our 
heads, because he chanted so unpleasantly and minced and rolled 
his eyes - yes, and talked endlessly and without aim or purpose.'19 
Trotsky rather facetiously added that all the further activity of 
Chernov in the revolution developed in tune with this first 
speech.20 
Shortly after arriving in Petrograd, Chernov addressed the 
Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies at Tauride 
Palace and was elected onto the Executive Committee, with the 
'group of the presidium' led by Tsereteli. He also became a member 
18 Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.311-312; L. Trotsky, The History of the 
Russian Revolution, translated by Max Eastmanm, London, Victor Gollancz 
1965. p.247; G. Katkov, The Kornilov Affair. Kerensky and the break-up 
of the Russian army, Longman, London and New York. 1980. p.54; N.K. 
Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917 edited, abridged and translated by 
Joel Carmichael from Zapiski 0 Revoliutsii, Oxford University Press, 
1955. pp.304-307; and Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.138. 
19 N. Sukhanov quoted in L. Trotsky, The History of the Russian 
Revolution, p.247. 
20 ibid, p.247. 
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of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies.21 His 
arrival late on the scene and his subsequent involvement in 
literary activities before his participation in the Provisional 
Government as Minister of Agriculture meant that his role in the 
Soviet was minimal. It became more of a sounding board for his 
polemical skills. 
The SR party in ,the early months of the revolution was confronted 
with numerous issues, the stance on which led to fissures and later 
inevitable and irreconcilable splits. The position of power was only 
one such issue. Should socialists participate and support a non-
socialist government, or should they seize power in their own 
right? The latter proposition was out of the question; the party at 
the outbreak of the revolution was merely a skeleton with little or 
no organisational networks in existence, and had only just recently 
emerged from a prolonged period of underground illegal activity. 
As a consequence, the party resolved to support the Provisional 
Government until the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, 
provided the government allowed political reforms which 
21 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.314. Along with Chernov, Gots, Bunakov and 
Zenzinov were also on the Executive Committee. P.N. Miliukov, The Russian 
Revolution, Volume 1: The Revolution Divided: Spring, 1917, edited by R. 
Stites, translated by Tatyana and Richard Stites, Academic International 
Press 1978. p.52. 
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facilitated free and unhindered party political activity in the realm 
of organisation and propaganda. The support of a non-socialist 
interim government did not mean participation, let alone 
coalition.22 
Yet Kerensky's participation, at his own initiative, in the bourgeois 
government as Minister of Justice obviously contradicted the stated 
party position. To allay party fears and resentment at such~ action 
by one of its own leaders, (but only nominally so), Chernov drafted 
a letter, which Kerensky published, in which he stated that his 
participation was upon his own initiative and was to protect 
revolutionary democracy, which at the time was in a state of 
disorganisation, and to provide a connecting link between 
revolution. democracy and the bourgeois government.23 This 
seemed to pacify SR leaders until the Third Congress of the party in 
May which ratified Kerensky's participation. 
Another issue to confront the party was the war. Chernov, energetic 
and unflagged by schisms in his party, pushed his international 
position, and specifically, the mobilisation of his third force whose 
22 Delo Naroda, no.1, 15 March, 1917, p.1 in Browder and Kerensky 
(ed.) The Russian Provisional Government 1917: Documents. vol.111. 
Stanford University Press. 1961. pp.1203-1204. 
23 Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii (Fevralskaia 
revoliutsiia), p.372. 'The Great Russian Revolution, p.205., The letter was 
in the party central organ Delo Naroda, no.33, 26 April, 1917. p.3. 
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intervention would result in universal democratic peace, a peace 
without victors or vanquished.24 Almost immediately upon his 
arrival in Russia, Chernov launched into a vitriolic polemic against 
Miliukov, the first Provisional Government's Foreign Minister and 
leader of the bourgeois Kadet (Constitutional Democrats Party), who 
advocated a peace through total victory. In a speech before the 
Executive Committee, a speech which was described by Sukhanov 
as' ... a flood of words, ... in an earnest and business-like tone, ... full 
of revolutionary patriotic sentiment and ... of puns and jokes .. .',25 
and a speech which was said to have been listened to with 
interest, Chernov attacked Miliukov's ministerial declaration of 
27 March. This was published the following day in the form of 
a statement to the citizens of Russia and entitled 'The Provisional 
Government's Declaration on War Aims'. Miliukov stated ' ... 
the aim of free Russia is not domination over other peoples, or 
seizure of their national possessions, or forcible conquest of 
foreign territory, but the establishment of a lasting peace on 
the basis of the self-determination of peoples. The Russian people 
is not endeavouring to enhance its own international power at 
the expense of other peoples, and does not have the aim of 
24 Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii, pp.356-357; The Great 
Russian Revolution, p.194. 
25 Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917, p.310. 
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enslaving or humiliating anyone•.26 The whole appeal, Chernov 
states, was called into question as can be seen when the statement 
concludes with the wording ' ... while at the same time fully 
observing the commitments assumed toward our allies. '27 All the 
communiques, interviews, etc., of the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs meant one thing: the revolution had made absolutely no 
change in the foreign policy and war aims of Tsarist Russia; the 
agreements concluded by tsarist diplomacy were still considered 
inviolable for revolutionary Russia; and no one abroad had even 
heard of the proclamation on war aims, as it was intended solely for 
home consumption.28 
Chernov's analysis of Miliukov's intentions was correct. Miliukov 
sought to adhere to the letter. the secret treaties signed between 
Russia and her wartime allies, England, France, and Italy. Among 
other things, they generously apportioned to each other large tracts 
of territory and influence in the Ottoman Empire. In April, 1917, in 
the party press Chernov initiated a stinging campaign against 
Miliukov whom he scornfully referred to as 'Miliukova -
Dardanelskogo' .29 
26 Miliukov, The Russian Revolution, p.65. 
27 Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii, p.360; Miliukov, ibid, 
p.65; Chernov, The Gr~at Russian Revolution •. pp.196-197. 
28 Che-rnov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii, pp.360-361; Chernov, 
The Great Russian Revolution, p.197-198. 
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The pressure from within the Provisional Government, the Soviet, 
and in no small way from Chernov's attacks, eventually 
culminated in Miliukov's capitulation. The declaration of war aims 
of 28 March was despatched to the Allies as an official document on 
18 April. Yet the shrewd Miliukov added a preface identifying the 
declaration on war aims with the 'lofty ideals which so many 
leading statesmen of the Allied nations often have expressed.' 
Miliukov declared that in Russia there was a 'national striving'' to 
carry the war 'to a decisive end, to obtain 'sanctions and guarantees' 
which would make new wars impossible. Finally, Miliukov once 
more promised 'the victorious cqnclusion of the present war in full 
cooperation with the Allies.'30 
The note of 18 April (published on 20 April), provided the catalyst 
for the April days. The Petrograd proletariat and soldiers and sailors 
of the garrison marched in the streets protesting against the 
Provisional Government. In the evening of 20 April, the 
Provisional Government met with the Executive Committee of the 
Soviet. The Soviet faced a dilemma, for they had no desire to take 
over power from the government, but instead, merely sought to 
29 
30 
Chernov, Zapiski Sotsialista-Revo/iutsionera, p.16. 
Miliukov, The FJussian Revolution, p.71; Chernov, Rozhdenie 
revoliutsionnoi Rossii, p.363; The Great Russian Revolution, p.199. 
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exert pres~ure upon it. Yet, the Soviet needed to ostensibly show 
that the anti-war sentiment could not be ignored,' and indeed, 
should be acted upon. Chernov at this meeting severely criticised 
the entire activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs·. While 
acknowledging the abilities of his opponent, Miliukov, he -
concluded that he might be more useful, for example, as Minister of 
Education; as Minister of Foreign Affairs he would remain a source 
of weakness and discord in the government and the country, for by 
his public recognition of the Tsarist war aims, he had become 
absolutely unacceptable to the democracy of toilers. 31 
In the end, Miliukov's position was even more undermined. The 
Petrograd Soviet issued a statement which attempted to clarify the 
more controversial and ambiguous p~ints of Miliukov's note. 
However, this did not placate the working class of Petrograd, and 
further armed street demonstrations occurred on 21 April. 
The attacks. on the· foreign policy of the first Provisional 
government were a joint aim of the two branches of Social 
Democracy, that is, the propaganda of Lenin's Bolsheviks and the 
work of Menshevik Tsereteli, but most of the credit can be squarely 
rested on the shoulders of Chernov for his forceful, concentrated 
•· ·
31
" Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionhoi Rossii; p.365; The , Great 
Russian Revolution, p.201; Miliukov, The Russian Revolution, pp.73-74. 
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attack on Miliukov, which eventually led to his retirement. In a 
deeper sense, Miliukov's ousting was made inevitable by the 
momentous decision to transform a non-socialist government into 
a coalition, a move which Miliukov opposed adamantly. The April 
days brought to the fore the relationship between the government 
and the Soviet. On the one hand, formal power without real force, 
on the other, actual strength without formal power. Powerless 
government, and governmentless force.32 
In Chernov's opinion this divorce between governmental power 
_and actual strength had to be ended as soon as possible. 33 The 
solution was a coalition government, but not one with equal 
socialist and bourgeois representation, it was to be one with socialist 
representation in key ministries. After vacillating for sometime, the 
Soviet Executive Committee at an evening session on 1 May, finally 
voted in favqur of participation in the government by a majority of 
41 votes to 18, with 3 abstaining.34 After long and protracted 
negotiations the socialists -appropriated six portfolios out of 
fifteen. 35 V.M. Chernov became Minister of Agriculture after 
32 Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii, pp.368-369; The Great 
Russian Revolution, p.204. 
33 ibid. 
34 Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii, p.372; The Great 
Russian Revolution, p.206. 
35 For an account of the negotiations to form a coalition government see V. 
Stankevich, Vospominaniia (Memoirs), Berlin, 1921. pp.12B-132; 
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initially refusing Foreign Affairs because the tone of the 
government statement was not sufficiently Zimmerwaldian. A 
coalition government was formed on 5 May, 1917. With the 
formation of a coalition government, Miliukov's role in the 
Revolution was as a private citizen, but still an influential one, as 
leader of the Kadet party and editor of its newspaper, Rech 
(Speech). 
Chernov's position in power as Minister of Agriculture and 
leader of the largest sqcialist party in Russia, albeit a very 
tenuously uni~ed one, should have been one of a position of 
commanding strength, but it was, in fact, one of increasing 
weakness. This was partly because his land policy was based, to a 
certain extent, on the military pressures of the time which 
forced him to prevent the peasants from seizing the land as their 
own, and, as a result, he left it to the Constituent Assembly to 
deal with the question of transferring land to the toilers. 
There was also an overemphasised preoccupation with 
achieving political freedom and too little attention was paid 
amongst party leaders to attain a social revolution, even if the 
opportunity arose, as it did in 1917. The declaration of 5 May of the 
new coalition government stated the new government would 'take 
Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii, p.373; The Great Russian 
Revolution, pp.206-207; Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, 
pp.173-177. 
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all necessary steps toward ensuring the greatest possible production 
of grain... and toward furthering the systematic utilisation of the 
land in the interests of the national economy and of the toiling 
population.36 This was a far cry from the agrarian socialism 
epitomised by Chemov's 'socialisation of the land'. 
The issue of class collaboration, that is, the participation of socialists 
in a coalition government, was to be sanctioned at the SR Third 
Party Congress, which convened toward the end of May. Ten years 
had elapsed since they had last met, during which time the SR party 
had been operating as an illegal underground organisation with the 
bulk of its leaders in emigration.37 May of 1917 was to find the 
party in power, yet dramatic events had intervened in the interim -
war and revolution. Their effects had dramatically altered the 
psyche and configuration of the party. The congress was to provide 
the opportunity for a re-evaluation of party policy and direction in 
light of recent events. The socialist revolution was at hand, the 
opportunity to transform Russian society had arrived. However, 
the congress was to prove impotent. 
36 Vestnik Vremennago Pravitelstva (Herald of the Provisional 
Government) no.49, 6 May, 1917, p.1. Daily official newspaper of the 
Provisional Government, Petrograd, 1917 quoted in Browder and Kerensky 
(ed.), The Russian Provisional Government, 1917: Documents, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1961, vol. Ill. p.1277. 
37 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.323. 
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The congress convened in Moscow on 25 May, 1917, and met until 4 
June, 1917. It was to see the formal emergence of separate factions of 
the two extremes, left and right; and a third, centre grouping which 
sought unity of the party through the art of compromise. This 
centre grouping included such prominent names as Chemov, Gots, 
Avksentiev and Rudnev.38 Yet even this centre 'unity' group were 
divided into left centre and right centre. Radkey states in his 
inimitable style: 
The prestige of Chernov his skill at devising formulas which 
could face both ways at once and satisfy discordant elements, 
lay unreservedly at the service of the center. His "all-uniting" 
(vseb" ediniaiushchie) resolutions, offered on the floor of the 
Third Congress and eagerly seized upon by the mass of 
delegates, were like brilliantly colored paper concealing cracks 
in the wall - and they lasted about as long. For the cracks ran 
through the center of the structure as well as between it and 
the two wings. 39 , 
The Congress focused its attention on the most burning of issues 
that confronted the party, the adoption of a party stance as regards to 
r the war. 'Chernov tried to steer the party between Scylla and 
Charybdis, between the slogans of "all for war," "war to victory," 
and their opposite, the defeatist tendency.'40 This self-evaluation 





Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.196. 
Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p.394. 
228 
variance with what actually transpired. Three resolutions were 
proposed with one coming from each of the various factions. The 
Congress passed a resolution drafted by Abram Gots in the name of 
the centre.41 The resolution advocated a continuation of the war, a 
separate peace or armistice was condemned and the door left open 
for an offensive effort that would help the British and the French. 
Chernov supported the resolution. It is now clearly evident that 
Chernov had purged himself of his Zimmerwaldian position and' 
had adopted a more moderate line. Conspicuous by its absence was 
any mention of the 'third force', and so as not to damage the 
unanimity of the Congress, Chernov withdrew his own resolution 
on the topic, which had been at the drafting stage when the hurried 
vote on the war resolution was taken. Efforts to reopen the debate 
were stifled with Chernov's acquiescence, when he became satisfied 
With revising Gots' resolution after it had been adopted.42 -
41 The Congress decided on 28 May, by a vote of 179 to 80 with 5 
abstentions, in favour of Gots' resolution over Kamkov's anti-war leftist 
resolution. The proposed right resolution was withdrawn; Tretii sezd Partii 
Sotsialistov Revoliutsionerov (The Third Congress of the Socialist 
Revolutionary Party). Petrograd, 1917. p.204, quoted in Radkey, The 
Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.199; tor the resolutions adopted at the 
Third Congress refer to Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.325-327 and 
Resoliutsii priniatyia na 3-m Sezde P.S.R. (Resolutions adopted at the 
Third Congress of the Socialist Revolutionary Party). Moscqw, 1917. The 
latter appears to be a special publication of th~ Moscow edition of Zemlia i 
VoJia· (Land and Freedom), -no.69, 1917. 
42 Tretii sezd P.S.R... pp.313-319 in Radkey ibid, p.201. For a 
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The adoption of Gots' resolution on war was an important 
development in the history of the SR Party during 1917. It signalled 
the rise in preeminence of Gots over Chernov. There had been no 
formal power struggle or contest, Chernov's obsequiousness was 
enough. Indeed, his whole conduct throughout 1917 was to be 
characterised by his continual self-effacing attitud~. 
On the question of participation in a coalition government, it was 
Chernov's resolution that the Congress accepted. In his view, the 
coalition government, which he characterised as half-socialist and 
half-bourgeois, was a transitory step to an all-socialist government. · 
It was an 'unavoidable step in the pressing struggle to avoid the 
terrible danger of an all-Russian collapse'; it was an inevitable step,' 
in the necessary struggle, for the strengthening of a new 
revolutionary Russia, the first citadel of the 'third force' in present 
day Europe.'43 The transitory nature of the government was 
further stressed, when later in the resolution, Chernov stated that 
'Russia [that is, bourgeois Russia] was not in a position to deal with 
the fateful problems of the present day, and socialist parties are still 
not compelled to take power into their own hands.'44 
detailed discussion of the behind the scenes intrigues of the 'lost resolution' 
see Radkey ibid, pp.198-209. ' 
43 
44 
Resoliutsii priniatyia na 3-m Sezde P.S.R. p.11-12. 
ibid, p.12. 
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This resolution is in stark contrast to Chernov's earlier 
pronouncements, especially those during the war years, when he 
' I 
called for a revolution and a speedy transition to true socialism. 
Another flaw was the absence of any criteria to judge the 
obsolescence of the coalition, and thus, the progression to the next 
stage. Like the First Congress, it was a declaration of principle rather. 
than a carefu~ly thought-out plan of action. The only. consolation in 
this respect was that the socialist ministers in the coalition were to 
administer their portfolios in tune with the policy laid down at the 
congress.45 
As a matter of priorities, one would have thought that the land 
problem would have been devoted the same amount of a,ttention as 
the question of war. The agrarian question had been in abeyance for 
more than 10 years, yet the Congress deferred any discussion of it to 
an agrarian commission of the Central. Committee46 and co11;fined 
its attention to interim measures pending the convocation of the 
Constituent Assembly. In doing so, the Third Congress 'failed to 
address many of the pertinent issues confronting the Party. One 
example of this is illustrated by the impediments posed, by claims 
for national or regional autonomy as against the peasants' call for 
45 ibid, p.13. 
46 The commission which eventually met in August, 1917, failed to -
address the land question and instead discussed the war issue. 
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land reform based upon the centralistic, egalitarian principle of the 
redistribution of all the land among all the toilers. Another issue 
was the impact of the Stolypin land reforms and the subsequent 
increase in individual holders, and the inevitable tensions that 
arose between them and the communal peasants. On the latter 
point, the Congress reaffirmed the right of the individual as well as 
the collective use of the land, and promised not to disturb separate 
holdings that did not exceed the average allotment.47 Such an 
affirmation, ostensibly based upon a sense of class unity, ignored 
the quite stark differences amongst the peasantry. Belatedly, on the 
issue of compensation, the Party reaffirmed its policy of confiscation 
without compensation.48 
In a surprising about face, the Congress rescinded itS support of land 
seizures which it had held in 1905, to one of opposition to them in 
1917. In the same breath, the Congress in its resolution on agrarian 
politics, stated that all private ownership of land be abolished, and 
that land should be turned over in common to all the· people 
without compensation for equal general use. The Third Congress 
called for a fundamental law on land that resolutely ensh~ined 
47 Tretii sezd P.S.R ... p.245, pp.255-256 in Radkey, The Agrarian 
Foes of Bolshevism, p.214. 
48 Tretii sezd P.S.R ... pp.430-431, ·in ibid, p.214. 
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these principles to be promulgated by the Constituent Assembly. 
The ultimate aim, however, was for land to be socialised.49 In the 
interim, all land was to be transferred to the management of land 
committees. The democratised land committees would conserve 
the land fund, livestock, farm equipment, forest and natural 
resources, prior to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.50 
Chernov supported the resolution. 
On the nationalities question, Chernov held firm to his 
internationalist position and recognised no distinctions among 
peoples. The Congress deferred to the Constituent ,Assembly each 
individual case for national or regional autonomy.51 
Perhaps the most fateful blunder of the whole Congress was its 
choice of members elected on to the Central Committee. After such 
a long break between congresses, members were elected on the basis 
of reputation and ·not on contemporary deeds or thoughts~ The --
composition of the newly elected Committee decidedly listed 
towards the right, yet, even so, it was by no means a united body;· 
'the excessive variety within the Central Committee,. .. made it a 





Resoliutsii priniatyia na 3-m Sezde P.S.R. p.13. 
ibid, pp.13-14. 
ibid, pp.15-16. 
Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p.396. 
233 
Chernov's fall from unquestioned leadership of the party is no 
more better demonstrated than in the election results to the Central 
Committee. Chemov ran 20 votes behind Gots.53 The lack of unity, 
common purpose and direction within this leading_ group of the SR 
Party in the course of what was perhaps the most important six 
months of the party's history, was to prove devastating. 
Kerensky failed by two votes to be elected to the Central Committee 
(134 to 136). However, the Congress approved Chernov's and 
Kerensky's participation in the coalition by a vote of 159 to 27 with 
29 abstentions.54 
In the end, the Congress failed to address the crucial issue that 
confronted the, party during the revolution, namely the transition 
to socialism. The resolutions on war, peace, and the agrarian 
question were made impotent by compromise for the sake of unity. 
In regards to tactics, once again the party neglected to formulate any 
policy, a crucial and inexcusable blunder. Chemov's role in ~l of 
this was one of continual acquiescence. 
Chernov, as Minister of Agriculture in two coalition governments 
53 A. Gots received 260 votes out of 270, N.I Rakitnikov 258, V.G. 
Arkhangelski 241, A.I. Rusanov 241, V.M. Chernov 240. 
54 For a detailed examination of the genesis of the enmity between 
Chernov and Kerensky and the machinations in regards to Kerenky's non-
,.._ 'election to -the -Central -Committee,· see Radkey, The Agrarian·~Foes of "· - ·· ... , , ;,. 
Bolshevism, pp.224-233. 
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from May to August 1917, was in a unique position to implement 
the party's agrarian poUcy, and as such, the burden for the failure to 
, do so must squarely rest upon his shoulders. Chernov's interim 
program until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly 
revolved around a troika concept: the abolition of the Stolypin 
legislation, the cessation of all sale of land, and the pacification of 
arbitrary anarchic peasant seizures of land through the 
establishment of land committees, which would determine the 
immediate utilisation of the land until its final disposal could be 
determined by the Constituent Assembly. This was not socialisation 
of land. Lacking a plan of action, substantive measures such as 
socialisation were deferred to the Constituent Assembly. 
In his tenure of office, Chernov only managed on 29 June, to 
abolish the measures introduced under the Stolypin land reform,55 
and only did so after having revived the obshchina, which he had 
previously relegated as being non-essential to the party's agrarian 
program.56' 
' In defence of Chernov, one must state that his efforts were 
continually frustrated by his own colleagues in the Provisional 
55 
'Of all the submissions of the Minister of Agriculture only the bill 
abolishing the Stolypin laws, which were directed against the obshchina, 
were passed unanimously.' I. G Tsereteli, 'Rossiiskoe krestianstvo i V.M. 
· :; Chernov v 1917 godu' {The Russian Peasantry. and V.M .. Chernov- in 1917), 
Novyi Zhurna/ (New Journal), vol.24 1952, p.228. 
56 Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p.237. 
''· 
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Government, who held diametrically, opp~sing views on the 
agrarian question. The multiplicity of organisations involved in· 
formulating and implementing an agrarian policy complicated 
matters even more. 'There was a "triangle" of agrarian policy, with 
the Board of the Chief Land Committee as its center, and the Social 
Revolutionary Minister of Agriculture and Soviet of Peasants' 
Deputies influencing it from both sides. But the more closely the 
three sides of this triangle fused, the harder it became to get its 
policy adopted by the coalition government.'57 
On 17 May, Chernov attempted to forbid all dealings in regards to 
land transactions. A joint administrative order with SR Minister of 
Justice Pereverzev, to this effect was sent out to all notarial bureaus. 
However, his colleague on 7 June, in a new telegram, removed all 
prohibition from tax contracts, purchases of non-agricultural land, 
and several other classes of contracts, and on 23 June, rescinded his 
joint communique with Chemov entirely.SB 
While Chernov managed to have the reforms of Stolypin abolished 
he suffered defeats in other areas. The Provisional Government 
rejected a bill approved by the Chief Land Committee on the use of 






peasantry which, after the emancipation of 1861, had been deprived 
of its due share, by transferring excess meadow land to the state. The 
cabinet rejected another bill to regulate fisheries through mediation 
by the Land Committees; private monopolies and fisheries 
contractors had encroached on the interests of fishermen and 
consumers. The same fate menaced all other bills, particularly those 
regulating rental relationships and utilisation of forests.59 
Furt~er intercine strife developed between Chernov and Prince 
Lvov (Minister of Internal Affairs). On 11 June, Prince Lvov made a 
special report to the government on the mass of 'revolutionary' 
decrees issued by local organs of popular government, in violation 
of the lawful rights of the landowners. He proposed that such 
decrees be declared invalid, and especially urged the necessity of a 
public declaration to this effect, signed jointly by himself and 
Chernov. Chernov refused categorically, for the lack of new 
agrarian laws from above made 'separate legislation' from below 
inevitable. Despite the imperfections of local legislation it was a 
lesser evil than efforts to compel the people to abide by the old 
tsarist lru:td laws, efforts which could end only in agrarian disorder 
and anarchy.60 
59 ibid 
60 ibid, pp.237-238; Tsereteli in ibid, pp.238-232. 
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In light of such developments, the peasants justifiably asked if the 
revolution had really happened, if it was not just all a dream. 
Attempts by the land committees to regulate rental relationships 
and rates were met with threats of court action. The provinces 
vociferously demanded the new laws promised by the Provisional 
Government; the Minister of Agriculture could only reply that ' the 
bills presented to the Provisional Government did not meet with 
unanimous approvaI.•61 
Agrarian unrest and food prices increased, food production 
decreased, and at a local level, Price Lvov's policy was 
circumvented by his own officials. Faced with an administrative 
breakdown of his own policy, Lvov presented his alternative to the 
Provisional Government: his resignation or Chernov's.62 
Prince L vov accused Chernov of passing 'laws which undermine 
the people's respect for the law.' These laws, ' ... not only-do not 
combat illegal seizures, not C?nly fail to normalize and guide land 
relations, but they seem to justify the ruinous arbitrary seizures 
which take place all over Russia. They also legalize the seizures 
, which have already taken place, and, as a matter of fact, they try to 
confron~ the Constituent Assembly with an accomplished fact.'63 
61 
62 
Cherriov, The Great. -Russian Revolution, p.239. 
Chernov, Pered Burei, p.335; Tsereteli in ibid, pp.232-236. 
•-....:::• 
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Such an accusation was misdirected, and incidently, was one that 
was often advanced against Chernov. Chernov had continually and 
consistently adhered to the SR Party program and on numerous 
occasions he· declared: 'Naturally in the Constituent Assembly, the 
land question, will occupy first place.... The Socialist 
Revolutionaries ... have attacked any kind of extra - legal seizures 
and outrages and have therefore instructed the peasantry 
consciously to prepare for the Constituent Assembly .... The most 
systematic slogan seems to be "Land through the Constituent 
Assembly"'.64 
Chernov was merely attempting to regularise what, in fact, was 
already happening, ' he felt that the only way in which the agrarian 
legislator could escape "confirming an accomplished fact", 
whatever form it might take, was through legislation which would 
not always lag behind reality, as it had so far, but would hastily dig a 
new channel for its irresistible current.'65 On 7 July, Prince Lvov 
withdrew from the Provisional Government and· Kerensky 
accepted the post of Minister-President. Several days earlier on 2 
July, the Kadet ministers had resigned over the lJkrainian question. 
' ' 
63 Delo Naroda, 9 July, 1917. no.96, p.1 cited in Browder and 




Chernov, Agrarnyi vopros i sovremennyi moment, p.14. 
Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p.242. 
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While Lvov's resignation is directly related to Chernov's policies, it 
can be argued that the Kadets' resignation from the coalition, while 
ostensibly based on the question of Ukrainian autonomy, can also 
be linked to the socialist ministers in the provisional government, 
and in the eyes of the Kadets, their subsequent undermining of the 
authority of the coalition. Chernov in particular, more so than the 
others, was blamed for this. 66 
Chernov was content with pyrrhic victories. At a cabinet session on 
7 July, the socialist ministers submitted a list of demands, high on 
which was the demand for a republic. Yet the 8 July declaration of 
the government inexplicably makes no mention' of a republic. 
Chernov's letter to Nekrasov (acting head of government in 
Kerensky's absence and a former member of the Kadet Party), 
containing his draft of the declaration, which was apparently an 
appeal to the public with an agrarian section, fails to make any 
reference to a republic.67 However, Nekrasov's draft of the 
declaration raises the very issue of a democratic republic.68 
Chernov's inexplicable omission provided Nekrasov with an ideal 
66 On the Ukrainian question and Chernov's account see The Great Russian 
Revolution, pp.264-288; for a detailed analysis see Radkey, The 
Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, pp.261-278. 
67 
. 'V. Chernov i iiulskie dni', (V. Chernov and the July Days), ed. M.G. 
Fleer, Krasnyi Arkhiv (Red Archives), vol.5, 1924, pp.268-270. 
68 ibid, p.270. 
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opportunity to simply ignore the whole matter . .The final 
declaration, heavily re-edited by Nekrasov, thus neglected the issue 
and the agrarian section remained unchanged. 
On 12 July, Chernov was able to finally put through his legislation 
forbidding dealings in land until the meeting of the Constituent 
Assembly, although the legislation had a caveat inserted that land 
contracts required in each case special permission of the local 
provincial Land Committee and confirmation by the Minister of 
Agriculture. 69 
Chemov attributes his legislation forbidding dealings in land as the 
end -of a policy of inaction, of helpless attempts to help the 
peasantry within the framewor,k of the pre-revolutionary land code. 
The premise on which this statement was based proved to be false. 
General Kornilov, commander of the Southwest front, effectively 
circumvented Chernov's legislation when he issued an order on 8 
July, forbid~ing all 'arbitrary interference' in land relationships by 
local agencies. On 16 July, Chernov took a new step. 
69 
He confirmed the right of the Land Committees to take over 
land which the landowners were unable to cultivate, and to 
distribute it among the peasants. He confirmed the power of 
the local Land Committees as mediators in revising rental 
contracts between owners and lessors. 
Peasants in a privileged situation, after deducting normal feed 
Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p.243. 
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requirements for their own cattle, were to surrender the rest 
for war needs at fixed prices. The instruction permitted 
compulsory utilization of the gentry's animal and mechanical 
equipment, but required consent by Land and Supply 
Committees and direct supervision by them. The Land 
Committees were to supervise protection. of forests against 
predatory lumbering and to secure for the peasants the 
privilege of takirig wood for the actual needs of their 
households and for public institutions. Protection of model 
farms, blooded cattle and valuable crops was provided for. In 
conclusion, the instruction recommended that the Land 
Committees go half way to satisfy the just and well-founded 
demands of the toiling peasantry, that they regard themselves 
as the authorized organs of the state and count on the full 
support of the Ministry of Agriculture; the latter, in turn, 
would do everything it could to issue new laws, in order to 
"end the present precarious and indefinite situation in land 
relationships, the cause of similar precariousness and 
indefiniteness in the popular conception of right and law."70 · 
Chernov was almost instantaneously attacked from witl1in the 
Provisional Government. Pereverzev, Minister of Justice led the 
attack, by asserting that the substance of Chernov's proposal would 
mean limiting the right to dispose of private property. The 
government discussed whether the Ministry of Justice could 
formally indict the Ministry of Agriculture for overstepping its 
powers. Just prior to this, the attempted Bolshevik insurrection of 
the famous July days (3-5), where the masses took to the streets 
calling for the All-Russian Soviet to 'take power into its own 
hands', took place. Here Chernov's authority and prestige were to 
70 ibid, pp.243-244. 
: _,',, ,_ ,J ~ • t 
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be even further tested. 
An incident on 4 July, during the failed insurrection, illustrates 
Chernov's rapidly waning popularity amongst the masses. On that 
day, outside the Tauride Palace (where the Duma and Soviet met in 
Petrograd), an angry crowd of Kronstadt sailors had assembled, 
chanting that the Soviet take power. Miliukov recounts the 
incident in his memoirs. 
Chernov came out to pacify the crowd. The mob threw itself at 
him demanding that he be searched for arms. Chernov 
announced that if they searched him, he would not deign to 
speak to them. The crowd fell silent. Chernov began a lengthy 
speech outlining the activities of the socialist ministers in 
general and his own as minister of agriculture in particular. As 
- far as the Kadet ministers were concerned, he said - "good 
riddance to them." In answer, voices shouted "why didn't you 
say this before? Announce at once that the land is going to the 
toiling people and the power to the Soviets." A sturdy worker, 
waving his fist in front of the minister's face, cried in a frenzy: 
"Take power, you son of a bitch, when it is offered to you." 
Amid the mounting tumult several people grabbed Chernov 
and pulled him towards a car. Others pulled him towards the 
palace. After ripping his coat, some Kronstadt sailors pulled 
him into the car and announced that they would not release 
him until the. Soviet had assumed full power. Some anxious 
workers broke into the meeting hall crying: Comrades, they are 
beating up Chernov. Amid the turmoil Chkheidze announced 
that Comrades Kamenev, Steklov, and Martov were delegated 
to liberate' Chernov. He was freed, however, by Trotsky who 
had just arrived on the scene. The Kronstadt people listened to 
him. Accompanied by Trotsky, Chernov returned to the 
hall.71 
71 P .N. Miliukov, The Russian Revolution, p.202. For Trotsky's version 
of the story see, The History of the Russian Revolution, translated by Max 
:'-Eastman, Victor Gollancz, London, 1965, pp.551-553 and_ My· Life,. Peter 
Smith, Gloucester, 1970, pp.311-313. See also N.N Sukhanov, The 
Russian Revolution 1917, edited, abridged and translated by Joel 
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Chernov makes no mention of this incident in his memoirs; 
' ... how could a "Peoples' minister confess his indebtedness not to 
his own popularity, but to the intervention of a Bolshevik for the 
safety of his head?'72 It is somewhat ironic that several days later 
,Chernov was part of the government that imprisoned Trotsky. 
S.P. Postnikov, in an interview with 0. Radkey, recounts the anger 
of Chernov on the evening of 4 July, at the editorial offices of Delo 
Naroda,73 where at 11 p.m., he sat down and cc;>mposed eight 
scorching editorials against Bolshevism, and of which, Postnikov 
and Ivanov-Razumnik felt just four would amply suffice for one 
issue. Chernov even wanted to print the documents in the 
possession of the Ministry of Justice representing the Bolshevik 
leaders as German agents. The next day, however, in a more sombre 
Carmichael from Zapiski 0 Revolutsii (Notes of the Revolution} 7 vols., 
Berlin 1920, Oxford University Press, 1955, pp.444-447 and M. 
Pokrovski, 'Grazhdanii Chernov v iiulskie dni' (Citizen Chernov in the July 
Days}, Pravda (Truth}, no.157. 16 July, 1922. Various versions as to the 
identities of the assailants abound. Trotsky claims agents of the Okhrana 
were responsible. Chernov states that dark elements, acting over the heads of 
the general mass of the workers and soldiers were responsible. Sukhanov 
states they were merely angry Kronstadt naval ratings. 'Chernov, refrained 
from making a public statement on the issue though he presented a secret 
document on the circumstances of his half-hour arrest addressed to a 
Commission of Inquiry.' Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, 
p.553. 
72 Trotsky, My Life, pp.312-313. 
73 The offices of Delo Naroda were located in Petrograd in the former -
residence of Grand~Duke Audrey Vladimirovitch, wher'e also· the Central · K 
Committee of the SR Party met and Chernov and his family lived. 
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mood, Chernov wrote two editorials in defence of the 'inalienable 
right' of the people to demonstrate.74 
In order to quell the disturbances, Kerensky brought troops from 
the front to Petrograd. Arrests of Bolsheviks began and right wing 
elements demanded the dispersal of the Soviets as well as the 
Bolsheviks. Chernov was a principal target in the Right's campaign, 
against the Soviets. He was vilified by individuals from within the 
government, and by patriotic chauvinists and right Kadets in their 
respective newpapers from without, for his agrarian policy and his 
Zimmerwaldian stance on the war. To avenge his defeat of the 
previous May, Miliukov led the attack. His newspaper, Rech, 
accused Chernov of 'defeatism' because he had participated in the 
Zimmerwald conference of socialist parties. He was also accused of 
helping to publish literature 'with German money' for Russian 
prisoners oJ war held in Germany.- The sole pretext for the latter 
accusation was his participation in the 'Society for Spiritual 
Comfort to Russian Prisoners of War', which published a 
periodical, Na Chuzhbine.75 The public campaign finally 
74 Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, pp.284-285. The other 
two editorials were entitled 'Moment obiazyvaet' (The Moment Imposes a 
Duty), and 'Nado razmezhevatsia' (We Must Draw a Line), Delo Naroda, 
no.93, 6 July, 1917. 
75 Chernov had, in fact, written only one article for Na Chuzhbine, on 
'Bulgaria and Russia', and this was reprinted in Delo Naroda, no.109, 25 
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culminated in the rumour that Burtsev and Shchegolev, 
investigators of espionage, held documents convicting Chernov of 
'serving the Germans'. 
Chernov demanded that the government investigate all his actions. 
He declared that he would give up his ministry for a time to 
facilitate the presentation of accusations. Rushing to the defence of 
the 'people's minister', various provincial peasant congresses 
passed resolutions in support of Chernov.76 Moreover, it was not 
just from the countryside that Chernov received support. Urban 
support for the SR minister was just as great; mass meetings were 
held in several factories and plants to protest against his departure, 
and on one occasion in Petrograd Clt an arsenal plant, ·4,00-0 
employees attended a protest meeting. 
After Burtsev and Shchegolev had refuted all reference to 
incriminating documents alleged to be in-· their- possession, the·- · 
government, in accord with the report of the ~inistry of Justice, 
recognised that the accusations had no factual basis. Four days had 
elapsed between Chernov's resignation on the 20 July and his 
July, 1917. 
76 Chernov resigned from the Provisional Government on 20 July, 1917. 
His letter of resignation, which was published in /zvestiia 21 July, 1917, 
no.123, p.5 is reproduced in Browder and Kerensky, pp.1416-1417. For 
. ·, an account of the whole episode from Chernov's perspective see his Great · . · _ 
Russian Revolution, pp.245-247. 
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reappointment to the Ministry. In the interim he was redeemed. 
Indeed,· a three day time limit was set by the SR Central Committee 
and Tsereteli for either Chemov's conviction or rehabilitation. The 
Central Committee published its decision in the party newspaper 
Delo Naroda on 23 July, 1917. 
In the second coalition government cabinet of 24 July, 1917, 
Chernov was again Minister of Agriculture, though not without 
staunch opposition from the Kadets. Chemov, as early as April, 
1917, had antagonised the Kadets by maintaining his 
internationalist position on the war, and by doing so had prompted 
their subsequent vitriolic attack on him in July. As a precondition 
of their participation in the new coalition, they demanded 
Chernov's exclusion. In their party newspaper Rech they stated, 
' ... the Central Committee [Kadet Party] ... deems it necessary to 
eliminate M.V.(sic) Chernov from the Government. Having met 
opposition from A.F. Kerensky, the Party declined to raise this issue 
in the form of an ultimatum. But three of its candidates (F.F. 
Kokoshkin, N.I. Astrov, and V.D, Nabokov) consider their entry 
[into the Government] impossible unless this condition is 
accepted. •77 Kerensky's personal hatred of Chernov which 
77 Rech, 15.July, -1917 no.165, p.1 cited in Browder and Kerensky, 
vol.111, pp.1402-1403. See also G. Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and 
other Diplomatic Memoirs, 2 vols. Cassell, 1923, vol.11, pp.159-160. 
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eminated from his non-electipn to the Central Committee of the SR 
Party at its Third Congress, and for which he blamed Chernov 
together with the support of the Kadet Party,-, was however, not 
enough to exclude him from the coalition government. The 
Central Committee of the SR party strongly pressured Kerensky for 
Chernov's retention. Trotsky in his History of the Russian 
Revolution, states, ' the reappointment of Chernov to the post of 
Minister of AgriCulture was nothing more than a tribute paid. to the 
prestige of the ruling party of Social Revolutionaries.'78 
-
In the new coalition Chernov once again persisted in his attempts 
to pass agrarian laws, but these attempts were met with inaction 
and the usual failure. On 9 August, the Provisional Government 
devoted a special session to the agrarian question. After listening to 
a two-hour report by Chernov, the government made no decision. 
" 
At this session the right wing of the government attacked Chernov 
for his public pronouncements on the issue. Chernov asserted that 
' -
any further procrastination in the way of legislation to formulate 
change in the country's agrarian order could provoke an explosion, 
chaos, and a Pugachev agrarian revolt.79 But Chernoy and the 
Buchanan was British Ambassador in Petrograd in 1910-1918. 
78 
_ Trotsky, The Hi~tory of the Russian Revolution, p._637. 
79 Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p.249. 
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majority of the Provisional Government were, 'in Lassalle's 
expression, "barbarians to one another"; they spoke different 
languages. •BO 
Chernov's continuance in the Provisional Government had 
become absolutely purposeless. He had so stated several times to the 
Central Committee of the party but each time their reply was that 
his resignation would bring catastrophe. However, in the leading 
circles of the party the opinion began to take shape that perhaps 
Chernov's policy could be saved by sacrificing his person. 
Kerensky's open conflict with the Commander in Chief, General 
Kornilov, exposed their very confused and ambiguous relationship 
and gave Chernov a pretext for breaking with Kerensky in a· 
decisive fashion and returning to the Soviet. On 27 August, 
Chernov resigned from the Provisional Government. S.L. Maslov, 
a member of the extreme right of the SR Party, was willingly 
accepted by Kerensky as Minister of Agriculture. 
Chernov now began defending his policy energetically through the 
press. This preoccupation with words instead of action is a clear 
indictment of Chernov's tenure as Minister of Agriculture. Instead 
of realising his agrarian policy when in a position to do so, 
Chernov's record is one of inaction. And it is a paradox in the 
80 ibid 
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extreme that after this withdrawal from office he had initiated a 
public exposition of his policy, when·in four months as Minister, he 
had hardly opened his month in dissent to attacks upon it. 
Kerensky reinforces the impression , of weakness received from 
Chernov's handling of the law on land committees by affirming 
that during the four months his opponent held office, never once 
did he cast a dissenting vote, despite his denunciation of the 
government's record after his retirement from office.81 
Not only did Chernov write articles when he should have been 
writing laws, but he even indulged in his craze for scribbling at 
cabinet meetings. Sometimes Tsereteli would nudge him and say, 
'Please listen, Victor Mikhailovich; this is important,' to which 
Chernov would answer, ' The editorial must be written, and 
anyhow, I shall vote the way you do.'82 
Chernov and the- SRs saw the convocation of the Constitutent 
Assembly as the panacea for all the ills that plagued the Provisional 
Government._ As the supreme embodiment of the Russian people's 
will, all important matters were deferred for its adjudication. In 
view of its importance, it is difficult to explain why Chemov, in his 
81 Oral statement made by Kerensky (Hoover Library, 1955) related in 
Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.333. 
82 Interview with· Tsereteli in New York (December, 1949) related in -
Radkey, ibid, pp.333-334. 
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position as a member of the coalition, acquiesced to the deferment 
of the election date when the government decided to do so on 9 
August. The date of 12 November had been previously decided 
upon under pressure from Tsereteli and Chernov, by the first 
coalition on 14 June. The date of the convocation of the Assembly 
had been decided as 28 November.83 
The Kornilov fiasco stained the right wing of revolutionary politics, 
especially the Kadet Party, and it also exposed rifts within the SR 
Party. Chernov on 3 September in Delo Naroda, in a series of four 
editorials, bitterly attacked Kerensky and the Provisional 
Government for refusing to purge the High Command and for 
appointing Kornilov Commander in Chief. The right wing of the 
party, in particular Argunov and Breshko-Breshkovskaia, rushed to 
Kerensky's defence. The Kornilov affair prompted a political crisis 
within the party through September and into October, the central 
issue being the continued existence and composition of the 
coalition. 
Chernov's position, and consequently that of the left-centre of the 
SR Party, on the issue of a coalition was based on a theoretical 
standpoint, namely that while the archaic feudal methods of 
exploitation had been virtually eradicated, capitalism still had a role 
83 Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, pp.408-409. 
251 
to play in Russia. Large landowners were reactionary and counter-
revolutionary and no agreement could be reached with them, while 
the industrial bourgeoisie were a socially progressive force. It was 
possible to come to some sort of accommodation with the latter. If 
they accepted socialisation of land, the SR Party would not attack 
the present economic order. Such a position was fully in accord 
with previously stated SR theory of land reform in a capitalist 
· environment. 
The Kadet Party represented propertied interests, in particular th~ 
estates of the nobility, and thus were a brake on the revolutionary 
movement in the agrarian sphere. Chernov hoped to drive a wedge 
between business interests and landed interests and thus make land 
reform possible. If such a wedge were effective, it would divid~ the 
Kadet Party and hopefully bring about its death knell. Chernov 
_ wished to exclude the Kadets from power by encouraging the 
participation of industrial and entrepreneurial capitalists. Class 
collaboration would continue, a coalition was still possible, but not 
with the Kadets. If no representatives of capitalism would acquiesce 
to this proposal, Chernov stated that he would support a purely 
socialist government. 84 
84 
'O postroenii vlasti', (Qn the .. formation of a Government),_ Delo 
Naroda, no.143, 1 September, 1917. See also Chernov, The Great Russian 
Revolution, pp.399-400. 
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The left wing of the party's position was unambiguous, namely an 
end to the coalition, while the right centre favoured a 'broad 
coalition' with a Kadet component, but not with those Kadets 
implicated in the Kornilov affair, and it totally rejected the 
possibility of an all socialist government. 
Chernov was adamant that a coalition with the Kadets was out of 
the question. The party equivocated. momentarily, but eventually 
on 27 August it adopted his resolution, which declared an alliance 
with the Kadet party impossible. An ultimatum to this effect was 
presented to Kerensky several days later on 31 August. Chernov in 
a speech to th~ Soviet of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants' Deputies 
outlined the SR Party stance . 
... yesterday the Socialist Revolutionary Party announced to 
Comrade Kerensky, who had outlined a cabinet which 
contained Kadets, that such a list was unacceptable to the party 
and that the party will not give a single representative to the 
Government.... The antagonism between Socialist 
Revolutionaries and the Kadets has reached a breaking point 
in the struggle against Kornilovism. 85 
Yet, in an about face on 12 September, the Central Committee of the 
SR Party passed a resolution stating the desirability of a coalition 
85 The Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet 
of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants' Deputies, 1 September, 1917. 
lzv.estiia, no.160, 2 September, 1917, pp.3-4; and no.161, 3 September, 
1917, pp.5-7, quoted in Browder and Kerensky, pp.1665-1666. 
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with 'propertied elements', enlarged and supplemented by. 
responsibility to the 'preliminary parliament'. This resolution was 
in direct contradiction with the decree against coalition with the 
Kadets which still remained in force.86 The 12 September 
resolution also established the principle of 'unit voting' for all 
members of the Central Committee; only the right of 'unmotivated 
abstention' was granted to those who disagreed. 87 The latter 
measure was designed to tighte~ discipline within the party so as it 
could present itself in a united voice at the forthcoming Democratic 
Conference, which was eventually convened on 14 September. In 




These decrees, passed just before the opening of the 
Democratic Conference, bound Chernov hand and foot and 
weakened his position still further. If he was the most 
"consistent" politician of the Social Revolutionary party, his 
energy encountered many obstacles .... He was completely 
satisfied with literary and oratorical successes, which are 
politically imponderable. It was perhaps splendid, but it was 
not practical, when he tried by personal example to show how 
'party discipline should be observed; at decisive Soviet 
meetings and congresses he was at times silent or abstained 
from voting in order not to violate some decree of the Central 
Committee with its unstable majority and varying decisions, 
while other comrades in the committee were unhampered by 
them. He was still living in the inertia· of that period when the 
leaders of the party had represented a firm moral unity. Those 
times were far in the past. 88 




On 19 September, the first question before the Democratic, 
Conference was a vote of principle, for or against a coalition. 
Chernov protested 'that an abstract "coalition in general" did not 
exist, and that such a vote would be ambiguous and indefinite, and 
was of no avail.'89 During the roll call Chernov, bound by the 
resolutions of his own Central Committee, could only abstain from 
voting.90 Other members of his own party openly flouted the 
Central Committee resolution, voting according to factional 
alliance. 
Tsereteli reported to the Democratic Conference that the pre~idium 
had concluded that ' ... within the organized democracy, there is no 
agreement, no unity of will, which could be translated into reality 
by the force of the whole democracy or by its greater majority.'9 1 
Chernov concluded: 'Labor democracy could not have dealt itself a 
more suicidal blow. Under the prevailing conditions, for democracy 
to sign its own act of bankruptcy was an indirect admission that the 
only solution was dictatorship.'92 
The onus was now back on Kerensky to form a new coalition in 
89 
90 
ibid, , p.403. 
ibid 
91 lzvestiia, no.176, 20 September, 1917, pp.5-7 cited in Browder 
~nd Keren sky, p.1686. 
92 Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p.405. 
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consultation with the presidium. Naively and rather optimistically, 
Chernov hoped for an impasse in the subsequent negotiations and 
the enforced resignation of Kerensky. In the event of such a 
resignation, Chernov prepared an alternative candidate list. 
Tsereteli was proposed for Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
As for himself, he 'preferred to remain outside the government, 
but was willing if necessary, to return to the Ministry of Agriculture 
or head a new "Ministry of Nationalities".'93 The presumption 
upon which it was drafted failed to materialise and Chernov's list 
came to nothing. 
After the behind the scenes intrigues and bickering had subsided, 
Kerensky announced the new cabinet on 25 September. Any dissent 
from the SR Party with respect to the composition of the new 
coalition was to be silenced by the regulation of 27 September, when 
the SR Central Committee reinforced its earlier decree, obliging all 
members of the committee to activ~ly carry out the committee's 
policy and completely prohibiting 'individual voting contrary to 
the opinion of the Central Committee.'94 
Another measure designed to muzzle dissent, and aimed in 
particular at Chernov, was a decision of the Central Committee on 
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28 September not to publish an article entitled 'Lessons of the 
Conference', which was to be the first of a series devoted to a 
systematic criticism of the mistakes of the revolution.95 
Matters went so far that a series of Chernov's warning articles 
was not published in the central organ of the party, even as his 
personal opinion. The Central Committee decided that the 
party was so accustomed to regard Chernov's articles as its 
official position that their divergence from the decisions of the 
Central Committee might cause general confusion. Even here 
Chernov submitted to discipline and patiently waited to appeal 
to the Fourth Party Congress.96 
Chernov withdrew in the forlorn hope that the Party's Fourth 
Congress to be held in November-December, 1917, would resolve 
all. As a consequence, Chernov refrained from active politics by 
periodically abstaining himself from Central Commitee meetings 
and by completely disassociating himself from the work of the 
Council of the Republic, the afterbirth of the Democratic 
Conference. He intended to travel the country, feeling the grass 
roots will and mobilising support for the Fourth Congress, hoping 
that it would replace the crown upon his head. But, by then it was 
too late, as history intervened. 
95 
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The SR Party's preoccupation with intra-party strife blinded it to 
developments around it, and more importantly, diverted its 
attention from the task at hand, the task of transforming Russia into 
a socialist society. The Bolsheviks were, on the whole, 
unencumbered by internal dissension and had a plan of action for 
the socialist transformation of Russian society. 
The Bolshevik seizure of power on 25 October, 1917, did not act as 
stimulus for SR Party unity. Splits and incessant bickering remained. 
Chernov reluctantly delayed his departure from Petrograd until the 
22 October, on the advice that an earlier departure would be 
understood as not being in solidarity with revolutionary anti-
Bolshevik forces. 1 Detached from developments, Chernov 
continued with his favourite pastime, writing articles for the party 
newspaper. On this occasion the topic was the desirability of an 
immediate implementation of agrarian reform. 
On the e:vening of 22 October, 1917, Chernov left Petrograd on a 
speaking tour of Moscow and the Western Front. When questioned 
by delegates at the Fourth Party Congress as to the reasons for his 
absence during the days of the Bolshevik uprising, which occurred 
on the 25 October, he replied that he had not wished to be present at 
Chernov, Pered Burei, p.345. 
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the Second Soviet Congress; as a disciplined member of the party he 
had no right to defend his personal point of view, and to defend that 
of the Central Committee was out of the question.2 
News of an imminent Bolshevik uprising was not a revelation to 
the SR Party. The Central Committee on the 15 October 'took the 
matter under consideration' and decided to 'compose a manifesto'. 
There was little else it could do.3 It gave the matter further 
consideration at another committee meeting on the 21 October. 
The success of the Bolshevik uprising on 25 October, prompted the 
SR Party into a -counter offensive against the Soviet regime. The 
Central Committee of the party enpowered A. Gots to organise 
armed resistance against the Bolsheviks through the Military 
Commission of the SR Central Committee, which Gots,. in turn, 
placed under the auspices of the Committee to Save the Fatherland 
and Revolution. SR Avksentiev was its chairman. Lacking support 
from its own elements 'within the army, Gots fell back on the cadets 
of Petrograd military schools whose farcical anti-Bolshevik uprising 
on 29 October was easily suppressed. 
Chernov opposed the party's action. Armed resistance was 
2 Kratkii otchet o rabotakh Chetvertago Sezda Partii Sotsialistov-
Revoliutsionerov (26 Noiabria - 5 Dekabria 1917 god.a), {Brief Account of 
the Work of the Fourth ~ongress ~f the So~ialist Revolutionary Party [26 
November - 5 December, 1917]), Petrograd, 1918. p.108. 
3 Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.454. 
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impractical, especially if perceived by the populace, that it sought to 
restore the Provisional Government. What was needed was a new 
government of socialists to challenge the Council of People's 
Commissars (Sovnarkom). 
At Mogilev on the Dnieper, the General Army Committee 
endeavoured to do just this.4 The Committee designated V.M. 
Chernov as their choice for I1linister-president. His credibility was 
more intact than most, by his opposition to imperialism, support of 
peasant interests, and his dissociation from Kerensky and the 
Provisional Government. Chernov arrived in Mogilev at the 
invitation of the chairman of the General Army Committee Staff 
Captain S.V. Pereki-estov, from Pskov where the proposal was put to 
him. Chernov accepted on the proviso that the Central Committee 
of the SR Party countenance the offer, and the All-Russian Congress 
of Peasants' Soviets do likewise. The Congress, Chernov requested, 
should move its forthcoming congress from Petrograd to Mogilev to 
4 This account of the Mogilev plan is based on Chernov's 'Tsentralnyi 
Komitet Partii Sotsialistov Revoliutsionerov na rubezhe dvukh revoliutsii' 
(The Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party on the border 
line between two revolutions) as cited in J. Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, The 
Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918: Documents and Materials. Stanford 
University Press. 1965; G. Semenov (Vasilev), Voennaia boevaia rabota 
Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov za 1917-18, (Military and Combat 
Activity of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1917-18), Berlin 1922; 
and Radkey, The Sick/~_ under _!he Hammer. The Russian Socialist 
Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule, Columbia University , 
Press, 1963, pp.73-91. 
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,, 
add its authority 'to the exercise. Both acceded and Chernov 
proceeded with the selection of a cabinet. The General Army 
Committee called for support of the new government on a program 
of restoration of civil liberties, transfer of the land to the land 
committees, and immediate peace negotiations. 
The whole endeavour was, however, to come abruptly to an end. On 
11 November, only four days after the General Army Committee 
had announced its intentions, it cancelled them. Outwardly the 
reason was that many political parties were apprehensive that the 
initiative to form a new government had come from a military 
authority, and instead would have preferred it to have come from 
the civilian arena. Behind the scenes intrigue played a substantial 
role as well. From his initial acceptance on the eve of 8 November, 
Chernov on 10 November, suddenly withdrew his candidancy. 
From his initial elation on the evening of 8 November, Chernov 
was now 'laying (sic) in a complete moral and physical state of 
collapse with a compress. on his head'.5 The answer for this 
sudden transformation lies with the arrival of Gots and Avksentiev, 
who promptly took a hostile attitude to the proposal, arguing it 
5 G. Semenov (Vasilev), Voennaia i boevaia rabota Partii Sotsialistov -
Revoliutsionerov za 191 ~-1918, (Military and Combat Activity of the 
Socialist Revolutionary in 1917-1918), Berlin. 1922, p.9. 
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would meet with no support in party circles, nor, in fact, in Soviet 
circles. Furthermore, after initially agreeing to move the site of their 
forthcoming meeting, the Peasant Executive Committee recanted 
and stated that the original site of Petrograd would remain. 
Chernov also claims that Avksentiev's opposition was motivated by 
the fact that he had been previously designated to form a new 
government, and carried with him a letter from Kerensky 
conferring on Avksentiev the rights and duties of the Prime 
Minister.6 
Chernov bowed to the wishes of his party comrades and left Mogilev 
for Petrograd in order to continue his verbal struggle against 
Bolshevism at the Peasants' Congress. The Congress opened on 10 
November and met until 25 November, electing left SR Maria 
Spiridonova as chairman after a walkout of right SRs and their 
sympathisers. It also at this time declared itself a 'Special 
Congress'.7 
Upon Chernov's arrival, the peasant delegates to whom he was the 
messiah, and who had only just recently walked out of the Congress, 
returned with a motion to elect Chernov as honorary chairman. The 
Bolshevik Zinoviev attacked Chernov for his association with 
6 A copy of the letter is reproduced in Browder and Kerensky, pp.1809-
181 0. 
7 Delo Naroda, no.207, 11 November, 1917, p.4. 
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tsarist generals at Mogilev and accused him as the 'man who once 
dispersed the Diet of Finland. He appealed to the Left SRs: 'You ... 
must decide 'once arid for all whether you ate with- us and with the 
revolutionary workers, soldiers, and peasants or against us.'8 
Chernov in what was now familiar territory, fended off Zinoviev's 
accusations claiming they were unfounded. He explained that. he 
had just returned from the army congress at Mogilev where the 
question of putting an end to the civil war was discussed, and 
concluded by saying that he was ready to give an explanation at any 
time. 9 The combination of Left SR and Bolshevik votes denied 
Chernov the chair. The congress then divided into two intransigent 
camps, the Extraordinary Congress of the Left SRs and Bolsheviks, 
and a Conference of the Executive Committee with its supporters, 
virtually all of whom were SRs of the centre and right. There was no 
hope o(reconciliation. - .. -. -
The Fourth and last Congress of the SR Party met in Petrograd from 
26 November to 5 December, 1917. The main issue confronting the 
party was the analysis of contemporary events and the tactics to be 
adopted. 10 While the Left SRs had formally broken away at the 
8 Sessions of the Peasants' Deputies 
Bunyan and Fisher in ibid, p.212. 
9
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Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Deputies (25-26 October), dissension of opinion within the ,SR Party 
was still rife. Chernov, like a phoenix, rose from the ashes and was 
elected as presiding officer together with a left centrist presidium.11 
Chernov used the Congress as an opportunity to release months of 
pent up frustrations at the lack of support given to him during the 
days of the Provisional Government. Discarding the obligation and 
discipline which he imposed on himself for the sake of party unity, 
he launched into a torrent of abuse.12 V.I. Lebedev took up the 
challenge and reproached Chernov for his inaction and acquiescence 
while a member of the Provisional Government and for effectively 
betraying Kerensky and knifing him in the back.13 These 
recriminations once again strained the unity of an already splintered 
party. 
V.M. Zenzinov, as the spokesman of the Central Committee, 
presented a report in which he admitted the many deviations from 
party policy, the lack of unity and discipline at decisive moments, 
and the lack of leadership and direction.14 Various delegates further 
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characterisation of policy as 'wobbling, zig-zagging, and 
indefinite' .15 From the left, the complaint was that the people had 
been confused by not being· able to tell where the party stood on the 
biggest issues of the day.16 The inactive and inept leadership of the 
Central Committee had, in the words of I.A. Prilezhaev, been to 
such a degree that Chernov's popularity was now gravely 
compromised.17 The report of the Central Commitee called for the 
choice of a new committee 'more homogenous' in composition and 
capable of putting through a firm policy of revolutionary 
socialism.18-
- The newly elected Central Committee saw Chernov's left centre 
faction supreme, to the great delight of the man himself, winning 11 
of the 20 positions and giving a clear indication of Chernov's 
ascendancy.19 The crown that Gots had worn since the Third 
' Congress was now back on Chernov's head. The Congress now 
turned to a discussion on the 'current moment' and future 





ibid, p.47 .. 
ibid, pp.78-79. 
18 Resolution of the report of the Central Committee in ibid, p.143. See 
also Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p.396. 
19 For a complete list of the successful candidates and their respective -
votes see Kratkii Otchet.. .p.143. 
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after being in a position of power, was now on the verge of 
becoming an illegal organisation, forced once again, into an 
underground movement. The latter involved what actions should 
be taken in respect of the Bolshevik regime. 
Chernov stated that the SR Party's pro-coalition policy was 
misguided, that the second trial of coalition had been superfluous 
and that the third was inexcusable. Under the domination of a clique 
which had no true majority behind it, the SR , concept of a 
revolution falling between a strictly· bourgeois and a thoroughly 
socialist one, had been scrapped in order to perpetuate a sterile 
union with the bourgeoisie. However, the SR masses would not 
accept a purely political revolution and, i!l not getting their own 
kind, had turned in large numbers to the maximalist utopia of the 
extremists. 20 
As for the future tactics of the SR Party in respect of the Bolshevik 
regime, Chernov urged patience, and to wait for the inherent 
negative aspects of Bolshevism to emerge and thus show their true 
colours. Only then, when the masses were free from the hypnotic 
trance of Bolshevism, could the party undertake armed resistance, 
20 Kratkii Otchet ... pp.25-26, p.123, pp.144-145 see also Chernov, 
'Otkliki pressy' (Echoes of the Press}, Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.32, 
December, 1923, pp.20-21, and 'lz itogov proshlogo opyta' (From the 
Results of Past Experience}, Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.23, December, 
1922, pp.3-4. 
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while being all the time conscious that it did not aid counter-
revolutionary elements. The task was to divest Bolshevism of its 
popular following, and also to wean its allies, the Left SRs and 
Mensh_evik Internationalists, before letting things come to an open 
fight. This could be done only if the SR Party straightened out its 
line and provided the country with a thoroughly revolutionary 
alternative to Bolshevism.21 
In the interim, the question was how could the party check the 
excesses and facilitate the withering away process? Chernov_ toyed 
with the idea of a resumption of terrorism, recalling an old slogan, 
'You shall get it according to your deeds',-and declaring ~t to be his 
party's duty to defend the will of the people against ravishers 'with 
all the force at its disposal, as in the days of yore'.22 This was to be 
only a brief flirtation, for the Central Committee, on 12 December, 
pronounced terrorism to be 'wholly inadmissable' as a means of 
struggle at this time, and ordered its decision to be communicated to 
all comrades working on the defence of the Constituent Assembly. 
Instead, the committee concentrated on agitation in factories in an 
attempt to ·recover lost ground and drive a wedge between the 
Bolshevik Party and its proletarian following. However, Chernov 
21 Chernov, 'lz itogov proshlogo opyta' Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, no.23, 
December, 1922, pp.4-5. · 
22 Kratkii Otchet ... p. 76, p.35. 
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ultimately believed that in the ~nd the final confrontation with 
Bolshevism would be an all out affair where even terrorism would 
be employed. 23 
In recognising the primacy of the Constituent Assembly, the SRs 
were on a collision course with the Bolshevik soviet system. 
I 
Chernov viewed soviets in the following way: 
Both in 1905 and in 1917 it was an organization ad hoe, the 
specific type of organization of a united socialist and 
revolutionary front in a militant period, in the fire and storm 
of advancing revolution. Unlike all other militant 
organizations of the working class, it was built not from above 
but below, by election at factory and shop meetings, and hence 
in some features was like a "preliminary parliament' of the 
working class.24 
They were revolutionary improvisations due to the absence of 
stable, well-established and distinct political parties· and trade 
unions, 'without which the working class is only "human dust". 
Hence the Soviets arose as a temporary substitute for the trade-




It was merely a later refurbishing in Russian style of the main 
idea of South European anarcho-syndicalism, at best, an 
unconscious parody of it. It is one thing to construct a 
working-class state on a firm basis, on labor unions forged by 
many years of mass struggle and practical activity; it is quite 
another to build it on improvized half clubs, half parliaments, 
Chernov, op cit. , 
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without experience, without a definite constitution or regular 
system of elections.26 
In Chernov's opinion, if the latter course was chosen, Soviets woul.d 
simply provide a facade for the dictatorship of the party which 
con trolled them. The Left SRs and the Bolsheviks took a 
diametrically opposing view. For the Left SRs, the Soviets assumed 
an independent value as agencies through which the toilers of 
Russia could fashion a new order, whereas the Bolsheviks regarded 
them essentially as organs for the mobilisation of the working class 
behind ils vanguard. Furthermore, in Lenin's view, the Soviets 
were a higher form of democracy than a Constituent Assembly. 
The Fourth Congress of the SR Party took the line that the SRs must 
thwart Lenin's strategy of opposing the soviets to the Constituent 
Assembly by getting them out of the field of government, but at the 
same time preserving them as nuclei of class action and, if need be, 
of defence against counter-revolution.27 Their various proposals 
for wresting control of the Soviets from Bolshevik influence, 
however were to fail. The Soviets as instruments of government 
were imbued with working class consciousness and the Bolshevik~ 
were too well cemented. 
26 ibid, p.104. 
27 Refer to Sections 10, 11, and 12 of the Resolution on ··the Current' 
Moment, Kratkii Otchet ... p.145. 
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On the question of the war, and more importantly, of peace, radical 
leftist elements that had fail~d to break away with the Left SRs, 
berated Chernov in his report for failing to address the growing 
disenchantment felt by the troops at the front with the continuation 
of the war, and praised the Bolshevik declaration for peace. Others 
demanded an immediate peace, not m.erely a separate peace, but 
peace at any price.28 The Congress fell back on its standard mode of 
operation when dealing with difficult and contentious issues by 
deferring to the Constituent Assembly. The SRs were to then 
instruct it to address a note to the Allies proposing a general 
armistice and the discussion of terms for a general · peace in 
conformity with the principle of the Russian Revolution.29 
The Fourth Party Congress of the SR Party failed to heal the wounds 
of the recent schism within the party with the secession of the left 
wing. Its proposals to supplant Bolshevik influence in Soviets with 
its own failed miserably; it skirted the land question and the 
problem of the equitable land distribution; it failed to resolve a 
concrete peace proposal, and thus tacitly endo~sed the continuation 
of a demonstrably unpopular war; and the nationalities question 
was as muddled as ever. In the midst of all this, Chernov 
28 
29 
Kratkii Otchet ... p.47, i;>.50. p.83, p.85. 
ibid, p.157. 
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congratulated the congress on having laid down a single line of 
revolutionary socialism and an anti-Bolshevik one at that.30 
Coinciding with the Fourth Congress of the SR Party was the 
meeting of the Second All-Russian Peasants' Congress, which also 
met in Petrograd on 26 November and was, in session until 10 
December. For the second time Spiridonova and Chernov opposed 
e~ch other for the chairmanship of the Congress. . On this occasion 
Spiridonova emerged triumphant, receiving 269 votes as opposed to 
Chernov's 230, and took the chair.31 The turbulent ·Congress 
continually descended into chaotic disorder, with the the Left SRs 
berating the impotency of the right SRs, and the right SRs decrying 
the collusion of the Left SRs with Bolshevism. The Bolsheviks were 
fuelling the fire of the two agrarian protagonists, with the end 
product of a divided class which posed little opposition to the 
leadership of Bolshevism. T~e ultimate aim was the domination of 
the peasant movement, not so much for class unity, but as a means 
of destroying their rivals. 
Chernov, in his major speech to the Congress, sidestepped the issue 
of his having six months in power with nothing to show for it, and 
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his nomination to the chair, was greeted with shouts of 'Doloi' 
(Down with him). Irreconcilable divisions within the congress 
eventually led on 4 December to inevitable splits into right and left 
factions and the walk out of the right SRs. From then until 10 
December, the two separate groups continued their fruitless 
deliberations. 
With the imminent arrival of the Constituent Assembly, SR 
attention focused on its defence against Bolshevik attack. As a 
' 
precaution against feared Bolshevik violence, a Committee for the 
Defence of the Constituent Assembly had been formed, cooperating 
closely with the Military Commission of the SR Party.32 On 18 
-December,1917, a squad led by Vecheka33 collegium member V.V 
Fomin, acting on Dzerzhinsky's instructions and with Sovnarkom 
assent, arrested Chernov and other prominent SRs, as well as 
Tsereteli and other Menshevik leaders, as they attended a rally of the 
Constituent Assembly Defence Committee. Among them were 
various delegates elected to the Constituent Assembly.34 When at a 
Sovnarkom meeting late that night, the Left SR I.N. Steinberg, the 
32 For a detailed analysis of the composition and role of the Committee and 
Commission see Radkey, The Sickle under the Hammer, pp.336-349. 
33 Vserossiiskaia Chrezvychainaia Komissiia (po borbe s 
Kontrrevoliutsiei Spekuliatsiei, Sabotazhem i Prestupleniiami po 
Dolzhnosti) All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (for Combating 
Counter-Revolution, Speculation, Sabotage, and Misconduct in Office). 
34 The letter of Arrest is reproduced in Bunyan and Fisher in ibid, p.366. 
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recently appointed Commissar of Justice, learned from Lenin of the 
detention and proposed incarceration of these parliamentarians, he 
sped to the scene and countermanded Dzerzhinky's order, releasing 
those arrested. 
The arrests of 18 December provided a clear indication of the 
Bolsheviks' intention in regards to the Constituent Assembly. To 
the Bolsheviks the Soviets were a higher form of democracy than 
any bourgeois institution such as the Constituent Assembly and as 
the revolution had developed into its proletarian socialist phase, the 
need for a Constituent Assembly was no longer present. Yet, one 
must not pre-empt events. Steinberg's timed intervention allowed 
the Constituent Assembly, the ultimate will of the people of Russia 
in the SR mind, to meet in Petrograd on 5 January, 1918, with 
Chernov's participation. 
In the elections to the Constituent Assembly held on 12 -14 
November, the SR Party amassed 380 deputies, the Left SRs 39, while 
the Bolsheviks recorded only 24 per cent of the vote with 168 
deputies.35 Chernov was elected in five districts, and chose to 
35 For a detailed analysis of the elections refer to Radkey, The Election to 
the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1950 also W.A. Dando, 'A Map of the Election to the Russian 
.Constituent Assembly of 1917', Slavic Review vol.25, June, 1966, 
pp.314-319. 
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represent the farming district of Kharkov. Discord rapidly developed 
between the elected parliamentarians and the Central Committee of 
the SR Party. The committee under Chernov's left centrist guidance / 
sought a delay in the convocation of the Constituent Assembly so as 
to allow time for the disillusionment of the people with 
Bolshevism, and hence, to provide a more favourable situation in 
which to provoke a final showdown. The right SRs, who 
maintained a majority of deputies in the delegation, sought an 
immediate convocation of the assembly as the expression of the 
sovereign will of the people, ignoring Soviet rule and the absence of 
any defence of the assembly. 
The obvious friction between the two viewpoints led to the creation 
of a rival centre of authority., On 9 December, the SR Deputies 
elected a Bureau of the Delegation to act as an executive organ. Of its 
twenty five members there was one notable omission: V.:M.· 
Chernov, the leader of the party.36 This. was an obvious and 
embarassing rebuff of Chernov's left centrist line. This situation 
could not continue, .and after several re-elections and the arrival of 
more deputies in Petrograd on 23 December, 
1 
Chernov's na~e 
appeared at the head of a list of successful candidates. However, the 
36' Volia· Naroda, no.190, 10 December, 1917 cited in Radkey, The 
Sickle under the Hammer, p.353. 
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fundamental rightist orientation of the delegation remained 
unchanged. 
The Fourth Congress in its organisational statutes explicitly stated 
that all members of the SR delegation in the Soviets, as in the 
parliament, must heed the in~unctions of the party leadership, and 
that the work of the parliamentary group must proceed under the 
direct supervision of the Central Committee.37 Yet, as had often 
been the case, adherence to party policy and discipline was not one of 
the main strengths of the SR Party, and the right SRs largely acted 
independently of the Central Committee. 
The tactics to be employed on the opening day of the assembly were 
predicated on a perceivably hostile Bolshevik reaction. So as not to 
inflame the situation the SR delegation decided to go unarmed to 
the Tauride Palace, entrusting their personal safety to the people. 
·They also resolved to restrain themselves in the face of any verbal 
abuse or provocation. And should the electricity be disconnected or 
delegates deprived of food Anastasia N. Sletova, sister of Stephen 
Sletov and first wife of Chernov, was to provide candles and a 
supply of sandwiches:3S 'Thus .. .', says Trotsky contemptuously, . 
'democracy entered upon the struggle with dictatorship heavily 
37 Kratkii Otchet...p.1 ~6, p.15~. 
'·. 
3B M.V. Vishniak, Dan proshlomu, (Tribute to the Past) New York, 1954. 
p.342. 
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armed with sandwiches and candles.•39 As to policy proposals, the 
SRs at the first session hoped to pass three pieces of legislation on 
peace, federalism and land. 
As a mask to the factionalism within the party, Chernov was chosen 
as a candidate for the presidency.40 The move can only be seen as a 
.tactical ploy by the right wing rather than a full endorsement of 
Chernov and his policies. He was still the 'village minister' to 
millions of peasants. Though they endorsed his candidacy, the right 
attempted to muzzle his mouth by having his opening speech 
vetted for content, if not for words. Vishniak states that Chernov 
agreed to speak to a pre-arranged plan, but would not divulge the 
general content of his speech.41 
The first session of the Constituent Assembly opened around four 
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42 Only the salient features pertaining to Chernov and the SRs will be 
examined. The Constituent Assembly proceedings are adequately covered in 
some detail by Radkey, The Sickle under the Hammer, Chap.VIII; Bunyan· 
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present out of a possible 800 as provided for by the electoral law. 
With the assistance of M.S. Uritskii, a Bolshevik who had been 
appointed Commissar in Charge of the All-Russian Commission for 
matters concerning the assembly as well as commandant of the 
Tauride Palace where tl~e Constituent Assembly met, the public 
galleries were stacked with workers, sailors and soldiers to ensure 
the deputies received a hostile and vocal reception. Zenzinov 
commented that; 'We, the deputies, were surrounded by an enraged 
crowd ready at any moment to throw itself upon us and tear us to 
pieces.'43 
Although the noisy and demonstrative public gallery was pro-
Bolshevik, the elections for the Assembly's President demonstrated 
anti-Bolshevik sentiment, as the Left SRs and Bolsheviks' 
' 
nomination of Maria Spiridonova was defeated by Che:rnov. Fears of 
a desertion amongst the peasant ranks to the left failed to eventuate. 
Chernov's nomination proved to be the magnet that prevented the 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 Contemporary Accounts, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1971, pp.268-272; Chernov, Pered Burei 
(Before the Storm), pp.353-366; V. Zenzinov, It Zhizni Revoliutsionera, 
(Out of the Life of a Revolution), Paris, 1919; Ludovic Naudeau 'Russia's 
Constituent Assembly: An Eyewitness's Story of the Seventeen Fateful Hours 
That Started the Nation Toward Ruin' in Current History Magazine of the 
New York Times, vol.8 part 2, August 1918, pp.267-275. The above list 
is by no means exhaustive. 
43 V. Zenzinov, /z Zhizni Revoliutsionera, p.99. 
277 
peasant deputies' desertion. 
My nomination as candidate for the Presidency received even 
greater support than had been expected. Some leftist peasants 
evidently could not bring themselves to oppose their own 
"muzhik minister". I obtained 244 votes against 150.44 
Chernov's election to the chair was followed by his inaugural 
address. The content and its reception are vividly recounted in his 
memoirs. 
I delivered my inauguration address, making vigorous efforts 
to keep self-control. Every sentence of my speec11 was met with 
outcries, some ironical, others spiteful, often buttressed by the 
brandishing of guns. Bolshevik deputies surged forward to the 
dais. C:onscious that the stronger nerves would win, I was 
determined not to yield to provocation. I said that the nation 
had made its choice, th.at the composition of the Assembly was 
a living testimony to the people's yearning for Socialism, and 
that its convention marked the end of the hazy transition 
period. Land reform, I went on, was a foregone conclusion: the 
land would be equally accessible to all who wished to till it. 
The Assembly, I said, would inaugurate an era of active 
foreign policy directed toward peace. 
I finished my speech amidst a cross-fire of interruptions and 
cries. It was now the turn of the Bolshevik speakers -
Skvortsov and Bukharin. During their delivery, our sector was 
a model of restraint and self-discipline. We maintained a cold, 
dignified silence. The Bolshevik speeches, as usual, were 
shrill, clamorous, provocative and rude, but they could not 
break the icy silence of our majority. As President, I was bound 
in duty to call to order for abusive statements. But I know that 
this was precisely what they expected. Since the armed guards 
·were under their orders, they wanted clashes, incidents and 
perhaps a brawl. So I remained silent.45 
44 Chernov, 'Russia's One-Day Parliament' in Mohrenschildt ibid, p.270; 
Chernov, Pered Burei, p.362. 
45 Chernov, 'Russia' One-Day Parliament' in Mohrenschildt ibid, 
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In an atmosphere of such hostility, even Zenzinov, a staunch critic 
of Chernov's from within his own party, conceded that he showed 
courage.46 Unfortunately, for Chernov, the SR Party, and the 
Assembly, his verbosity and obtuseness pleased virtually no one, not 
the right wing of his party and c.ertainly not the Left SRs and 
Bolsheviks. His speech was cautious and. ambiguous, or as his wife 
recalled in her memoirs, his deviation from party policy into the 
realm of his own ideas gave his sp,eech a duplicity of meaning.47 In 
his speech, Chernov rejected the notion of a separate peace, 
cautiously put the Constituent Assembly above the Soviets, and on 
the question 'of nationalities, indicated his desire to hold the tsarist 
empire together in a fraternal federation of peoples. On the land 
question, he once again invoked the slogan of socialisation of land. 
Slogans and formulas were not enough, their realisation was what 
counted, and for all their talk, it was something Chemov and the 
SRs could not provide. 
After the failure of the Assembly to make the Bolshevik Declaration 
is in l.S. Malchevski (ed.), Vserossiiskoe Uchreditelnoe Sobranie, pp.9-
23. Excerpts are reproduced in M. Vishniak, Dan Proshlomy, pp.366-369. 
46 Vishniak, Dan Proshlomy, p.369. 
47 Olga Tchernoff, New Horizons. Reminiscences of the Russian 
Revolution, translated from the French by C. Herbert, Hyperion Press, 
Westport 1975. Reprint of the 1936 edition published ·by Hutchinson; -
London. p.101. 
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of the Rights of Toiling and Exploited Peoples the order of the day, 
the Bolsheviks withdrew from the assembly, and the Left SRs 
followed shortly thereafter. The monumental events that followed 
are related in Chernov's own words. 
We knew that the Bolsheviks were in conference, discussing 
what to do next. I felt sure that we would be arrested. But it 
was of utmost importance for us 'to have a chance to say the 
last word. I declared that the next point on the agenda was the 
land reform. At this moment somebody pulled at my sleeve. 
"You have to finish now. There are orders from the People's 
Commissar." 
Behind me stood a stocky sailor, accompanied by his armed 
comrades. 
"What People's Commissar?" 
"We have orders. Anyway, you cannot stay here any longer. 
The lights will be turned out in a minute. And the guard are 
tired." 
"The members of the Assembly are also tired but cannot rest 
until they have fulfilled the task entrusted to them by the 
people - to decide on the land reform and the future form of 
government." 
And leaving the guards no time to collect themselv~s. I 
proceeded to read the main paragraphs of the Land Bill, which 
our party had prepared long ago. But time was running short. 
Reports and debates had to be omitted. Upon my proposal, the 
Assembly voted six basic points of the bill. It provided that all 
land was to be turned into common property, with every tiller 
possessing equal rights to use it. Amidst incessant shouts: 
"That's enough! Stop it now! Clear the hall!" the other points 
of the bill were voted. 
Fearing that the lights would be extinguished, somebody 
managed to procure candles. It was essential that the future 
form of government be voted upon immediately. Otherwise 
the Bolsheviks would not fail to charge the Assembly with 
having left the door open for the restoration of the monarchy. 
The motion for a rep1:1.blic form of governm~nt was __ c_a!ried. 
unanimous! y. 
In the dawn of a foggy and murky morning I declared a recess 
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until noon. 
At the exit a palefaced man pushed his way to me and 
beseeched me in a trembling voice not to use my official car. A 
bunch of murderers, he said, was waiting for me. He admitted 
that he was a Bolshevik, but his conscience revolted against 
this plot. 
I left the building, surrounded by a few friends. We saw 
several men in sailor's uniforms loitering near my car. We 
decided to walk. We had a long distance to go, and when I 
arrived home I learned that rumours were in circulation that 
the Constituent Assembly had dispersed, and that Chernov 
and Tseretelli had been shot. 
'At noon several members of the Assembly were sent in 
reconnaissance. They reported that the door of the Tauride 
Palace was sealed and guarded by a patrol with machine guns 
and two pieces of field artillery. Later in the day a decree of the 
Sovnarkom was published by which the Constituent Assembly 
was "dissolved." 
Thus ended Russia's first and last democratic parliament.48 
The question that obviously faced the deputies to the Constituent 
Assembly is what should they do now? A group of delegates 
assembled the next day at Gurevich high school to deliberate their 
fate. Various delegates expressed their desire to continue meeting in 
some factory under the auspices and protection of the proletariat of 
Petrograd. An invitation to this effect had been extended via A. 
Vysotski from the Semiannikov foundry and another from the 
Obukhov steel mill and cannon foundry. Chemov was among those 
that supported the idea of reopening the sessions of the Constituent 
48. Chernov, 'Russia's One-Day Parliament' in Mohrenschildt, ibid, 
pp.271 :272; Chernov, PEJred Burei, p.364-366;. Vishniak, Dan 
Proshlomy, pp.376-379. 
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Assembly in such circumstances. Other delegates, who constituted a 
larger grouping, argued against such an action, claiming that 
workers' lives would be put at risk if the Bolsheviks used force, 
particularly with the fire power of a gunboat anchored in the nearby 
Neva river at their disposal. More importantly, any decisions 
arrived at would be unenforceable, and there was no mechanism 
available in which they could publicise the results of their 
deliberations. The majority view held sway and the delegation 
decided to turn down the offer.49 The delegation moved to Moscow 
at the behest of the SR Central Committee at the end of January 
where, according to Cherl).ov, the Bolsheviks were entrenched just 
as strongly as whence they came.so 
While in Moscow the SR Party held its Eighth Party Conference on 
26 May, 1918, which reviewed the Bolshevik dispersal of the 
Constituent Assembly and the· recent separate peace treaty with 
Germany in Brest-Litovsk on 3 March, 1918. Though without 
foreign aid, the party resolved to take up armed resistance against 
the Bolsheviks. It was thought that such aid could be utilised in the 
war against Germany on the ' ... condition that Russia's territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty will not be violated ... and that the 
49 , Chernov, Pered Burei,· pp.367-368. 
50 ibid, p.368 .. 
282 
appearance of the Allies in Russian territory will be for strategic 
1 •51 reasons on y .... 
Chernov left Moscow at the beginning of June and initially travelled 
to Saratov, where both. he and the SR Central Committee imagined 
themselves to be on the eve of liberatic'm.52 In order to escape the 
\ 
ever vigilant Cheka, Chernov was forced to go into hiding. 
Technical and personal complications further held up his passage, 
and when he finally reached Samara (now Kuibyshev) in mid-
September, he had been cut off for eight months from all but 
underground politics, and for nearly four months from any politics 
at all. He arrived with the ideas that had been accepted (largely 
through his own persuasion) by the SR Central Committee at its 
Eighth Party Conference. The Bolsheviks were pawns and allies of 
Imperial Germany. Allied military aid might be accepted against the 
German-Bolshevik alliance, but in the liberation of Russia from 
Bolshevik tyranny, no section of the SRs could count on any force 
other than the force of the Russian people. 
Chernov's conception of civil war was one of popular uprisings. 
Peasant revolt would follow peasant revolt having a snowball effect 
51 Resolutions of the Eighth Conference of the Socialist-Revolutionists of 
the Right 26 May, 1918, quoted in J.Bunyan, Intervention, Civil War, and 
Communism in Russia April-December 1918: Documents and Materials, 
Octagon, New York 1976, p.187; Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.371-372. 
52 Zenzinov, lz Zhizni Revoliutsionera, p.103. 
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until Bolshevik rule was swept away in the avalanche. Civil war, he 
maintained, ·was 75 per cent propaganda. He poured scorn on 
professional soldiers with their hackneyed ideas of fronts and 
formations and lines of communication. He was keenly alive to the 
danger of reaction, to the prospect that there might arise 'against the 
Left-wing Red dictatorship an equally despotic but Right-wing White 
dictatorship'. In the struggle between these two 'the Socialist 
Revolutionary Party, if it is to fulfil its historic role, must emerge as 
a Third Force and fight a determined war for Democracy on two 
fronts. 
'Chernov's arrival in Samara was' viewed with some apprehension 
by right-wing SRs. They feared that' his arrival and subsequent 
planned immediate departure for · Ufa would jeopardize the Ufa 
Conference. Accordingly, while he was received with respect, 
allotted the best room in the Hotel National and given an official 
banquet and speeches, he was discreetly prevented from going on to 
Ufa.53 The conference at Ufa was held between 8 September and 23 
September in the Urals and was an attempt to organise a counter-
government against the Bolsheviks. Twenty-three shades of political 
opinion were represented; the numerically biggest group was the 
'
53 
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Komuch (Komitet Chlenov Uchreditelnogo Sobraniia- Committee 
of Members of the Constituent Assembly, mainly comprised of 
Socialist Revolutionaries). The Komuch was inaugurated on 8 
June, 1918, in the town of Samara on the Volga, with the aim of 
seizing power in the country on behalf of the Constituent Assembly. 
With the aid of the Czechs, the Komuch gained control over a large 
part of the Volga region. It declared war on the Soviet regime and 
Germany and appealed for Allied aid in organising resistance to the 
Germans and Bolsheviks and to ~stablish a People's Army.54 
Though numerically superior, the Komuch strength at the Ufa 
Conference was negated by the right of veto accorded to each party, 
irrespective of size. The Ufa conference, at its fifth and concluding 
session, managed to form a Directory of five members (consisting of 
Avksentiev, General Boldyrev, Zenzinov, Vinogradov and 
Sapozhnikov), which would constitute an -All-Russian Provisional 
Government. 55 
54 The proclamation of Komuch, its policies, establishment of a People's 
Army and Allied Intervention are reproduced in J. Bunyan, Intervention, 
Civil War and Communism in Russia; April-December 1918: Do9uments 
and Materials, Octagon, New York, 1976. pp.283-290. 
55 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.377; Zenzinov, /z Zhizni Revoliutsionera, 
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Until the convocation of the All-Russian Constituent 
Assembly, the All-Russian Provisional Government will be 
the sole trustee of sovereign authority over all territories of 
the Russian state .... All functions of sovereignty which ... have 
been exf?rcised provisionally by the different regional 
governments will be turned over to the All-Russian 
Provisional Government when claimed by it.56 
The Directory was to be the national government until sufficient 
members of the Constituent Assembly of January, 1918, could be 
assembled. The Directorate initially favoured Yekaterinburg as the 
seat of government, but was later persuaded in favour of Omsk as 
the capital, and the new government moved to that city in the early 
part of October, 1918. It was to have a short-lived existence. The 
Directorate was overthrown in a coup d'etat on 18 November, 1918, 
and replaced by a military dictatorship led by Admiral Kolchak. 
Chernov was highly critical of developments around him upon his 
arrival in Samara. He later recounted to his wife, ' ... that eminent 
members of the Party , our comrades, were among those who helped 
Koltchak's (sic) dictatorship to happen. They pulled down the 
bulwark of democracy with their own hands. I foresaw what would 
happen as soon as I arrived at Samara for I was horrifieq by the 
Sapozhnikov of P.V. Vologodsky; and V.M. Zenzinov of N.V. Chaikovsky. See 
Bunyan, ibid, pp.355-356. 
56 Excerpt from the Constitution of the Ufa Directorate (Resolution of the 
.. • ~ - < -
State Conference, 23 September, 1918) reproduced in Bunyan, ibid, 
p,353. 
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progress made by the monarchists, and by the weakness of the 
moderate ones among us in consenting to a coalition with all the 
' 
anti-democratic forces .... When the Directory opened its Conference 
at Ufa I was unable to arrive in time, but I telephoned to the 
members of our Party and used all my strength to argue against the 
coalition. I implored them not to take part in the Directory, but of no 
(sic) avail'.57 
N. Saviatitsky, a member of the Constituent Assembly and 
prominent in SR circles, recounts those dramatic and divisive 
developments in the days of the Ufa Directorate . 
... Notwithstanding the fact that the Central Committee [of the 
S.R's] ... approved the Ufa Agreement officially, there was no 
unanimity on that question ·among its members .... When 
Chernov and Rakitnikov arrived at Samara and learned of the 
nature of the proposed' agreement. .. and the composition of 
the Directorate, they sounded an alarm. V.M. Chernov urged 
by telegraph ... "not to ruin the party and the democracy" by 
sanctioning the [Ufa] agreement. .. But Chernov's plea had no 
success. Of the seven Central Committee members present at 
Ufa, three were against the agreement and four in favor. The 
agreement was thus approved by a majority of one .... 
When the State Conference came to a close, all members of the 
Central Committee (except V.M. Zenzinov) departed for 
Samara to call a plenary session [of the Central Committee] 
and to consider the extremely delicate situation in which the 
party found itself.... Two points of view at once asserted 
themselves: that of M. Hendelman, approving the Ufa 
Agreement. .. , and that of V. Chemov, sharply denouncing it. 
Chernov's point of view prevailed and on October 24 the 
Central Committee ... passed a lengthy ... "declaration" which 
57 0. Tchernoff, New Horizons: Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution, 
p.152. 
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was destined to play an important political role ... 58 
Chernov had the greatest possible reservations against the Ufa 
Agreement. He defended the vi~w that the SR Party should form a 
democratic 'third force' and should fight on two fronts, that is, 
against the Bolsheviks and against the bourgeois reactionaries. Tl;le 
Central Committee supported this opinion by six votes to two. 
The declaration referred to by Sviatitsky is sometimes referred to as 
the 'Chernov Manifesto' of 24 October, 1918. The document was not 
meant for public circulation, but was to be confined for discussion 
from within the party.59 Chernov was the author of the 'manifesto' 
and in ~t he was very critical of the Ufa Conference, although he did 
not renounce the Directorate in so many words. As for the SR 
negotiators at the conference, this group 'suffered from lack of unity 
and discipline'. The manifesto goes on to give a long list of the 
failures and concessions of the Directorate since its appointment. 
Perhaps its most contentious passage was, however, an appeal to the 
party to mobilise all of its forces so that, if need be, it could resist the 
organisers of a counter-revolution behind the anti-Bolshevik front. 
58 N. Saviatitsky, K Jstorii Vserossiiskogo Uchreditelnogo Sobraniia, 
(Towards a history of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly), pp.59-60, 
reproduced in Bunyan, op.cit, pp.361-362. See also Chernov, Pered 
Burei, p.37 4. The meeting started in Samara, but was forced to evacuate to 
Ufa due to the close proximity of the Red Army forces. 
59 Qhernov, Pered Burei, p.389. 
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In anticipation of possible political crises resulting froin 
counter-revolutionary schemes, all party forces must' be 
mobilized immediately, given military training, and armed, in 
order to be able to withstand at any, moment the attacks of 
counter-revolutionists who organize civil war in the rear of 
the anti-Bolshevik front .... 60 
The document concluded with the famiiiar reaffirmation of faith in· 
the Constituent Assembly; ' ... only the Constituent Assembly with 
its leading S.R'. group can safe-guard the people against a change 
from Bolshevik tyranny to that of counter-revolution.'61 
The 'Chernov Manifesto' met with an unfavourable reception from 
non-socialists. A month later, when they ousted the Directory, 
Kolchak and his supporters did not neglect to produce the 
'manifesto' as proof of the unreliability of the Socialist 
Revolutionaries. 
The Directorate in Omsk lacked authority and a power base. While 
the Directorate was impotent, there remained the Congress of 
Members of the Constituent Assembly, ·a body recognised by both the. 
Ufa Conference and by 'Chernov's Manifesto' as a viable political 
organ. The former saw it as an integral part of the All-Russian 
Provisional Government, while the latter saw it as a pre-parliament 
60 Sovremennyia Zapiski, no.45. 1931, pp.348-352 in Bunyan,op.cit, 
p.364. 
61 ibid, p365. 
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to the Constituent Assembly; ' ... the tactics of the S.R. party should be 
to rally its forces ... around the Constituent Assembly and the 
Congress of Members of the Constituent Assembly, which is a 
preliminary to the former ... .'62 The Congress was dominated by the 
SR Central Committee and the Central Committee was now 
dominated by Chemov. 
The imminent arrival of Red army troops necessitated an 
immediate evacuation of Samara. The evacuation train carrying 
Chernov and his colleagues did not reach Ufa until after the 
departure of the Directorate for Omsk. The immediate task was the 
location of the Congress, and after considering various options 
including Omsk, Cheliabinsk and Ufa, it was decided in favour of 
Yekaterinburg63, with the Congress members eventually arriving 
on 19 October,1918. 
At Yekaterinburg, there was no crowd ovation as a welcome, 
accomodation proved to be difficult to obtain, and it was only 
through the intervention of Czech General Gaida that they were 
housed in hotel rooms, with two to three having to share each one. 
An old Diocesan school on the outskirts of Yekaterinburg was 




Until 1924 known as Yekaterinburg, now called Sverdlovsk. 
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could be utilised. 64 
Lack of proper communication facilities further frustrated Congress 
members. Sinister rumours spread, one of which was that 
disgruntled officers with rightist leanings were on their way there to 
murder Chemov, V.K.Volskii and I.M. Brushvit.65 
A round-the-clock watch, was put on Chernov's room at the Hotel 
Palais Royal by his closest comrades. On the evening of 17 
November the Congress delegates received the news that a coup 
d'etat had taken place in Omsk and that the SR members of the All-
Russian Provisional Government, Avksentiev, Zenzinov and 
Argunov were under arrest.66 Further news followed that Admiral 
Kolchak had assumed power, dissolved the Congress of Members of 
the Constituent Assembly in Yekaterinburg, ordered the arrest of its 
members, and installed himself as All-Russian Supreme Ruler.67 
A hastily organised SR Central Committee meeting with the Bureau· 
of the Congress was convened the same evening to formulate 
contingency plans in the struggle against reactionary forces. The 
Central Committee and the Bureau members duly assembled in ' 
64 K. Burevoi (left-centrist SR), Raspad, 1918-1922 (The Collapse, 
1918-1922), Moscow, 1923, pp.35-36. 
65 ibid, p.37. 
66 Burevoi, Raspad, 1918-1922, p.37; Zenzinov, lz Zhizni 
Revoliutsionera, pp.115--1 f9; ch·ernov, Pered Burei, p.390. - · J! = • 
67 ibid, Burevoi. 
291 
Chernov's bedroo:i;n and decided that the Congress should assume 
authority in free Russia. This decision WaS to be ratified by a full 
session of the Congress to be held at the Diocesan school. It was to be 
the first and last time that the venue was used. The full Congress 
was to meet at lla.m. in the morning on 19 November. The 
Congress at this session approved the decisions taken the previous 
night a,nd the Congress of Members of the Constituent Assembly 
announced their assumption of power.68 
It was a shallow, symbolic and futile gesture. The Congress had little 
authority and virtually no power base. Appeals to the workers and 
soldiers of Yekaterinburg to rally in support of the Congress failed. 
In the evening at approximately seven o'clock at the Palais Royal 
were Chernov, his six bodyguards and a dozen or so Congress 
men:ibers as well as SR party members occupying several rooms of 
the- second floor. The hotel was surrounded by Siberians 
(monarchists). Earlier in the day, a sympathetic Czech officer warned 
Chernov of the impending attack on the Congress, and as he was 
unable to provide an armed escort, the members decided to stay, 
resolving to defend themselves to the last. 
Amid the explosion of . two bombs, the troops rushed the hotel. 
.. , ··~heir· previous resolve: to defend themselves to the< last ,wilted, for 
68 Burevoi, ibid, pp.37-38; . Chernov, ibid, pp.390-391. 
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fear of the needless shedding of blood. During the confusion, SR 
Maksunov was fatally wounded by a revolver shot. -Rooms were 
searched; money and papers, even shaving gear, cigarette cases and 
brief cases were confiscated.69 Chernov, Volskii, Rakitnikov, 
Burevoi, Chernenkov and others were arrested. In all some 19 
individuals were taken into custody.70 
Orders arrived from General Gaida that they all, except Chernov, 
were to leave Yekaterinburg immediately for Cheliabinsk. To leave 
Chernov behind to the mercy of the Siberians would mean his 
certain death. Numerous appeals to Gaida swayed his mind and he 
relented. Chernov was to travel with the others.71 
Cheliabinsk was a sanctuary for the Congress members. Most of the 
Czech National Council was there, and so was Czech M.ilitary 
Headquarters under General Syrovy. Upon their arrival, Syrovy 
intended to transfer them to Shadrinsk, a small nearby town. This 
action would have preduded the Congress members from active 
participation in politics. They petitioned the Czech authorities for a 
transfer to Ufa. After some protracted discussion the Czechs relented 
and the Congress proceeded to Ufa. 72 
69 Burevoi, ibid, p.38; Chernov, ibid,p.392; 0. Tchernoff, New 
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The inconsequent.ial discussions at the Hotel Volga in Ufa came to 
an end on 2 December, 1918, with the arrival from Omsk of a special 
task force in Ufa. Under instructions from Kolchak, it was to 
suppress the Congress. A final appeal was made to Czech General 
Voitsekhovskii who was in charge of Czech troops there to support 
the Congress members. He replied that he was under strict orders of 
neutrality.73 
There was little else Congress members could do in order to survive; 
their only option was flight. Chernov escaped into hiding in the late 
evening of the 2 D'ecember, 1918, in Ufa. In the early morning the 
next day the Siberians arrived at the hotel and arrested the 
remaining thirteen delegates.74 
Chernov, whilst in hiding, continued to advocate his plan of war on 
two fronts, the liquidation of the right counter-revolution of 
Kolchak, for which even terrorist methods could be employed, and 
the combatting of the Bolshevik influence, with the SRs forming a 
democratic 'third force' (tretia sila). 75 To postulate such a position 
in ~uch circumstances, while admirably consistent, was in no way 
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Chernov, irrepressible as ever, conceived of a plan of making his 
way secretly across Red Russia to the Ukraine. The German military 
collapse, he reasoned, would entail the fall of Skoropadskii in Kiev~ 
and that would give the Constituent Assembly the opportunity to 
impose its authority.76 The plan, however, failed to materialise. 
Meanwhile, the Bolshevik Red Army relentlessly pressed closer and 
closer towards both Orenburg and Ufa. Their imminent arrival 
prompted calls from certain quarters within the SR Party that it 
should establish contacts with the Bolsheviks. Indeed, some even 
questioned whether the idea of fighting on two fronts was still 
tenable, and whether it would not be better to drop the fight against 
the Bolsheviks for the time being and to launch all their forces 
against Kolchak. 
Che:rnov opposed any direct communication with the Bolsheviks 
unless they accepted the principle of the sovereignty of the people, 
embodied in the Constituent Assembly. To stay behind in Ufa, as 
some SRs advocated, and await the arrival of the Red Army, and 
then proceed to undertake negotiations for some sort of coalition 
76 Chernov, ibid, pp.396-398; see also V. Tchernov (Chernov), Mes 
Tribulations en Russie Sovietique (My Tribulations in Soviet Russia), 
translated by V .0., J. Povolozky Paris, 1921, pp.18-20. The latter is an 
important work as it covers Chernov's activities in Russia from June 1918 
·-to-March 1919, and is the same as Meine Schicksa/e-im Sowjet~· Russ/and; ··- ': 
translated by Elias H urwicz, Berlin, 'Der Firn', 1921. 
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government, was impractical, simply because a victorious Red Army 
would pay scant attention to a few underground revolutionaries. 
Indeed, Chernov thought that the SRs should only come out of 
hiding on the precondition of Bolshevik acceptance of his proposal. 
As direct negotiations were unacceptable, an intermediary could be 
used. Ivan Volnov, a friend of Maksim Gorky, was available and the 
plan was for him to cross the front, proceed to Moscow, and inform 
Gorky of SR intentions for peace, provided all freedoms and the 
Constituent Assembly were restored.77 
. The proposal to use an intermediary was accepted and shortly before 
. the fall of Ufa to the Red- Army, Volnov set off on his mission. 
Chernov escaped to Orenburg, where he lived in hiding, first from 
Whites, and later, when the Red Army arrived, from the 
Bolsheviks.· There was no news from Volnov, and unknown to 
those awaiting his reply, his journey was severely delayed, taking 
him some months to reach Moscow.78 
In the meantime, and without the knowledge of Chernov, several 
Ufa colleagues remained behind to commence direct negotiations 
with the Bolsheviks. On 31 December, 1918, a delegation was chosen 
comprising V.K. Volskii, N.A. Shmelov, N.V. Sviatitskii, N.I. 
Rakitnikov ·and K. Burevoi.79 Chernov only became aware of his 
77 
78 
Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.400-401. 
ibid, p.402. 
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colleagues about face when he read a Bolshevik newspaper in 
Orenburg that contained a signed appeal by Volskii and others 
calling for the People's Army of the Komuch to stop the civil war 
against the Bolsheviks and to direct their weapons against the 
Kolchak dictatorship and Allied Imperialists on his side.80 
However, the 'Ufa delegation' as the group became known, in no 
way represented general party opinion, and their actions in no way 
contributed to the legalisation of the Right Socialist Revolutionaries 
in a decree promulgated by the All-Russian Central Committee on 
26 February, 1919, which repealed an earlier decree of 14 June, 1918, 
outlawing the Right SRs. The SR Party took no steps to achieve its 
legitimisation, and the decree of 26 February was I\Ot based on any 
agreement between the Sovie-t gov,ernment and the Central 
Committee of the SR Party. 
The circumstances that led to the party's legitimisation by the 
Bolsheviks were that the .sR conference of party organisations in 
Bolshevik controlled territory, which met in Moscow from 6 to 9 
February, 1919, had condemned both the idea of armed struggle and 
the Allied intervention, had rejected cooperation with the bourgeois 
parties, and had called on its organisations to overthrow the 
79 - Burevoi, Raspad/ 1918-1922, p.60. -'f, ~ --;· -. 
80 Cherhov, ibid, pp.402-403; Burevoi ibid, pp.59-61. 
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· reactiqnary governments.81 
Chemov returned to Moscow in March, 1919, from Orenburg, with 
the journey taking eleven days.82 His arrival coincided with a brief 
period of freedom for SRs, which enabled them to appear in public. 
Chernov, however, continued to maintain a low profile, living on 
the outskirts of Moscow in a house hidden in the depths of a pine 
forest. He lived there under an assumed name, so as to protect his 
own identity and that of his family.83 
The SR Central Committe was able to meet in Moscow without 
restraint. They were again able to publish their newspaper Delo 
Naroda, of which they printed 100,000 copies, together with a daily 
newspaper Vesna (Spring). According to Chernov, the leaders of 
the party were under no illusions. They made use of the opportunity 
to propagate their opinions in public and to ventilate their criticism 
of the Bolsheviks, but their organisation was kept secret.84 This , ' 
policy proved to be a correct one, as their freedom for action was to 
be for only the shortest of durations. After ten days Delo Naroda 
and Vesna were banned. The Bolsheviks resumed their campaign 
against the party and the arrest of party members.SS 
81 
82 
Chernov, ibid, p.406; Burevoi, ibid, pp.62-63. 
Chernov, ibid, pp.403-404. 
· · 83 1 ·0. Tchernoff, ibid, p.153. 
84 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.406. 
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According to Chernov, the legalisation was nothing other than a 
political manoeuvre with a view to the conference which the Allies 
wanted to hold on the island of Prinkipo in the Marmara Sea, with 
the groups and movements that were fighting each other in 
Russia.86 To add credence to the view that the Bolsheviks actually 
favoured cooperation with the other socialist parties, Sverdlov 
publically pronounced that the purpose of Chernov's arrival in 
Moscow was to finalise a secure agreement between his party and 
the Bolsheviks. 87 
Chernov managed to elude arrest by fortuitously changing his 
passport and address two days prior to the renewed Bolshevik clamp 
down.88 Others were not so lucky. 
Towards the end of 1919, the Cheka began to earnestly hunt down 
the members of the SR Party's Central Committe~. The party's 
intellectual and political leader, Viktor Chernoy, managed to escape 
his pursuers for some time by continually changing his place of 
concealment, at times even on a daily basis. He was, however, able 





87 V. Tchernov (Chernov), Mes Tribulations en Russie Sovietique, p.29; 
Chernov, Pered Burei, pp.405-406. 
88 Chernov, Pered Burei, p.407. 
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English delegation in early 1919.89 For C~ernov, this speech was to 
mark the end of his period of overt political activity on Russian soil. 
The increasing vigilance of the Cheka prompted the Central 
Committee of the party to advise Chernov to leave the country. He 
left Russia in May, 1920, under a false passport with an Estonian 
identity, to act as the SR Party's official representative abroad.90 In 
December of 1920, in Reval (Tallin), Estonia, Chernov started 
publication of Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia (Revolutionary Russia). In 
October of the following year, the paper became the party's official 
voice under three editors: Chernov, Postnikov and Soukhomlin.91 
By the middle of 1921, with the exception of those who had left the 
country, all active members of the Central Committee were in 
prison. To all intents and purposes, the history of the SR Party had 
cqme to an end. 
For three years after the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 Chernov 
fought the Bolsheviks, and at the same time, opposed collaboration 
with right-wing reactionary groups and their allied friends. In 





91 S. Postnikov 'Historique de la presse periodique de I' emigration 
socialiste russe, 1917-1937', (History of the periodical press of the 
Russian Socialist emigration, 1917-1937) Bulletin of the International 
Institute for Social History (Amsterdam) vol.111, 1938, p.97. 
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The chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Victor Chernov, 
sends his fraternal greetings to the heroic comrades-sailors, the 
Red Armists and workers, who for the third time since 1905 
are throwing off the yoke of tyranny. He offers to aid them 
with men _and to provision Kronstadt through the Russian co-
operatives abroad. Inform what and how much is needed. Am 
prepared to come in person and place my energies and 
authority at the service of the people's revolution .... 
I hail you as the first to raise the banner of the people's 
liberation! Down with despotism from the left and right!92 
The Kronstadt sailors declined politely but firmly. 
Berlin became the focal point for the activities of the Foreign 
Delegation of the SR Party. This was the party's official 
representation outside Russia and consisted of Chernov, I. 
Rubanovich, N. Rusanov, V. Soukhomlin and V. Zenzinov. The 
paper Golos Rossii (The Voice of Russia) was produced in Berlin in 
1922 by the Foreign Delegation. Its main aim was the defence of SRs 
' (mostly members of the Central Committee) whom the Soviet 
government had just brought to trial on charges of terrorism and 
armed struggle against the Bolsheviks. 93 
A Russian language Bolshevik newspaper Novyi Mir (New 
World), was also published in Berlin in 1922, until April. The editor 
of the paper, the German Kurt Kersten, published two articles in 
which the SRs were accused of having perpetrated attacks on 
92 Reproduced in 1.N. Steinberg, In the Workshop of the Rev()lution, 
Rinehart,- New York, 1953. p.284. 
93 S. Postnikov, in ibid, p.98. 
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Bolshevilk leaders, and of having received funds from the ·German 
General Staff, the Russian bishops, and the French mission. 
Chernov ·sued Kurt Kersten for libel. The case was heard before a 
Berlin court o~ 30 October, and Kurt Rosenfeld appeared as one of 
Chernov's lawyers. The SRs had intended to use the trial as a 
publicity mechanism in which they would retute the 'charges made 
against those accused in Moscow. The Berlin court did not fall in 
with this idea, however, but did fine Kersten for ~ontempt.94 
From Berlin, Chernov travelled to Prague where he organised the 
Czech supported 'SR centre' there and continued agitation until the 
O.G.P.U. cut off its Russian contacts. Just ahead of the Gestapo, he 
fled to Paris in 1938 and then to New York in 1940, taking with him 
his organ Za Svobody (For Liberty), which he published until 1950. 
On the 15 April, 1952, at the age of 78, Chemov died in a tiny gloomy 
apartment in New York. 
94 Prozess Tschernoff gegen Kersten, Arkiv, No 777/1 International 
... ,Institute of Social History (Amsterdam) cited in M. Jansen, A Show Trial 
Under Lenin: The Trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries, Moscow, 1922, 
translated by J. Sanders, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1982. pp.159-160. 
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For Chernov the motive force behind the revolution was the 
working class, which he defined, not solely in terms of the 
industrial proletariat, as orthodox Marxist theory would have it, but 
instead, he broadened those terms to include the small producers, 
namely the peasants. It was this adaption of Marxist theory to 
Russia's peculiar conditions that earned Chernov and the SRs the 
ire of. Social Democracy. 
I 
Chernov possessed a distinctive theory and strategy for a socialist 
revolution in a backward, agriculturally based economy. As leader 
and chief party ideologist o! the SR Party froin its inception to its 
demise in 1920, he devised his own 'scientific' analysis of the 
motive force of change, a town-country alliance, with the 
proletariat in the vanguard role leading the mass peasant based 
army. 
Social Democrats categorised the peasantry as petty bourgeois 
because they owned their means of production, and their mode of 
production was individual rather than collective. The former 
criticism, Chernov argued, was meaningless because the peasantry 
like the proletariat supported themselves exclusively by their own 
personal labour. This labour could be exploited by the privileged 
classes in the form of taxes and rents - their ownership of the means-
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of production did not constitute 'capital'. As for the latter, a 
fundamentally more important hurdle, Chernov devised his two 
stage revolutionary process. The initial minimum stage was to be 
the socialisation of the land. This was not socialism, it was more of 
an anti-capitalist anti-feudal measure epitomised by the slogan, that 
the land b~longs to those who work it, that is, equal access to the 
land. The maximum or second stage was to be the socialisation of 
agricultural production and industry. Lenin acknowledges his debt 
to Chernov when he states that it was only by adopting the SR land 
program in 191°7, that he achieved the temporary support of the 
rural masses. 
We achieved victory because we adopted, not our own 
agrarian programme, but that of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 
and actually put it into practice. Our victory lay in the fact that 
we carried out the programme of the Socialist-
Revolutionaries, that is why it was achieved so ea.sily.1 
For Chernov, socialism could not be defined only as an economic 
system. He did not equate socialism merely with centralised public 
ownership and planning of the economy, nor did he conceive of 
' . 
socialism as merely being a mode of production. Such a narrow 
view of the socialist movement, in Chernov's opinion, ignored 
issues in socialism such as social equality, individual autonomy 
V.1. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.24, Moscow, 1966, p.286. 
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and self-determination. 
Chernov's neo-populism, a distinctive and largely original 
ideology, emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century in the 
form of his agrarian program, his two-stage revolution and his 
concept of the 'third force'. 'The serious and viable Populism of the 
twentieth century was the creation of the man who died in New 
York in 1952, in the bitterness and obscurity of a second exile.'2 
The force of these ideas on SR thinking became most evident in 
their adoption into the party platform of the SR Party. 
Despite Chernov's firm imprint on SR ideology, as leader he 
presided over a disunited and fragmented party. At the crucial 
historical moment, that fateful year of 1917, most SRs did not 
appear to share a general outlook or tactic. On the crucial issues of 
bourgeois coalition and the war, the party found little common 
ground, with many unequivocally embracing the Provisional 
Government, and war to victory. Chernov as a leader proved too 
inconsistent and weak. He readily admitted himself that as a 
politician, he was a failure. He was merely a litterateur, having a 
' ... genuinely Slav breadth of nature, a certain pliancy and 
adjustability were combined in him with a tendency to withdraw 
into the world of ideas, of social diagnosis and prognosis, of 
2 0. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, p.4. 
. -~' . 
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intellectual initiative and creative imagination, and to leave to 
others the concrete organisation of current work. •3 
This study has focused on Chernov as a man of action, and the 
theories he devised to justify and explain his action or inaction. 
Chernov was guilty at times of both abandoning his principles and 
ignoring the realities of new circumstances for the sake of party 
unity. His political outlook cannot be characterised as static. On 
numerous occasions he formulated new tactics or stressed ideas he 
had once only tacitly accepted. Yet, he never strayed from the 
fundamentals of the position he had formulated between the years 
1900 and~905, a position which was incorporated into the SR Party 
platform at its First Congress in 1905-1906. 
On fundamentals, one is indeed struck by unmistakeable signs of 
continuity and consistency. His ideological constancy justifies one 
viewing him as a prototypical 'neo-populist' whose position on 
various issues helps in the evaluation of a movement and ideology 
that have not been easy to define. This is because the protagonists in 
the intense factional struggles tried to justify their conduct, often 
long after the battles had lost their significance, by claiming that 
they had always been motivated by basic convictions and principles. 
3 V.M. Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, pp.398-399. 
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Such was the case with the two divergent tendencies, Maximalism 
and Popular Socialism, and the Left SRs in 1917. 
In a much wider context, the sort of Russian society that Chernov 
had attempted to transform by his neo-populist socialist revolution 
is of particular significance and relevance to today. For example, 
certain present day Latin American and African countries share in 
having predominantly agriculturally based societies and are 
undergoing similar capitalist encroachment. In fact, all of the class 
struggles and national liberation' movements of this century have 
aimed, in one way or another, at creating a more 'democratic' 
society, in which large numbers of people, especially those hitherto 
excluded, would play a more direct and more effective part in 
making the decisions that affect their lives,whether in the 
workplace, the family, and the local community, or on a national 
and international scale. 
As a political figure in Russia, Chemov cannot be judged a success. 
He realised few of his aims and was unable to prevent his worst 
apprehensions from becoming a reality. Nonetheless, in the history 
of the Russian revolutionary movement, he occupies a special 
place. He took up the cause of the working class as he saw it, and 
- ' 
fully identified with them throughout his political life. Although 
he proved to -be inconsistent at times, his commitment to a new_ 
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social order, to a free and socialist society and to a democratic 
republic on a federative basis for relations between the separate 
nationalities, remained the dominant themes of his political work. 
Chernov -was not, superficially, a strong personality in the 
conventional se_nse. He did not normally try to dominate 
colleagues, nor did he have any taste for intra-party intrigue. He 
rarely indulged in the self-righteousness, imperiousness, or 
vindictiveness that afflicted so many other leaders of the 
movement. In his dealings with other people he ·generally exhibited 
a compassion that matched the humanity that had inspired his 
political convictions. On the other hand, neither should he be 
characterised as having a weak personality. In fact, there was in his 
personality an unusual blend of flexibility and firmness, of pliability 
and obstinacy. 
The free and socialist society Chemov envisaged for Russia failed to 
materialise with the ascendency of Bolshevism in 1917. Forced to· 
emigrate in 1920, Chemov spent a long desolate period in exile 
experiencing self-doubt and self-criticism about what could have 
been, and his inability to change the course of events. He took no 
comfort in the knowledge that failed revolutionaries are spared the 
frustration and disenchantment of attempting to put their socialist 




Viktor Chernov was a prolific writer, and to compile a bibliography 
of his works proves a difficult task as most of his writings have 
never been collected. This is partly because Chernov's political 
activity, like that of most other political activists or revolutionaries, 
was subject to severe repression from tsarist forces. Censorship and 
the ever vigilant secret police necessitated the use of 
pseudonyms 1, which proved helpful for the publication of 
revolutionary propagan.da, but have proved to be an obstacle, and 
indeed, a constant frustration for the researcher in his attempts to 
compile a list of Chernov's writings. 
Another difficulty is that a number of his writings are still in 
manuscript form in various Soviet, European and. American 
libraries. Perhaps the most important of these is the Hoover 
Institute at Stanford University, which holds the Paris Okhrana 
'files, the Chernov Collection and the B.I. Nicolaevsky Collection. 
Other notable collections are the Russian Archives Abroad in 
. Prague, and the International Institute of Social History, 
1 Chernov used during the course of his revolutionary career some 
sixteen pseudonyms; V. Ch, la Vechev, lu Gardenin, lurii Gardenin, V. 
Lenuar, B. Olenin, Boris Ole~in, R.R (with M.R. Gots), Tuchkin, lu. G., B. 
lurev, A. Doverine, Junior, Victor, S._R. Krainy, Bobrov. 1.F. Masanov, 
Slovar Psevdonimob Russkikh Pisatelei, Uchenykh i Obshchestvennykh 
Deiatelei (Dictionary of Pseudonyms of Russian Writers, Scholars and 
Public Figures), 4 vols. Moscow, 1956. 
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Amsterdam. For a study of Chernov's revolutionary activity, the 
Okhrana files are useful to locate Chernov's movements. Access to 
Soviet archives, which hold material not available elsewhere, 
would be n~cessary if one wished to attempt a full biography of 
Chernov's life. 
For a study of Chernov's thought and action, his two memoir 
works Pered Burei (Before the Storm) and Zapiski Sotsialista-
Revol i u t s ion era (Notes of a Socialist-Revolutionary) are an 
indispensable foundation. Zapiski was written in Moscow, at a 
time when Chernov was residing there illegally between 1919 and 
1920. Together they cover Chernov's life from birth to his exile 
from Russia in 1920. Many pages of Pered Burei repeat, with some 
deletion, material published elsewhere. For example, excerpts from 
his Zapiski and Mes Tribulations en Russie Sovietique (My 
Tribulations in Soviet Russia) appear in various forms in Pered 
Burei. However, Pered Burei also contains material not to be 
found elsewhere. 
Chernov's newspaper articles are at times selectively collected into 
a published work, Marksizm i agrarnyi vopros: istoriko-
kriticheskii ocherk (Marxism and the agrarian question: historical-
critical essay) Petersburg, 1906, which is a collection of articles from 
Nakanunie, Russkoe Bogatstvo, and other journals. 
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Chernov's Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi rossii: fevralskaia 
revoliutsiia (The birth of revolutionary Russia: the February 
revolution) is one of the most valuable memoirs from a participant 
in the days from February to October, 1917, while his Mes 
Tribulations en Russie sovi~tique covers the civil war period until 
March, 1919. 
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